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Preface
The present publication is identical with the final report of the research project "Development
and validation of scientific indicators of the relationship between criminality, social cohesion
and economic performance" which has been commissioned and financed by the European
Commission, Directorate-General Employment and Social Affairs.
The results obtained within the framework of the project do not necessarily represent the
opinion of the European Commission nor can the Commission be held responsible for the
contents of the study. The aim of launching the research project was to contribute to a better
understanding of the interactions between criminality, economic performance, social cohesion
and the socio-economic situation of the population. We have tried to achieve this aim by em-
ploying adequate multivariate statistical methods to European data from different levels of
regional disaggregation. When interpreting our empirical results, it has to be taken into ac-
count that the estimated coefficients of some variables might be affected by the use our re-
gional data set. Since the Commission was primarily interested in the use of replicable official
data, no individual survey data have been collected. Thus, some results might suffer from un-
observable heterogeneity or the omission of relevant (but unavailable) variables. In the project
report as well as in the present paper, we have made all potential results of this nature quite
clear by hinting at these problems (see, for instance, the interpretation of crimes committed by
"foreigners"). In spite of the fact that empirical investigations are performed with great care, it
seems advisable to make this note of caution, because otherwise superficial reading might lead
to potential misinterpretations. Moreover, it might be important to note that channels of influ-
ence are crime-specific. This implies that for types of crime which are not subject of our
study, as, for instance, white-collar and organised crime, no conclusions can be drawn.
Non technical summary
According to the European Parliament, unemployment, social disintegration, the lack of an
integrative policy, and the worsening of urban services and living conditions cause frustration
and despair, especially among economically and socially disadvantaged groups, and constitute
unfavourable conditions that might lead to delinquent behaviour. Furthermore increasing pov-
erty and inequality are supposed to be crime-enhancing factors. Based on this view, the Euro-
pean Commission has put out to tender a research project titled "Development and validation
of scientific indicators of the relationship between criminality, social cohesion and economic
performance" which has been executed by ZEW during the period 1/12/1998 - 29/2/2000.
The present publication provides the results obtained from this project.
The study intends to contribute to a better understanding of the interactions between criminal-
ity, economic performance and social cohesion. We try to achieve this aim by evaluating the
existing economic and criminological research (with a special focus on quantitative research)
and by carrying out own empirical investigations on the basis of a panel consisting of national
time series from the 15 EU member states, an international cross-section of nations and an
unique set of regional panel data originating from eight EU member states.
Our empirical results about causes of crime reveal the crime reducing potential of intact fam-
ily values. A smaller number of divorces and earlier marriage significantly reduce delin-
quency. By the same token, less efficient child care as a consequence of lacking family cohe-
sion might explain the crime enhancing effects found for increasing female labour force par-
ticipation rates. Further evidence supporting the interdependence of crime and the labour mar-
ket show up in significant parameter estimates for indicators of unemployment, fixed-term
contracts and part-time working. Furthermore, we find that higher wealth is associated with
higher property crime rates and more drug-related offences, and that in turn drug offences
foster the incidence of property crime.
Compared to studies assessing causes of crime, investigations on its consequences are rare. In
order to contribute to the closure of this gap, a special focus of our analysis is to investigate
the impact of crime on economic performance. Using highly disaggregated regional data we
find evidence that employment as well as GDP growth rates are negatively affected by the
incidence of criminality. Interestingly, this result does not show up when the analyses are per-
formed with data from the national level.
Regarding the importance of social cohesion on criminality and the strong evidence of rever-
sal effects of crime on economics, one may conclude that fighting crime should not only be a
matter of domestic policy, but also of social policy and of selfish economic interests, i.e. of
economic policy.
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Abstract. The study intends to contribute to a better understanding of the interactions between
criminality, economic performance and social cohesion. We try to achieve this aim by evalu-
ating the existing economic and criminological research and by carrying out own empirical
investigation on the basis of international panel data sets from different levels of regional ag-
gregation. Our empirical results with respect to the causes of crime clearly reveal the crime
reducing potential of family cohesion and the link between crime and the labour market. Fur-
thermore, we find that higher wealth is associated with higher rates of property crime and of
drug-related offences. Drug offences themselves turn out to be robust factors of property
crimes. Compared to studies assessing the causes of crime, investigations on its consequences
are relatively rare. In our analysis, we investigate the impact of crime on economic perform-
ance. We find evidence that employment as well as GDP growth rates are negatively affected
by the regional incidence of criminality.
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1 Introduction
The present study "Development and validation of scientific indicators of the relationship
between criminality, social cohesion and economic performance" is organised in three parts.
In the first part (Section 2), the most significant empirical crime research with respect to so-
cio-economic causes, interactions and consequences of crime is first summarised and then
condensed to a (large) set of crime-related indicators. This set of scientifically relevant indi-
cators serves as an input for the subsequent parts of the study.
In the second part (Section 3) a parameterised indicator model is specified, which on the one
hand allows forecasts of the future incidence of crime and on the other hand enables us to as-
sess the consequences of crime on economic performance. On the basis of the primary indi-
cators identified in Section 2 we are going to derive socio-economic indicators of crime and
criminality indicators of economic performance. It is extensively discussed why our approach
is based on the multivariate statistical analysis of panel data.
In the third part (Section 4) the parameterised indicator model developed before is validated
by means of data from the EU member states. We are going to asses the determinants of
criminality as well as the consequences of higher crime rates for GDP and employment
growth with respect to variety of criminal offences (e.g. murder, rape, serious assault, robbery,
theft of motor cars, fraud and drug offences). In order to reach the highest possible degree of
reliability, we consider data from three different levels of regional disaggregation (NUTS 0,
NUTS 2 and NUTS 3). Such a proceeding is recommendable in order to check the robustness
of the findings, since empirical crime research in general and international crime research in
particular have to cope with many problems which might negatively affect the quality of the
estimation results (e.g. different shares of unreported crimes over time and/ or across regions,
omitted variables due to limited data availability, country specific rules of crime registration
etc.).
The study concludes with Section 5 where the central results of our research project are briefly
summarised.
2 Summary of recent research on socio-economic causes, interactions and
consequences of crime, and the presentation of crime related indicators
Empirical crime research employing sophisticated (i.e. multivariate) statistical methods
emerged about 25 years ago with the seminal paper "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A
Theoretical and Empirical Investigation" by the economist Isaac Ehrlich (1973). Until today
hundreds of multivariate crime studies have been produced by researchers from many differ-
ent scientific disciplines like sociology, law, psychology, political science and economics
which are based on a wide variety of data sets and statistical methods. This variety, however,
seems to vanish, once origin and main object of this research are taken into account: The vast
majority of contributions to quantitative crime research stems from Anglo-Saxon - especially
US-American - researchers and deals with the causes of crime.
Considering origin first, significant quantitative contributions of criminologists from Conti-
nental Europe seem to be relatively rare. This can be inferred from a paper by Cohn and Far-
rington (1994) who have ascertained the most-cited authors (self-citations excluded) in four
major criminological journals with a main focus on the causes of crime and the processing of
offenders. Among the 20 most cited authors there are 12 Americans, 5 Englishmen, 1 Austra-
lian, 1 Canadian and 1 Irishman.1 Since economists who investigate crime do not normally
publish in these exclusively criminological journals which are dominated by sociologists, law
professors and psychologist, the influence of their origin is not present in. the study of Cohn
and Farrington (1994). Unfortunately, US-American economists do even worse in this non-
comparison than US-criminologists.2 The consequence of these facts for the non-present study
is that we have to rely mainly on evidence from the United States.
On what concerns the focus of the empirical crime-literature, we must conclude that more
than 90 per cent of all studies under investigation deal with questions concerning causes of
crime. In contrast to that, the number of studies investigating the consequences of crime and /
or its interactions with other variables is rather small. This ongoing specialisation might be
1
 It should be mentioned, however, that this result is biased in favour of the Non-Americans since the
evaluation is not based on the four major criminological journals in the world, which are all US-
American, but on one US-American, one Canadian, one British and one Australian journal.
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 Peculiarly economists remain "economists" even if crime is their main field of research. In contrast to
that, academics from other disciplines are called "criminologists" when specialising in research on de-
linquency.
due to the fact that there is still no full agreement neither on the determinants of crime nor on
their relative importance.
By investigating a large number of recent papers in leading criminological, sociological and
economic journals and by considering significant monographs and anthologies we do not only
hope to identify the most important determinants of crime, but also want to shed some light on
the causes of possible ambiguities.3 As far as the summary of the major contributions on so-
cio-economic interactions and consequences of crime is concerned, the relatively low number
of studies enables us to seek completeness.
Since the authors of this report are economists and have already been engaged in crime re-
search for several years, the contributions in leading economic journals (The Journal of Politi-
cal Economy, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, The American Economic Review etc.)
which are related to the topic under investigation can be regarded as fully covered from the
onset of economic crime research in the late sixties (see Becker 1968).
Compared with economics, crime research is much more popular among sociologists, psy-
chologists and law professors - at least until today. In order to capture the non-economic con-
tributions adequately, it is advisable to investigate criminological journals, since these bring
together the work of crime researchers from all other disciplines. The major criminological
journals (see Cohn and Farrington 1994) are Criminology, The Journal of Quantitative Crimi-
nology, Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, The Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology and British Journal of Criminology, among which Criminology and The Journal
of Quantitative Criminology have a main focus on quantitative research. These journals have
been systematically searched for relevant papers since 1990.
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 The diversity in empirical findings stems from theoretical and empirical reasons. The results are influ-
enced by theoretical considerations, because included variables, imposed causality and the structure
of estimated equations rely on theory. Since there is a wide variety of more or less distinct crime theo-
ries (see Sections 2.1.1-2.1.8) it is a logical consequence that the estimation results will also show a
certain variation. In estimation practice, however, "[...] these theories share many of the same inde-
pendent variables" (Agnew 1995:363). Thus, empirical reasons seem to be more important for the
discrimination between possibly conflicting results. Empirical studies might vary with respect to the
starting-point of data collection (official institutions, (potential) offenders or victims), the degree of data
aggregation (individual or aggregated data), the dimension of the data (panel, cross-sectional or time-
series data), the choice of the dependent (different crime categories, initiation or continuation) and
independent variables and the statistical method applied to the data. For example, estimation coeffi-
cients of unemployment variables seem to be very sensitive with respect to the type of data used.
Whereas most theories predict a crime-enhancing impact of unemployment, the results - especially in
macro studies - are often inconclusive or even in conflict with intuition.
Since quantitative crime research is a domain of sociologists, many of their contributions are
also published in generally oriented sociological journals, among which American Sociologi-
cal Review and The American Journal of Sociology are the most important ones. These jour-
nals have been searched since 1985.
Apart from the systematic investigation of the leading criminological and sociological jour-
nals, we have also closely examined other promising sources obtained from an intensive elec-
tronic databank search, and by e-mail and postal questioning of national and international ex-
perts in the field of quantitative crime research.
2.1 Summary of recent research activities on causes of crime, and interactions between
crime, social cohesion and economic performance
Since today the empirical literature on crime has reached an enormous extent, it is recom-
mendable that a survey is structured in some way. This can be done, for example, with regard
to underlying theories. Apart from the aspect of structure, this proceeding contributes to a
better insight into the reasons of different empirical specifications and helps us to understand
why some empirical studies are carried out on the individual level and others on the aggregate
level. Hence, in this section we introduce the most important theories of crime together with
major empirical studies building on them. The theories under consideration are the following:
• Social disorganisation theory (Shaw and McKay 1942),
• lifestyle/ routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson 1979),
• economic rational choice theory (Becker 1968, Ehrlich 1973),
• differential association/ social learning theory (Sutherland 1942, Akers 1977),
• social control theory (Hirschi 1969),
• self-control theory (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990),
• strain theory (Cohen 1955),
• interactional theory (Thornberry 1987).
By far not all empirical crime research relevant to the present study is explicitly testing crime
theories, but rather investigating special topics like unemployment, poverty or inequality. In
order to provide a reasonable survey of the literature, we have chosen the following additional
structuring scheme:
• Wealth, economic growth and economic system,
• poverty and inequality,
• labour market,
• social security,
• family,
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• peers and gangs,
• social class,
• mobility and community change,
• age, gender and nationality/ race,
• urbanity,
• law enforcement,
• private crime prevention,
• media,
• religion/religiosity,
• weather.
It has to be stressed that for the present study the interactions between crime, social cohesion
and economic performance are of special interest. To cope with this task, one of the items
mentioned above (interactional theory, see Section 2.1.8) is exclusively devoted to this sub-
ject. Provided that relevant studies have been found, interactions are, of course, also consid-
ered under the other structuring items.
2.1.1 Social disorganisation theory (Shaw and McKay 1942)
According to Shaw and McKay (1942) " [...] three structural factors - low economic status,
ethnic heterogeneity and residential mobility - led to the disruption of community social or-
ganisations, which in turn accounted for variations in crime and delinquency rates. [...] The
disorganisation approach is grounded in [...] the systemic model, in which the local commu-
nity is viewed as a complex system of friendship and kinship networks, as well as formal and
informal associational ties rooted in family life and ongoing socialization processes [...]. From
this view, both social organization and social disorganization are inextricably tied to systemic
networks that facilitate or inhibit social control" (Sampson 1997:228). In the meantime the
theory has been extended by the factors "family disruption" and "urbanisation". Its updated
version can be gathered from Figure 1.
Following this theory, delinquency emerges as a consequence of undesirable developments at
the community/ neighbourhood level. Thus, the social disorganisation approach can be con-
sidered a macro-theory of crime and is thus predestined to be tested at this level of aggrega-
tion. Since in the empirical part of the present report (see Section 4) the macro level will be
the relevant one, an important stimulus from the social disorganisation theory can be ex-
pected. This leads us to discuss the empirical implications of this theory more specifically.
Figure 1: Causal model of extended version of social disorganisation theory
Low economic status
Ethnic heterogeneity
Residential mobility
Family disruption
Urbanization
Sparse local
friendship
networks
Unsupervised
teenage peer
groups
Low
organizational
participation
Crime
and
delin-
quency
Source: Sampson and Groves (1989).
The first empirical test of the social organisation theory was performed by Sampson and
Groves (1989) using data from 238 localities in Great Britain constructed from a 1982 na-
tional survey of 10,905 residents. The authors also provide evidence based on 300 localities of
11,030 residents from a survey of 1984. Their (weighted-least-squares) regression estimates
strongly support social disorganisation theory as can be inferred from Table 1 where the re-
sults are presented in a simplified form.
The most important factors which foster crime (measured as the community crime rates ac-
cording to victimisation surveys) are family disruption, urbanisation and peer groups. Signifi-
cant determinants of crime reduction are organisational participation and the density of friend-
ship. Thus, Sampson and Groves (1989:799) have "[...] demonstrated that social organisation
theory has vitality and renewed relevance for explaining macro-level variations in crime
rates". Another interesting implication of the results is that estimation quality improves with
respect to crime categories: from crime against objects (vandalism) via violence against the
person (stranger violence, assault) to property crime (robbery, burglary, auto theft).
Whereas Sampson and Groves (1989) used cross-sectional data for British localities Miethe,
Hughes and McDowall (1991) carried out their estimations using cross-sectional time-series
(or panel) data from 584 US cities for the years 1960, 1970 and 1980. Another difference lies
in the use of official (police) rather than victimisation data and the simultaneous evaluation of
social disorganisation and lifestyle/ routine activity theory (the latter will be discussed in Sec-
tion 2.1.2). It is striking that the disorganisation variables (depicted in bold letters in Table 2)
perform perfectly in accordance with theory. Ethnic heterogeneity and the home-overcrowding
variable have a positive significant impact on homicide, robbery and burglary rates, whereas
institutional control (degree of community supervision and attachment to or involvement in
traditional institutions) has the expected negative signs. Residential mobility estimates - with
exception of homicide - also support the theory.
Table 1: Simplified representation of estimates
Dependent variables
Independent variables
Socio-economic status
Ethnic heterogeneity
Residential stability
Family disruption
Urbanisation
Local friendship networks
Unsupervised peer groups
Organisational participation
Street corner peer groups
Density of friendship
Mugging/
Street
Robbery
0
+
0
(+)
+
-
+
(-)
Stranger
Violence
0
0
0
+
0
0
+
-
1982
Total
Victimisa-
tion
0
0
0
+
+
-
+
-
from
Bur-
glary
(+)
+
0
+
+
-
+
-
Sampson &
Auto Van-
Theft dalism
(-)
0 0
(-)
+ 0
+ 0
0 0
+ +
0
Groves
Bur-
glary
+
0
0
(+)
+
+
-
(1989)
1984
Van- Rob
dalism bery
0
0 +
0 0
0 +
0 +
+ +
0
As-
sault
0
+
0
(+)
0
+ •
( - )
Source: Sampson and Groves (1989), own representation.
Note:"+" ("-") represents positive (negative) coefficients which are significant at the 5%-level,"(+)" ("(-
)") represents positive (negative) coefficients which are significant at the 10%-level, "0" indicates insig-
nificance, empty cells indicate that the corresponding variable was not included in the estimation.
In an additional test Miethe et al. use changes in crime rates as dependent variables. The esti-
mated coefficients still support the disorganisation theory, though significance is somewhat
decreasing, a phenomenon often found in empirical research which is due to the elimination of
spurious trend factors.
Table 2: Simplified representation of estimates from Miethe et al. (1991)
Dependent variables
Independent variables
Unemployment rate
Ethnic heterogeneity
Residential mobility
Institutional control
Female labour-force participation
Workers using public transportation
Retail sales from eat/ drink establishments
Median family income
Mean household size
More than one person per room
Homicide
+
+
0
-
-
+
0
0
-
+
Robbery
0
+
+
-
+
0
0
-
+
Burglary
+
+
-
-.
0
+
0
-
+
Source: Miethe, Hughes and McDowall (1991), own representation.
Note: see Table 1.
In another study Warner and Pierce (1993) test the social disorganisation theory by means of
1980 cross-sectional data from 60 Boston neighbourhoods using calls to the police as depend-
ent variable. According to Warner and Pierce (1993:512) calls to the police data have advan-
tages in comparison to victimisation or official data: "Unlike the majority of victimisation
data, call data can be easily aggregated to the neighbourhood level and they are not biased by
respondents' unwillingness to report certain types of incidents to interviewers. Unlike official
data, the call data used here are not influenced by biases introduced by police definitions of,
and responses to, crime". In addition to the "classical" variables of the theory measuring low
economic status, ethnic heterogeneity and residential mobility as well as family disruption and
population density, Warner and Pierce investigate the impact of interaction effects between
crucial independent variables. Their results are depicted in Table 3, where columns indicated
with " 1 " contain the starting equations, columns 2 the starting specifications with interaction
effects added, and columns 3 the final equations with an additional family disruption and
population density variable, but without variables that show insignificance in estimations 2.
The results are not as appealing as those from the two studies discussed before. Poverty per-
forms in accordance with theory, but mobility has unexpected negative signs in the regres-
sions for assault and is found insignificant in the burglary estimations. Heterogeneity is only
positive and significant for burglary and insignificant otherwise. Likewise, family disruption
and population density which are added in specifications 3 remain insignificant. Interaction
variables perform badly. They are often insignificant and if not they have unexpected signs.
Table 3: Simplified representation of estimates from Warner and Pierce (1993)
Dependent variables
Independent variables
Poverty
Mobility
Heterogeneity
Poverty x Mobility
Poverty x Heterogeneity
Mobility x Heterogeneity
Per cent female-headed
household with children
Structural Density
Assault
(1)
+
-
0
Assault
(2)
+
-
0
-
-
0
Assault
(3)
+
-
0
0
-
0
+
Rob-
bery
(1)
+
+
0
Rob-
bery
(2)
+
0
0
-
0
0
Rob-
bery
(3)
+
0
-
+
+
Bur-
glary
(1)
+
0
+
Bur-
glary
(2)
+
0
+
' 0
-
0
Bur-
glary
(3)
+
+
-
+
0
Source: Warner and Pierce (1993) , own representation.
Note: see, Table 1.
Recently, Sampson (1997) has assessed the social disorganisation theory by means of data
collected by the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN). This
8
so called "accelerated longitudinal data set" consists of data from 343 Chicago neighbourhood
clusters which are initially collected at the individual level. The estimation results presented in
Table 4 support theoretical predictions with only one exception (residential stability is found
insignificant). Robustness of the results has been checked by introducing the lagged crime rate
to the model.
In order to summarise, it can be stated that measures of social disorganisation like ethnic het-
erogeneity, family disruption and population density/ urbanisation perform well in explaining
delinquency: Mobility variables, however, do not always perform as expected - estimates of-
ten turn out to be insignificant and in one case even counterintuitive (see Table 3). Weak re-
sults for mobility can also be observed in the paper of Smith and Jarjoura (1988). This study
is based on cross-sectional victimisation data of 1977, which covers 57 neighbourhoods in
three Standard Metropolitan Areas (SMSAs). In their violent crime regression Smith and
Jarjoura find the expected sign and significance for poverty and racial heterogeneity
but insignificance for mobility.
Nevertheless, social disorganisation seems to be a powerful approach to investigate crime at
the macro-level. Collecting evidence from several studies using different data sets has proved
to be a suitable way to develop stylised facts about the effects of particular factors of crime.
We will follow this strategy throughout the entire study, even though in a less extensive man-
ner.
Table 4: Simplified representation of estimates from Sampson (1997)
Dependent variables
Independent variables
Structural disadvantage
Ethnicity/ immigration
Residential stability
Child social control
Lagged crime rate
Delinquency
+ ,
+
0
-
Delinquency
+
+
0
-
0
Source: Sampson (1997), own representation.
Note: see Table 1.
Finally, some remarks about the effects of crime on social cohesion and economic perform-
ance are appropriate. Skogan (1991) provides a list of far-reaching consequences of crime for
social and economic organisations:
• Physical and psychological withdrawal from community life,
• weakening of the informal social control processes that inhibit crime,
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• decline in the organisational life and mobilisation capacity of the neighbourhood,
• deteriorating business conditions,
• importation and domestic production of delinquency and deviance,
• further dramatic changes in the composition of the population.
Unfortunately, the number of interactional studies - especially at the macro level - is rather
small. However, the existing literature provides clear evidence in favour of the assumption
that crime and social cohesion are reciprocally related. One of the central findings is that
crime generates a fear of strangers and a turning away from participation in community life
(Skogan 1986 and 1991 and Rosenbaum 1991). In addition, it has been shown that increasing
crime rates and concerns about safety lead to out-migration (see, for instance, Bursik 1986).
Skogan (1991) also found that high rates of crime and disorder were associated with higher
rates of fear, neighbourhood dissatisfaction, and intentions to move out. Moreover, in a study
of Dallas neighbourhoods, Katzman (1980:278) found that the rates of property crime were
linked. The aforementioned results are all based on neighbourhood level data, but can also be
replicated at the city level. Using data from the 55 largest U.S cities, Sampson and Wool-
dredge (1986) reported that crime rates were negatively related to the population change from
1970 to 1980. As a general conclusion based on studies assessing the interactions of crime and
social cohesion, it can be recorded that "crime itself can lead to simultaneous demographic
'collapse' and a weakening of the informal control structures and mobilization capacity of
communities, which in turn fuel[s] further crime" (Sampson 1995:203). Further evidence on
the consequences of crime for out-migration from central cities is provided in Sections 2.1.18
and 2.2.3.
2.1.2 Lifestyle/ routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson 1979)
The fundamental axiom of lifestyle/ routine activity theory is that a successful criminal viola-
tion involves three essential parts: an offender who is willing to commit a crime, a suitable
target (person or property) to be victimised by the offender, and the absence of third parties
("guardians") capable of preventing the violation (Cohen and Felson 1979). Therefore lifestyle
aspects like going out in the evening and routine activities which "involve greater or lesser
amounts of time spend within the confines of the immediate household" (Messner and Blau
1987:1037) are supposed to have a significant impact on the incidence of crime by altering
opportunities in the above mentioned context. Lifestyle/ routine activity theory is not a pure
micro or macro theory, thus it can also be tested at either level. More recent tests at the macro-
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level have been performed by Messner and Blau (1987), Miethe, Hughes and McDowell
(1991) and Roncek and Maier (1991). Corresponding micro-evaluations are presented by Mi-
ethe, Stafford and Long (1987), Miethe, Stafford and Sloane (1990), Osgood, Wilson,
O'Malley, Bachman and Johnston (1996) and Tremblay and Tremblay (1998).
Considering macro-studies first, Messner and Blau (1987) investigate the influence of routine
activities on 7 types of crime (homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny,
auto theft) using 1982 cross-sectional data from 124 U.S. Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (SMSAs). Their routine activities variables are a nonhousehold index intended to repre-
sent the extent of leisure activities (measured by the supply of sports and entertainment estab-
lishments) and thus the extent of the exposure to potential risks and a TV viewing index
(measured by the populations' mean TV viewing intensity). Apart from these variables, Mess-
ner and Blau control for poverty, race, population size, gender and age. In the regression
analysis both routine activity variables perform in accordance with the theory, i.e. crime-
enhancing effects for the non-household index and crime reducing-effects for the TV viewing
index are found. The coefficients are always significant at the 5% level with only two excep-
tions - TV viewing does not significantly influence homicide and non-household activities
have no impact on auto theft.
Another macro study is the one by Miethe, Hughes and McDowall (1991), which has already
been introduced in the previous section. Reconsidering Table 2, all variables other than those
in bold type can be interpreted in the sense of lifestyle/ routine activity theory: Higher unem-
ployment and mean household size increase guardianship, higher female labour-force partici-
pation reduces guardianship and more often exposes women to potential dangers, more work-
ers using public transportation services mean more potential targets in dangerous places, retail
sales from eat/ drink establishments say something about the extent of public leisure activities,
and median family income represents a measure of attractiveness of targets. Considering esti-
mated coefficients, only mean household size is in accordance with theory for all three crime
types. Public transportation performs well for homicide and robbery and is insignificant for
burglary, whereas the opposite applies to retail sales. Median family income is always insig-
nificant. Finally, unemployment and female labour participation rather contradict the lifestyle/
routine activity theory.
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A very impressive study devoted to the lifestyle/ routine activity theory is that of Roncek and
Maier (1991). They use cross-sectional data from 4,396 residential blocks of Cleveland in
1980. "City blocks are the smallest geographical units for which data on population and
housing are available" (Roncek and Maier 1991:731). The authors have 10 crime variables
and 16 independent variables at their disposal. The independent variable they are most inter-
ested in is the number of recreational liquor establishments (i.e. taverns and cocktail lounges)
which is presumed to be connected to the lifestyle/ routine activity theory for several reasons.
"First, patrons of such businesses are likely to have cash with them and thereby present op-
portunities for crime, especially if they become intoxicated.[...] Second, the customers of tav-
erns and lounges are likely to have cash on hand and also have desirable goods[. ...] Third,
intoxicated individuals may engage in behaviours different from those they exhibit when so-
ber. [...] Forth, [...], these businesses can and do draw individuals to areas in which they may
not reside.[...] Finally,[...] these businesses might attract a clientele among whom can be po-
tential offenders" (Roncek and Maier 1991:726). The taverns or lounges variable shows sig-
nificance in each of the 10 regressions (the dependent variables are murder, rape, robbery,
assault, burglary, grand theft, auto theft and the aggregated categories violent crime, property
crime, all index crime) even when controlling for 15 other variables. Thus, the lifestyle/ rou-
tine activity theory is strongly supported.
The following four studies evaluate the lifestyle/ routine activity theory at the micro-level.
Miethe, Stafford and Long (1987) use victimisation data of 107,678 residents in thirteen U.S.
cities. Their lifestyle/ routine activity variables are "frequency of night time activity" (dummy
variable, which is 1 if the individual goes out late at least once a week and 0 otherwise) and
"major daily activity" (dummy variable, which is 1 if the individual is employed or goes to
school and 0 otherwise). The dependent variables are violent and property crime victimisation.
In the estimation of violent victimisation, the night activity variable is positive and highly
significant (i.e. going out at night increases the risk of victimisation). The indicator of daily
activity, however, turns out to be insignificant. For property victimisation both lifestyle/ rou-
tine activity variables are found to have a highly significant and crime enhancing effect.
Miethe, Stafford and Sloane (1990) use a panel of 33,773 individuals and 19,005 households
from two separate National Crime Survey Projects (a survey of eight cities and a survey of the
five largest U.S. cities) at two points in time. The panel structure of the data allows them to
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investigate whether changes in lifestyles are associated with changes in individuals' risks of
personal (i.e. assault with theft or a personal larceny) and property victimisation (i.e. at-
tempted or completed burglary). Miethe et al. find that higher daytime and night-time activi-
ties outside home as well as decreases in the number of household members are accompanied
with an increased risk for both types of victimisation. They also find that individuals who
maintain high levels of night-time activities are also more likely to be victims during both
time periods. However, Miethe et al. (1990:357) have to admit that "'active' lifestyle changes
(increased precautionary actions) did nor have their expected impact on reducing victimiza-
tion risks, and several other changes over time also were inconsistent with expectations".
Osgood et al. (1996) use a U.S. panel of 1,700 18- to 26-year-old individuals including five
waves of data. They investigate the influences of 13 types of lifestyle/ routine activities on 5
types of deviant behaviour. The routine activities are arranged in the three groups "unstruc-
tured socialising" (containing "ride for fun", "visit with friends", "go to parties" and "eve-
nings out"), "other activities outside home" ("go on dates", "go to movies", "community af-
fairs", "active sports" and "go shopping") and "at-home activities" ("work around house",
"watch TV", "relax alone" and "read book or magazine"). The five types of deviant behaviour
(or dependent variables) are "criminal behavior", "heavy alcohol use", "marijuana use", "other
drug use" and "dangerous driving". The fixed effects regression results strongly confirm the
positive effect of unstructured socialising variables on deviant behaviour of any type - from
20 coefficients (5 dependent times 4 independent variables) 16 carry the right sign and are
significant at the 5%-level, only two coefficient estimates are found to be insignificant. For
the two other groups of independent variables less significant estimates are found. One ex-
ception from this is "work around house" which has a significant negative impact on heavy
alcohol use, marijuana use and dangerous driving.
In another paper, using Montreal police data from 1992 and 1993, Tremblay and Tremblay
(1998) support the lifestyle/ routine activity theory by showing that public transportation has
an important effect on the incidence of interracial violent offences. According to the authors,
the explanation of this phenomenon is that public transportation brings together social groups
with unequal offending rates who usually are quite segregated. By these means a criminal po-
tential emerges, which otherwise would be absent. Tremblay and Tremblay (1998:295) con-
clude that "such findings suggest that patterns in the circulation of people and property in so-
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cial space [should] be added to the limited list of basic antecedent determinants of aggregate
crime distributions".
Summarising the results from the empirical assessments of the lifestyle/ routine activity the-
ory, it can be recorded that measures of public leisure activity, at-home staying and circulation
of people and property can contribute a great deal to understand the incidence of crime. This
applies to micro studies as well as to macro settings. However, not all variables which are
potentially related to the lifestyle/ routine activities of individuals are suitable measures in an
empirical investigation, because their meaning in terms of other theories might be more im-
portant (the unemployment rate might be a good example).
Unlike all other theories which will be discussed subsequently, social disorganisation and life-
style/ routine activity theory shift the attention away from the personal histories of offenders -
but they do this for different reasons. Whereas the social disorganisation theory sees the cause
of crime in the decay of social institutions at the community level, the lifestyle/ routine activ-
ity theory explains crime by means of opportunities presented by the routine activities of eve-
ryday life.
2.1.3 Economic rational choice theory (Becker 1968, Ehrlich 1973)
The economist and noble prize winner of 1991 Gary S. Becker has added a very important and
provoking theory to the understanding of crime. According to Becker (1968:176) "a person
commits an offense if the expected utility to him exeeds the utility he could get by using his
time and other resources at other activities". The innovative element of this assumption is that
it can dispense with special theories of anomie, psychological inadequacies or inheritance of
special traits. Instead criminals are regarded as normal persons who commit crimes not be-
cause their basic motivation differs from that of other persons, but because their benefits and
costs differ (Becker 1968:170). It should be mentioned, however, that Becker's major inten-
tion was not the development of a new theory of delinquent behaviour but rather a guideline
of how to minimise social losses from crime. The obvious prove for this claim is the fact that
Becker developed the microeconomic theory of crime in a footnote. Nevertheless, it was this
by-product which attracted the great attention of academia and influenced countless subse-
quent theoretical and empirical papers.
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According to Becker's theory, individuals, form expectations about the utility that could be
gained from committing a crime. The potential offender assesses the potential loot, the prob-
ability of being arrested and convicted and the severity of the punishment which would follow
the conviction. If he4 comes to the conclusion, that the expected utility from committing the
crime is higher than the known utility from using his time otherwise (e.g. for legal work), the
crime will be committed, otherwise the possibility will be rejected. From this calculus Becker
derives the so-called supply of offences function which is "relating the number of offenses by
any person to his probability of conviction, to his punishment if convicted and to other vari-
ables, such as the income available to him in legal and other illegal activities, the frequency of
nuisance arrests, and his willingness to commit an illegal act" (Becker 1968:177). The core of
the theory is that state authorities may influence individual crime decision, and thus the supply
or incidence of crime by increasing the probability of conviction (more police) or the severity
of punishment (higher fines, longer terms of jail). Since the probability of conviction and the
severity of punishment are negatively related to the expected utility from crime, after a per-
ceived rise in their magnitudes, potential offenders will more often come to the conclusion
that crime is not rewarding, since the expected utility of an offence will more often,fall short
of the utility from other non-delinquent activities.
 ; .
Becker's theory was very influential, though it has certain shortcomings such as the missing
microeconomic link between the crime decision and the supply of offences, the missing long-
term considerations, and the neglect of influences on the crime decision other than the prob-
ability of conviction and severity of punishment. Further developments of Becker's theory
took account of microeconomic time allocation models (Ehrlich 1973, Heinecke 1978, Wol-
pin 1978 and Schmidt and Witte 1984) and introduced norms and tastes (Block and Heineke
1975, Heineke 1978, Schmidt and Witte 1984, Eide 1994 and Ehrlich 1996).
The most significant contribution following Becker's seminal paper is the one of Ehrlich
(1973). He extends the criminal choice model by considering a time allocation model with
fixed leisure time in which, at the beginning of a period, the individual splits up his time
budget into legal work and illegal activities. By these means, the difference between legal and
illegal income opportunities is included into the model. Whereas higher legal income oppor-
4
 We use "he" since most crimes are committed by males.
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tunities (e.g. higher wages) tend to foster legal work/ activities and reduce crime, higher ille-
gal income opportunities (e.g. more valuable targets) make crime more rewarding and thus
augment its incidence.
Since the rational choice theory builds on individual decisions, it is a micro theory of crime.
Hence, it might be surprising that the large majority of empirical studies is macro-based, with
the exception of papers published by Witte (1980) and Trumbull (1989). The explanation of
this contradiction is given by Witte (1980:57), who states that "researchers have not used ag-
gregate data by choice but rather have been forced to use it because of the lack of appropriate
data for individuals".5 Nevertheless, macro evaluations of the rational choice theory make
sense when individual determinants of crime can be adequately represented at a suitable ag-
gregated level (for example, by using the means of the relevant variables in a community).
Micro studies like those from Witte (1980) and Trumbull (1989) have the disadvantage of
lacking generality due to their exclusive consideration of ex-prisoners.
A typical empirical specification of the economic crime theory uses three kinds of independ-
ent variables in order to explain the supply (individual or aggregate) of offences: deterrence
variables, variables that measure legal and illegal income opportunities (wages, gross domes-
tic product, wage and income distribution, unemployment etc.) and a number of control vari-
ables like gender, age, race, education, urbanity etc.. From the dozens of econometric investi-
gations of the economic crime model we have selected four for detailed discussion. They are
either very famous (Ehrlich 1973, Wolpin 1978), or deal with special data (Witte 1980) or
have a close connection to the task of the present EU-study (Entorf and Spengler 1998). The
central features of the studies (data and variables) are summarised in Table 5.
Before turning to the discussion of empirical studies we want to stress that there are two im-
portant features that distinguish evaluations of the economic rational choice model from em-
pirical tests of other crime theories. The first one is the consistent inclusion of deterrence vari-
ables and the emphasis on economic variables like income, inequality and unemployment as
5
 It has to be emphasised that this statement does not apply to criminologists who have - due to their
existing research networks and high scale projects (see, for example, Sampson 1997) - a much better
access to individual data. Crime research of economists is often limited to few papers and is not long-
term orientated. Therefore, easy access to available official crime data - which is exclusively macro-
data - is preferred to the expensive collection of individual data. It is up to economists to make an effort
in investing in long-term projects in order to receive less aggregated or individual data.
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measures of legal and illegal income opportunities. Other independent variables (e.g. age, race
etc.) largely correspond to those used in criminological studies. Especially the consideration
of inequality makes empirical crime research by economists an important source of evidence.6
Ehrlich (1973) was the first who tested the economic model of crime empirically.7 He investi-
gated 7 types of crimes by using cross sectional data from the U.S. states from 1960 (see
Table 5). Illegal income opportunities are measured by the median income of families. It is
argued that a higher,median income is associated with a higher level of transferable assets (or
targets) and thus with higher rewards of illegal activity (i.e. higher illegal income opportuni-
ties). Ehrlich uses the percentage of families below one-half of median income as an indicator
of legal income opportunities. This is his conclusion: the less families fall below this line (i.e.
the less unequal the incomes are) the better are the chances for the lower ends of the income
distribution to make their living by legal work (i.e. legal income opportunities are higher), and
the smaller are the incentives for these risk groups to commit crimes. Ehrlich admits that the
unemployment rate may also be interpreted in the sense of illegal income opportunities. Since
a person who is unemployed is per definition excluded from work and from most legal income
opportunities, unemployment can be interpreted as a negative measure of legal income op-
portunities. Therefore the unemployment rate or a related variable should always be present in
empirical investigations of the economic crime model.
Ehrlich's estimation results support the economic theory of crime. The deterrence variables
always have the expected negative sign and show significance at the 5% level in 10 out of 14
cases. Whereas the coefficients of the probability of conviction variable are significant for all
offences, those for the punishment variable exhibit insignificance in the regressions for mur-
der, robbery, auto theft and larceny. As far as property crime is concerned, estimates of the
illegal and legal income opportunity variables perform in accordance with the theory. All co-
efficients show the expected sign and - with the exception of robbery - also significance. A
higher median family income rises the number of robbery, burglary, larceny and auto theft by
means of more valuable targets, and higher income inequality fosters the incidence of bur-
glary, larceny and auto theft because of reduced legal income opportunities of lower income
6
 As the European Commission (1998) points out, one major question to be answered is whether the
European model of social solidarity bears a crime reducing effect.
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groups. A higher income inequality also fosters the violent crimes of murder and assault sig-
nificantly.
Ehrlich also includes four further independent variables, namely the unemployment rate, the
labour force participation of young men, the share of young men in the population, and the
share of non-whites in the population. For the unemployment variable he generally finds in-
conclusive results. The signs are not stable across different regressions and besides insignifi-
cant. The labour force participation of young men is significant in some cases but with oppo-
site signs and is thus also not very conclusive. The shares of young men and non-whites in the
population, however, always show a positive sign and are significant in most cases.
We now consider the study of Wolpin (1978) which to our knowledge is the investigation
with the largest set of deterrence variables (see Table 5). Wolpin uses time-series data from
England and Wales covering the long period from 1894-1967. As regards estimated coeffi-
cients of the five probability variables devoted to deterrence, it can be stated that each of them
has a negative sign in each of the six estimations. However, by far not all coefficients turn out
to be significant. The most important probability is the clearance rate (proportion of crimes
cleared by the police) with 5 significant coefficients, followed by the imprisonment rate (pro-
portion of the guilty who are imprisoned, 3 significant coefficients). Surprisingly, the punish-
ment variable turns out to be insignificant across all offences. Considering the share of young
men in the population and unemployment, the results presented by Ehrlich (1973) are repli-
cated. A higher share of young men leads to higher crime rates and unemployment is again
found to be badly performing with only one (positive) significant coefficient for burglary. On
the other hand, the proportion of individuals from the age of 15 up and still at school is con-
sistently negatively related to the different types of crime. This might be interpreted in the
sense that higher education and regular daily routine have crime decreasing effects. Estimates
for urban population and per capita gross domestic product are sometimes positive significant
sometimes negative significant and thus inconsistent and the results for the wage variable are
as well in conflict with the expectations. Wolpin argues that the implausible results are partly
due to the inclusion of a time trend variable in the regressions.
7
 To our knowledge, Ehrlich's work was also the first rigorous econometric study of the causes of crime
to be published in a leading economic, sociological or criminological journal.
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Table 5: Selected
Authors .
Ehrlich.
(1973)
Wolpin
(1978)
empirical studies evaluating the rational
Data set Dependent variables
(crime variables)
Cross sectional data Crimes against the person
from Murder
U.S. states Rape
1960 Assault
Crimes against property
Robbery
. - Burglary
Larceny
Auto Theft
Time series data Crimes against the person
from England and Malicious wounding
Wales Felonious wounding
1894-1967 Crimes against property
Robbery
Burglary
Larceny
Auto Theft
choice model
Independent variables
(determinants of crime)
, , Deterrence variables
Imprisonment rate
Average sentence
Economic variables
Median income of families
Families below one-half of median in-
come
Unemployment rate of civilian urban
males aged 14-24 and 35-39
Labour force participation of civilian
urban males aged 14-24
Other variables
Non-whites
Males aged 14-24
Deterrence variables
Clearance rate
Conviction rate
Imprisonment rate
Recognisance rate
Fine rate
Average sentence
Economic variables
Real gross domestic product per capita
Unemployment rate
Real weekly wage in manufacturing for
manual workers
Other variables
Males aged 10-25
Individuals from age 15 onward enrolled
in schools
Individuals residing in non-rural areas
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Witte Post-release random
(1980) sample of 641 men
who were in prison in
North Carolina in
1969 or 1971
Entorf and Spengler Panel data from
(1998) German states
1975-1996
Number of arrests per month free
Number of convictions per month free
Crimes against the person
Murder and Manslaughter
Rape
Dangerous and serious assault
Crimes against property
Robbery
Theft under aggravating circumstances
Theft without aggravating circumstances
Fraud
Damage to property
Deterrence variables
Conviction rate
Imprisonment rate
Individual average historical sentence
length received prior to release
Economic variables
Accumulated work release funds re-
ceived after release
Number of months until first job after
release
Hourly wage rate after release
Taste variables
Age at release
Age at first arrest
Number of arrests and convictions re-
spectively, before incarceration
Race
Serious alcohol problems
Drug use
Parole when released
Married
Number of rule violations during prison
term
Deterrence Variables
Clearance rate
Economic variables
Real gross domestic product per capita
Relative wealth
Unemployment rate
Other variables
Foreigners
Males aged 10-25
State dummies
East/ west dummies
Source: Own representation.
Witte (1980) was the first to test the economic rational choice model with individual data. Her
data, however, does not stem from a random sample of the whole population, which would
include offenders as well as non-offenders, but from a random sample of ex-offenders who
were incarcerated in North Carolina in 1969 or 1971. Witte tries 12 different specifications
varying the dependent variables (number of arrests per month free or number of convictions
per month free with respect to different crime types) and independent variables (exclusion or
inclusion of taste variables). The estimation results only weakly support the economic crime
theory. The estimates of the deterrence variables mostly show a negative sign but there is a
general lack of significance. Only 5 out of 24 coefficient estimates of the variables measuring
certainty of conviction and punishment show significance and one of these has an unexpected
sign. Support for the deterrent effect of longer prison terms is only somewhat stronger, with 3
out of 12 coefficients being significantly negative. Turning to economic opportunity variables,
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implausible estimates with altering signs are obtained for the measure of legal income oppor-
tunities (hourly wage rate after release) and a suitable variable representing illegal income
opportunities could not be found and is thus excluded from the analysis. Inconsistent results
are also found for the expected unemployment rate, which turns out to have a crime reducing
effect when it is significant. In contrast to deterrence and economic variables, taste variables
generally carry the expected sign and often show significance. Witte's "results point up the
need for additional tests of the economic model of crime using individual data. Such tests
would be most beneficial if they dealt with groups less committed to criminal activity than
former prison inmates" (Witte 1980:82).
In a recent study, Entorf and Spengler (1998) have tested the economic crime model using
panel data from the West German states for the period 1975-1996. As deterrence variable they
only have the clearance rate at their disposal. Illegal income Opportunities are represented by
real gross domestic product per capita and legal income opportunities are approximated by a
variable that measures the relative difference between real gross domestic product per capita
in the particular state and the German average. It is argued that when a state is relatively rich
with respect to the federal average, legal activities are supposed to be more rewarding than in
relatively poor states. This might be due to higher wages in legal jobs and/ or to a higher prob-
ability to find a sufficient job when legal work is desired.
Critics may infer that such a reasoning would rather suggest the unemployment rate (which is
also included as a regressor) being the adequate measure of legal income opportunities. We do
not want to rule this out, but the following example may explain why relative income is a
more appropriate measure: Let us consider the two German states Hamburg and Saarland
which had approximately equal unemployment rates in 1996 (11,7 and 12,4 per cent respec-
tively). When using the unemployment rate as a measure for legal income opportunities one
would infer that there is no or only a slight difference between the two states. When consid-
ering the relative distance to the German average the income in Hamburg is 80 per cent above
the mean and the one in Saarland is 20 per cent below the mean. This large difference stems
from the fact that Hamburg is a fully industrialised metropolitan area with a wide variety of
businesses ranging from a major container terminal over a large consumer good industry to an
enormous service sector, whereas Saarland is a declining coal and steal producing area. There-
fore we think that ceteris paribus a potential offender who intends to find a job and/ or to re-
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ceive a certain wage would be more successful in Hamburg than in Saarland. Thus, we pre-
sume that our relative income measure is a more suitable indicator of legal income opportuni-
ties. It has to be stressed that this is no contradiction to the fact that Hamburg has a crime rate
which is more than twice as high as that of Saarland. Since crime can only be understood in a
multivariate context, there are a lot of other potential influences that may account for this
striking difference (see, for instance, the very high absolute income in Hamburg).
Generally speaking, the estimation results in Entorf and Spengler's paper are in accordance
with those presented by Ehrlich (1973).8 The estimated coefficients for the deterrence variable
(clearance rate) turn out to be negative in 6 out of 8 cases and show high significance in re-
gressions for the property related crimes of robbery and theft under aggravating circum-
stances. (Unexpected signs are found in the regressions for fraud and vandalism, however,
these estimates are not significant at any usual significance level.) Real gross domestic prod-
uct per capita, i.e. the measure for illegal income opportunities, performs well in the property
crime related regressions with exclusively positive coefficients and significance in 3 out of
four cases. In order to provide an example, the authors find that a one per cent increase in real
gross domestic product per capita is associated with a two per cent increase in the robbery
rate. In accordance with Ehrlich (1973), insignificance of the absolute income variable is
found in the regressions for murder and rape. This again indicates that the economic theory of
crime is rather applicable to property than to violent crime. The previously discussed relative
income variable turns out to be a suitable indicator for legal income opportunities. The ex-
pected negative9 sign is found for all coefficients in the four property crime regressions, with
significance in the case of robbery and theft under aggravating circumstances. Again, the re-
sults for the unemployment rate are ambigous. Authors find three significant coefficients, two
of which are negative. In contrast to that, and also in accordance with Ehrlich (1973), Entorf
and Spengler find almost exclusively positive coefficients for the socio-demographic control
variables (share of foreigners in the population, share of young men in the population) which
show significance in 6 out of 16 cases.
This is an interesting result since the studies consider different countries (United States vs. Germany)
with different data sets (cross sectional vs. panel) at times (1960 vs. 1975-1996).
9
 A negative coefficient means that a higher value of the relative income variable (which is associated
with a rise in a states income in comparison to the federal level and therefore with better legal income
opportunities) reduces crime.
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In order to summarise the key implications of the empirical studies testing economic crime
theory for the design of a model based on socio-economic indicators, it can be recorded that
deterrence as well as income opportunity variables should be present in such a model. Moreo-
ver, the studies suggest the inclusion of socio-demographic variables accounting for ethnic
heterogeneity and the age-gender structure of the population. Somewhat surprising are the
poor results concerning unemployment. Coefficients are often found to be insignificant or
even counterintuitive.
On what concerns interactions of crime with explaining variables, Ehrlich (1973) takes into
account that there might exist a bi-directional relation between crime and the probability of
conviction. This would be the case if a higher incidence of crime led to lower clearance rates
due to the overload of the given and temporarily fixed police staff. Another potential source of
interaction lies in the supposed reaction of citizens to rising crime rates. If the shrinking toler-
ance of the population towards increasing crime leads to the hiring of new police officers
(what is not unlikely - at least in advance of elections) and thus to a higher number of clear-
ups, the clearance rate would be influenced by changes in the number of crimes. If such recip-
rocal mechanisms are present and not accounted for in the empirical analysis, the estimates of
the supply of offences function will be unreliable. In order to tackle this problem, Ehrlich
(1973) uses a two-stage regression procedure, where the conviction rate is determined in the
first step by regressing it on the one period lagged crime rate and a set of other relevant vari-
ables. In the second step, the crime rate is regressed on the predicted values of the clearance
rate from the first step and all other independent variables.10
2.1.4 Differential association/ social learning theory (Sutherland 1942/ Akers 1977)
Sutherland (1942) gave the name "differential association" to the process by which persons
experience conflicting definitions about appropriate behaviour. Definitions favourable and
unfavourable to delinquent or criminal behaviour are learned through interaction (communi-
cation) in intimate personal groups (Matsueda 1982:489).Thus, peer and family relations play
a central role in this theory. It has to be stressed, however, that the effect of peers and family
10
 It has to be stressed, however, that this procedure can only be successful if the researcher has so-
called " instrumental variables" at his disposal. Instrumental variables are variables which have a sig-
nificant direct effect on the dependent variable of the first stage (clearance rate) but no direct impact on
the dependent variable of the second stage (crime rate).
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on individual delinquency is expected to be rather indirect (via the definitions concerning
crime) than direct. Empirical evaluations of differential association theory face the difficulty
that the central explanatory variable "definitions favourable and unfavourable to delinquent
behaviour" (DEF) is a "latent" variable i.e. it cannot be observed or measured directly. There-
fore - similar to legal and illegal income opportunities in economic crime theory - DEF has to
be determined indirectly in terms of one or more observable variables.
A central paper testing the differential association theory is Matsueda (1982). He uses self-
reported individual data of 1,140 non-black males stemming from the Richmond Youth proj-
ect. Employing LISREL11 he finds - in accordance with the theory - that "definitions favour-
able to delinquent behaviour" (DEF) is by far the most important variable explaining youthful
offending. DEF is measured by age, sex, the degree of parental supervision (SUPER), the in-
tensity of attachment to peers (ATTACHPE), a variable indicating whether any of the individ-
ual's friends have ever been picked up by the police (FRPICKUP), a variable which indicates
if the individual thinks that young people in his neighbourhood always get into trouble
(YOUNGTRO) and a variable indicating if either father or mother do not live with the re-
spondent (BROKHOME). After the inclusion of DEF in the delinquency equation all other
variables which have been significant before turn out to be insignificant (YOUNGTRO,
SUPER, FRPICKUP, ATTACHPE). This can be interpreted in the sense that family and peer
relation do not directly affect youthful delinquency, but that they do it indirectly via DEF.
Thus the chain of action which follows from the estimation results of Matsueda (1982) is as
follows: Higher levels of YOUNGTRO and FRPICKUP as well as lower levels of SUPER
and ATTACHPE lead to more DEF and more definitions favourable to delinquency increase
youth delinquency.
Two other micro-studies (Bruinsma 1992 and McCarthy 1996) also support the differential
association theory but go even a step further. They argue that people do not only learn about
crime predominantly or exclusively through exposure to attitudes and motives that legitimise
such a behaviour but also through tutelage in criminal methods. Bruinsma (1992) finds that
for explaining the frequency of criminal behaviour the frequency of communication about
11
 LISREL is a software package especially designed for multivariate analyses with latent variables.
The basic idea behind LISREL is to model a latent variable in terms of one or more observable vari-
ables and thus inferring its effect on other latent or non-latent variables (i.e. crime variables).
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relevant techniques is roughly as important as the definitions of deviant behaviour. McCarthy
(1996) finds the tutelage to be a highly significant determinant for drug selling and theft.
In order to summarise the empirical results for the differential association theory, it can be
captured that factors like delinquent parents and peers, low parental supervision of youth, dis-
rupted families etc. alter the definitions favourable to delinquency (and the frequency of
communication about delinquent techniques) and thus the individual frequency of deviant
behaviour. Thus, appropriate peer and family variables should be present in a crime related
indicator system. Concerning studies which assess the differential association theory with re-
gard to interactions, we refer to Sections 2.1.8, 2.1.13 and 2.1.14.
2.1.5 Social control theory (Hirschi 1969)
Instead of asking why individuals engage in crime - as do most other theories - the social
control theory asks why most persons refrain from criminal behaviour. According to that de-
linquency is taken for granted; conventional behaviour is problematic (Hirschi 1969:10).
Positively seen, the control theory maintains that persons conform to legal codes because they
are bonded to society. This bonding can be summarised best by means of the termini "attach-
ment", "committment", "involvement" and "believe". To be more precise the social control
theory states that
• the more individuals are attached to significant others,
• the more they are committed to-values of conventional subsystems,
• the better they are involved in conventional systems, and
• the more they believe in conventional values and norms,
the more conforming and the less delinquent their behaviour will be (Junger-Tas 1992:26).
Similar to the differential association theory, the determinants of crime in the social control
theory are latent variables which have to be approximated adequately. In his empirical test of
the social control theory, Agnew (1991) provides a guideline that helps to assess latent vari-
ables of attachment, commitment and believe (see Table 6).
Agnew's (1991) study is based on the first two waves (1976 and 1977) of the National Youth
Survey, a longitudinal (i.e. panel) survey of delinquency and drug use conducted by the Be-
havioral Research Institute (Boulder, Colorado). The survey is based on a national probability
sample of youths aged between 11 to 17 and contains 1,72.5 respondents. Agnew estimates
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three models, one for general delinquency, one for minor delinquency, and one for serious
delinquency. He only reports the results for minor delinquency, since results do not differ
much across the models. The innovative element in Agnew's study is the account of interac-
tions between crime and other variables. The findings, however, do not support the social
control theory. Neither bonding variables (attachment and commitment) and delinquency nor
deviant beliefs and crime are directly related to each other. In contrast to that, delinquent peers
(P) and delinquency (D) are involved in a bi-directional relationship: P2 —> D2 = 0,26 and
D2 -> P2 = 0,38 (Thornberry 1996:225). This result is rather in favour of the differential asso-
ciation theory, where relations to deviant peers are assumed to be the major sources of own
delinquent behaviour.13 Agnew (1991:150) thus concludes, that "social control variables have
a weak effect on the three forms of delinquency examined in this article. Current delinquency
is largely a function of prior delinquency and, to a lesser extent of an association with delin-
quent peers. The analyses in this article correct for many problems previously researched, and
for that reason they raise further doubt about the importance contributed to Hirschi's theory as
an explanation of general delinquency among adolescents".
Nevertheless, there are other recent studies (e.g. Agnew and White 1992, Agnew 1993, Pater-
noster and Mazerolle 199414, Junger-Tas 1992, Horney, Osgood and Marshall 1995) which
support the social control theory. Junger-Tas (1992) uses a random sample of 2500 juveniles
from two Dutch cities (The Hague and Venlo) consisting of both self-reported and official
data. After having constructed scales of family integration (parental control, communication
with parents, family activities, and family climate), school integration (liking school, com-
mitment to school values, school performance, and social behaviour), leisure and peers (nature
and involvement in leisure activities, bravado), changes in social integration were measured
over a period of 2 years and compared to the impact of official intervention in delinquency
cases by police or prosecutors (Junger-Tas 1992:9). In contrast to the economic crime theory
Junger-Tas finds no impact of police or prosecutors intervention on later delinquency. On the
12
 This expression can be read as: the causal effect of delinquent peer relations in period 2 on personal
delinquency in period 2 is estimated to be 0,26 (Thornberry 1996:212).
13
 Matsueda (1982) in his aforementioned study has explicitly compared differential association and
social control theory and finds differential association theory supported over control theory.
14
 These studies will be discussed in Section 2.1.7.
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other hand, there seem to be strong and inverse relationships between the changes in social
integration (i.e. the attachment to society) and the frequency of offending.
Table 6: Possible measures of latent variables in social control theory
Scale
1. Parental attachment
2. School attachment . .
3. Commitment
4. Deviant beliefs
5. Delinquent peers
Item of the National Youth Survey
Family that does lots of things together
Have parents that you can talk to about almost everything
Get along well with your parents
-•., Teachers do not call on me in class, even when I raise my
hand.
I often feel like nobody cares about me at school.
I do not feel as if I really belong at school.
Even though there are lots of kids around, I often feel lonely
at school.
What is your grade point average?
Are you doing well even in difficult subjects?
Do you have a high grade point average?
How wrong is it for someone of your age to purposely dam-
age or destroy property that does not belong to him or
• • • • • ' • h e r ? • • - -: • • •"
...steal something worth less than $5?
...hit or threaten to hit someone without any reason.
...steal something worth more than $50?
During the past year how many of your close friends have .
purposely damaged or destroyed property that did not
belong to them?
...stolen something worth less than $5?
...hit or threaten to hit someone without any reason.
...stolen something worth more than $50?
Source: Agnew (1991), own adjustment.
Horney et al. (1995) perform a test of the social control theory on the basis of 658 newly con-
victed male offenders sentenced to the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services during a
nine-month period in 1989-1990. The data set comes from interviews covering inmates' of-
fending/ life histories of the two calendar years preceding the year of arrest. Horney et al. seek
to determine whether formal (former probation or parole) and informal mechanisms (going to
school, being employed, living with a wife or girlfriend, drinking heavily, using drugs) of so-
cial control affect the likelihood of committing nine major offences. In accordance with
Junger-Tas (1992), but in contradiction to the economic crime theory, Horney et al. find no
significant coefficients for deterrence (former probation or parole). On the other hand, meas-
ures of local life circumstances (i.e. social control) perform fairly well. Drug use has an en-
hancing impact on property crime, assault and drug crime. Heavy drinking fosters property
crime and going to school reduces drug crime. Living with a wife has a negative (reducing)
effect on assault, whereas living with a girlfriend fosters drug crime. Only the labour variable
performs very badly, revealing insignificance in most cases, and if not, an inconclusive sign
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arises. However, interpreting the results, one should pay attention to the fact that Horney et al.
use data on offenders being incarcerated. This data set does not only bear the problem of a
selected sample based on offenders, but the authors even use a sample with offenders who are
selected (who select themselves) to go to prison. This might seriously restrict general conclu-
sions that could be drawn from the study.
We conclude that the empirical findings for the social control theory are not as clear as those
for other theories. Nevertheless, family attachment and school commitment finally turn out to
have at least some relevance for a proper understanding of delinquency (see also Section
2.1.7). Somewhat surprising is the insignificance of formal social control (i.e. deterrence)
variables. This, however, might be due to the use of offender or inmate samples.
2.1.6 Self-control theory (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990)
Gottfredson's and Hirschi's (1990) theory explains differences among individuals in criminal
and analogous behaviour (e.g. gambling, sexual promiscuity, accidents, excessive alcohol use,
heavy smoking etc.)15 as a product of personal variations in self-control (Gottfredson and
Hirschi 1990:97). According to the theory, individuals with low self-control "exhibit a per-
sistent tendency to act in their own short-term self-interest, with little regard for the long-term
consequences of their behavior. They are thereby easily seduced into committing acts that
require little devotion or commitment, are easy to complete, and provide immediate pleasure"
(Paternoster and Brame 1998:634). Since criminal acts generally reveal these characteristics, a
key implication of the theory is that persons with low self-control are more likely to commit
crimes throughout their life course than those with higher self-control levels. Low self-control
itself is assumed to be determined - in the early years of life (prior to age 10) - as a conse-
quence of ineffective childhood socialisation, which in turn is caused by parents who fail to
monitor the child's behaviour, do not recognise misbehaviour when it occurs, and neglect to
punish the child for it. Because of the contention that the cause of crime and its prevention
(i.e. self-control) is set in early childhood, later life experiences are expected to have little
impact on delinquency.
15
 Because of this perceived applicability on all deviant behaviour, the self-control theory is also called
"general theory".
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In contrast to the economic crime theory, the self-control theory is a micro theory, which can
hardly be translated into the macro level, therefore its relevance for the present EU-study is
rather minor. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to draw attention to some recent empirical studies
investigating this rising theory. Like other theories, the self-control theory has to cope with a
latent variable, since self-control cannot be measured directly. Gibbs, Giever and Martin
(1998) and Arneklev, Grasmick, Tittle and Bursik (1993) provide large sets of items suitable
to measure it. The following list contains some examples:
• I often act on the spur of the moment,
• I seldom pass up an opportunity to have a good time,
• I try to look out for myself first, even if it means making things difficult for other people,
• I frequently try to avoid things that I know will be difficult, etc..
In order to briefly summarise the results of four recent empirical studies (Arneklev et al. 1993,
Polakowski 1994, Paternoster and Brame 1998 and Gibbs et al. 1998) testing Gottfredson's
and Hirschi's theory one can state that all of them find at least some support for self-control as
a relevant determinant of delinquency. However, generality, i.e. the ability of self-control the-
ory to explain all kinds of deviant behaviour (e.g. heavy smoking; gambling etc), is doubted
by three of these four studies. ;• ,
2.1.7 Strain theory (Merton 1938, Cohen 1955 and Agnew 1992)
According to the traditional strain theory, youth/ individuals are motivated to commit delin-
quent acts because they have failed to achieve desired goals, such as economic success (Mer-
ton 1938) or middle-class status (Cohen 1955). The critical point for empirical investigations
of this theory, however, is how to operationalise strain. Most often, researchers have measured
strain either as the gap between aspirations and expectations or as perceived blocked oppor-
tunities (Agnew 1987 and Burton and Cullen 1992), though other scholars have proposed that
strain might be assessed as relative deprivation (Burton, Cullen, Evans and Dunaway
1994:214). Before we turn to the empirical results of Burton et al. (1994) who have tried all
three strain indicators, some remarks have to be made about how these indicators might be
obtained from the items of a survey or interview. Economic aspirations are conceptualised as
the "overall or general" desire individuals feel about "making money" in the future. On the
other hand, expectations are the actual chances the individual believes to have to "make a lot
of money" in the future (Burton et al. 1994:220/221). Suitable measures to assess the gap
between the two concepts could be derived from the items "I would like to make a lot of
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money in my life" (for aspiration) and "Realistically, I do not think I will make as much
money as I would like" (for expectations). Three useful items in order to assess blocked op-
portunities might be "Every time I try to get ahead, something stops me", "If I had connec-
tions, I would have been more successful" and "I have often been frustrated in my efforts to
get ahead in life" and suitable measures of relative deprivation can probably be gathered from
one (or a combination) of the items "It bothers me that most people have more money to live
on than I have", "It is frustrating to see people driving nicer cars and living in nicer homes
than I do" and "I get angry when I see people having a lot more money than I do, spending
their money on foolish things".
Burton's et al. (1994) empirical test of the traditional strain theories was carried out on the
basis of self-reported survey data from 555 individual aged 18 and older16, residing in a mid-
western, urban area of the United States. The dependent variables are "utilitarian" crimes (i.e.
crimes providing economic gain) and "non-utilitarian" crimes (i.e. crimes perhaps providing
psychic rewards, but not providing material gain). The list of the employed independent vari-
ables is evident from the first column of Table 7. A very interesting point of the study by
Burton et al. (1994) is that this study does not only assess the strain theory, but at the same
time typical variables from three other leading crime theories (social-control, self-control and
differential association theory). Considering estimation results, it is striking that non of the
strain-variables shows significance neither for utilitarian nor for non-utilitarian crimes.
Whereas the importance of the strain theories is rejected, all other theories are supported with
respect to at least one of their central variables.
The lacking empirical support for the traditional strain theories found by Burton et al. is not an
isolated case. Referring to studies of Reiss and Rhodes (1963), Elliott and Voss (1974),
Greenberg (1977), and Agnew (1984), Paternoster and Mazerolle (1994) report that null find-
ings are rather the rule than the exception. In response to that and by assessing that traditional
theories are unduly narrow in the conceptualization of the sources of strain, Agnew (1992)
further developed the existing theories to what he calls "general strain theory" (GST). The
new feature of GST is the assumption that "in addition to the failure to achieve desired goals,
strain can also be brought about when others take away from us something we value and when
16
 This is a variation in comparison to former tests of the strain theory, most of which rely on samples
exclusively composed of juveniles see Burton and Cullen 1992).
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we are confronted with negative or disagreeable circumstances" (Paternoster and Mazerolle
1994:237). According to this, strain is understood as a more general phenomenon than the
pure discrepancy between aspirations and expectations.
Table 7: Simplified representation of estimates from Burton et al. (1994)
Dependent variables
Independent variables
Strain '
Aspiration/ expectation "gap"
Blocked Opportunities
Relative deprivation
Social control
Married • :
Attachment to family
Self-control
Low self-control
Differential association
Individual definitions toward law . ,
Others' definitions toward law
Criminal friends
Control variables
Age _/.'•...
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Source: Burton, Cullen, Evans and Dunaway (1994), own representation.
Note: see Table 1.
The first empirical test of GST has been performed by Agnew and White (1992). The study
relies upon data from the first wave of the Rutgers Health and Human Development Project
(HHDP), a prospective longitudinal study, including 1,380 New Jersey adolescents aged 12,
15, and'18, who were interviewed between 1979 and 1981. The dependent variables cover
"delinquency" measured by offences such as fighting, robbery, larceny, burglary, vandalism,
running away, truancy etc. and "drug use". The latter measures whether individuals frequently
use alcohol, marijuana, and other drugs, such as psychedelics, cocaine etc. The independent
variables can be inferred from the first column of Table 8. As a consequence of the broader
(and less precise) definition of strain, important life circumstances like "negative relations
with adults" and "parental fighting" do enter the model. In the second column of Table 8, we
provide the items suggested by Agnew and White in order to operationalise the relevant strain
variables. Similar to Burton et al. (1994) indicators from rival theories (social control and dif-
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ferential association theory) are also included in the estimations and, thus, allow to assess the
relative importance of GST.
The estimation results based on GST presented in Table 8 are much more in favour of strain
as an important cause of crime than the results of traditional strain theories. Eight out of 16
estimated coefficients show significance and the expected sign. "Negative life events", "life
hassles" and "parental fighting" turn out to be the most important strain variables. The empiri-
cal support for GST found by Agnew and White (1992) is confirmed by other studies (see
Agnew 1993, Paternoster and Mazerolle 1994, and Hofman and Miller 1998).
Table 8: Simplified representation of estimates from Agnew and White (1992)
Dependent variables
Independent variables
Strain
Negative life events
Life hassles
Negative relations with adults
Parental fighting
Neighbourhood problems
Unpopular with opposite sex
Occupational strain
Clothing strain
Social control
Parental attachment
Parental permissiveness
School attachment
Peer attachment
Time spent on homework
Grades
Educational goals
Differential association
Friends' delinquency
Control variables
Age
Sex
Item
...have experienced negative events that upset them,
including assault, death of a friend, serious illness,
divorce of parents etc.
..."very much bothered" by such "concerns and difficul-
ties" as "not having enough time to do all the things 1
really want to", adults and friends "do not respect my
opinions", "my classmates do not like me" etc.
...teachers embarrass them for not knowing the right
answers, parents often complain about them etc.
...bothered by the fact that parents often fight or argue
with one another
...their neighbourhood is unsafe and they are afraid to
walk alone in it during the day or night
..."very bothered" by the fact that they are not good
looking and are not popular with the opposite sex
..."very unsure" they will get the job they want
...parents can never afford to buy them the kind of
clothes they want
Delin- Drug use
quency
+ +
+ +
+ 0
+ +
0 +
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
+ +
0
0
+ +
+ +
0
Source: Agnew and White (1992), own representation.
Note: see Table 1.
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After having assessed the seven most popular theories of crime, an interim judgement about
the causes of crime seems to be appropriate. Our findings suggest that each of the considered
theories has practical relevance. This has the important implication that neither theory might
serve as the general theory which renders other theories superfluous. This reasoning, particu-
larly applies to the question whether crime should be modelled at the micro or at the macro
level. The correct way to cope with the problem of crime is to use both the individual and ag-
gregate levels. Crimes are based on individual decisions which suggests using individual data.
On the other hand, individuals' decisions and acts take place in a specific environment, which
in turn relies - at least to a certain extent - on macro factors and macro settings (like policies
of fighting crime, poverty, unemployment, social problems etc).
2.1.8 Interactional theory (Thornberry 1987)
The core of the interactional theory can be best explained in the words of the scholar who de-
veloped it: "Interactional theory proposes that delinquent behavior develops in a dynamic
fashion over the life course. Rather than seeing delinquency as a simple consequence of a set
of social processes, an interactional perspective sees delinquency as both cause and conse-
quence, involved in a variety of reciprocal relationships over time" (Thornberry 1996:198).
Thus, interactional theory makes two important points - developmental perspective and recip-
rocal effects - which are assumed to be essential for a proper understanding of crime but have
been virtually ignored in the major theories.
The developmental perspective points to the fact that "crime does not appear to be a perma-
nent trait of the individual"! Crime can rather be split up in three clearly distinguishable
phases: initiation, maintenance, and termination. This view is consistent with the generally
observed incidence of crime in the life course, where offenders start their criminal conduct
around the of ages 12 or 13, rapidly increasing their involvement to a peak around the ages of
16 or 17, and then terminating delinquency by the mid 20s (Thornberry 1996:200). In order to
account for the developmental aspect of crime longitudinal (i.e. panel) data is needed.
Conventional crime theories are recursive (or unidirectional) by nature, i.e. they treat delin-
quency as a pure outcome (endogenous) variable out of a large set of socio-economic and psy-
chological factors, but do not consider possible feedback effects (see Figure 2). This view
appears to be unrealistic, since it implies that "no matter how prolonged or serious the per-
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son's delinquent behavior, it has no causal impact on relationships within the family, selection
of peers, success in school or work, and so forth" (Thornberry 1996:202). In contrast to the
traditional view, the interactional theory explicitly considers the possibility of reciprocal ef-
fects among crime and its explanatory factors. In order to account adequately for reciprocal
effects, special statistical techniques have to be employed (e.g. LISREL). ^
Figure 2: The conventional view of the relations between crime and its explaining vari-
ables
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Source: Thornberry (1987:202).
Thornberry (1996) provides a discussion of all 17 interactional studies he could identify at the
time he prepared his survey. Table 9 contains a short summary of these studies with respect to
the origin of the data set used (column 2), the age/ grade (column 3) and sex (column 4) of the
individuals under investigation, the wave/ lag structure of the data set (column 5), the delin-
quency variables (column 6), and the explanatory variables (column 7) for which interactions
with delinquency have been examined. The explanatory variables largely stem from two tra-
ditional theories - the social control theory (Section 2.1.5) and the differential association/
social learning theory (Section 2.1.4). In order to structure the further discussion, we follow
Thornberry (1996), who divides the studies in three clusters according to the theoretical origin
of their explanatory variables. Thus, we distinguish studies which exclusively use variables of
attachment (i.e. from social control theory), studies which exclusively use learning variables
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(i.e. from differential association/ social learning theory) and studies which use both kinds of
variables.
Figure 3: The interactional view of the relations between crime and its explaining vari-
ables
Source: Thornberry (1996:202).
The studies focusing on the variables of attachment can be found in the works of Agnew
(1985), Agnew (1989), Liska and Reed (1985), Matsueda (1989), Minor (1984), Rosenberg,
Schooler and Schoenbach (1989) and Thornberry and Christenson (1984). In accordance with
the social control theory Liska and Reed (1985) report an effect from parental attachment to
delinquency. Apart from this, however, no significant relationships between parental attach-
ment and delinquency could be found. The unidirectional effects from grades, involvement in
school and peer attachment to delinquency reported by Agnew (1985) are also in accordance
with the social control theory. All other relationships of these variables with crime, however,
are either from delinquency to "attachment" or bi-directional and, thus, in conflict with the
social control theory. In order to provide an example Liska and Reed (1985) report a recipro-
cal relationship between school attachment and crime. Further findings in conflict with the
unidirectional view are those concerning the relationship between crime and conventional
beliefs. Agnew (1985) reports a reciprocal relationship between these two variables, Minor
(1984) also reports a reciprocal relationship, but with a stronger impact of beliefs on delin-
quency than vice versa, and Matsueda (1989) finds an effect of delinquency on conventional
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beliefs. Finally Thornberry and Christenson (1984) obtain a strong reciprocal connection be-
tween unemployment and crime (Thornberry 1996:218/219).
In sum, studies exclusively relying on learning variables (Elliot and Menard 1992, Kandel
1978, Meier, Burkett and Hickman 1984, Menard and Huizinga 1990 and Reed and Rose
1991) provide a strong support of reciprocal relationships between learning variables (delin-
quent peers etc.) and delinquent behaviour. Thus, unidirectional models leading from differ-
ential association through delinquent beliefs to crime seem to provide improper simplifica-
tions. Moreover, Elliot and Menard (1992) support the developmental perspective of an inter-
actional theory. They find a unidirectional effect from delinquent peers and from delinquent
beliefs on crime in the phase of onset of criminal involvement. In the phase of maintenance,
however, these relationships appear to be reciprocal and amplifying (Thornberry 1996:223).
Studies simultaneously considering attachment and learning variables are presented by Agnew
(1991), Burkett and Warren (1987), Elliot, Huizinga and Morse (1985), Ginsberg and Green-
ley (1978) and Paternoster (1988). Holding learning variables constant, Elliot, Huizinga and
Morse (1985) and Agnew (1991) neither find unidirectional nor bi-directional relationships
between various bonding variables and delinquency. Likewise, Ginsberg and Greenley (1978)
do not report any direct impact of commitment and school involvement on marijuana use. On
the other hand, Burkett and Warren (1987) and Paternoster (1988) report relationships be-
tween some of the variables of attachment and delinquency. Paternoster, for example, reports
a moderate reciprocal relationship between parental supervision and delinquency for both
marijuana use and petty theft. In contrast to this relatively weak findings, learning variables
exhibit a much better performance even if attachment variables are controlled. In all studies
associations with delinquent peers and delinquent behaviour turn out to be mutually reinforc-
ing variables, i.e. the association with delinquent peers increases criminal behaviour and de-
linquency increases with associations to delinquent peers. Paternoster (1988) confirms the
existence of a reciprocal relation between delinquent beliefs and delinquent activity (Thorn-
berry 1996:228).
Since 16 out of 17 studies find at least moderate relationships between one of their explana-
tory variables and delinquent behaviour, it can be concluded that interactional theory provides
a valuable approach in order to understand the phenomenon of crime. As regards the relative
importance of attachment and learning variables, the results are clearly in favour of the latter.
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This is underpinned by the fact that all 9 studies examining the relationship between delin-
quent peers and delinquent behaviour find strong bi-directional effects. Two implications
arise: First, the differential association/ social learning theory seems to be the more suitable
approach towards a proper understanding of crime and, second, traditional crime theories
should be extended with respect to reciprocal effects between crime and other variables. Of
course, this conclusion also applies to the analytical and empirical part of the present report.
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Table 9: Studies examining reciprocal
Author
(D
Agnew
(1985)
Agnew
(1989)
Agnew
(1991)
Burkett & Warren
(1987)
Elliot, Huizinga & Morse
(1985b)
Elliot & Menard
(1992)
Kandel
(1978)
Data set
(2)
Youth in Transition
Youth in Transition
National Youth Survey
Pacific northwest city
National Youth Survey
National Youth Survey
New York State
causal effects involving delinquent behaviour
Age/ grade
(3)
10th to 11th
grades
10th to 11th
grades
Ages 11-17 to
12-18
10th to 12 grades
Ages 11-17 to
15-21
Ages 11-17 to
18-24
9th to 12 grades
Sex
(4)
Males
Males
Males/
females
Males/
females
Males/
females
Males/
females
Males/
females
Waves/ lag
in month
(5)
2/18
months
2/18
months
2/12
months
3/12
months
5/12
months
1-5/12
months
6/36
months
2/8
months
Delinquency variable
(6)
Total delinquency
Serious delinquency
Aggression
Theft/ vandalism
Escape from school
Minor delinquency
General delinquency
Serious delinquency
Marijuana use
General delinquency
General delinquency
Minor delinquency
Index delinquency
Marijuana use
Other variables
(7) ,
Parental attachment
Grades
Dating index
School attachment
Involvement
Commitment
Peer attachment
Belief '
Negative school attitudes
Mean teachers
Parental punitiveness
Parental attachment
School attachment
Commitment
Deviant beliefs
Delinquent Peers
Religious commitment
Belief/ sin
Peer associations
Normlessness
Pro-social roles
Involvement
Strain
Delinquent peers
Deviant bonding
Family sanctions
Delinquent peers
I
\
Peer associations
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Ginsberg & Greenley
(1978)
Liska & Reed
(1985)
Matsueda
(1989)
Meier, Burkett & Hickman
(1984)
Menard & Huizinga
(1990)
Minor
(1984)
Paternoster
(1988)
Reed & Rose
(1991)
Rosenberg, Schooler &
Schoenbach
(1989)
Thornberry & Christenson
(1984)
University of Wisconsin
Survey
Youth in Transition
Youth in Transition
Pacific Northwest city
National Youth Survey
College students
South-eastern city
National Youth Survey
Youth in Transition
Philadelphia birth cohort
Freshman/
sophomore
to junior/
Senior
10th to 1 1 *
grades
10th to 12th
grades
10th to 12th
grades
Ages 11-1.7 to
18-24
Median ages
18 to 18.3
10th to 12th
grades
Ages 11-17 to
13-19
10th to 11 t h
grades
Ages 21 to 24
Males/
females
Males
Males
Males/
females
Males/
females
Males/
females
Males/
females
Males/
females
Males
Males
2/26
months
2/18
months
1-2/18
months
3/12
months
1-5/12
month
6/36
months
2/3
months
3/12
months
3/12
months
2/18
months
4/12
months
Marijuana use
Interpersonal
violence
Theft/ vandalism
Minor deviance
Marijuana use
General delinquency
Minor delinquency
Index delinquency
Marijuana use
Cocaine use
Fighting
Drunk & disorderly
Shoplifting
Variety index
Marijuana use
Serious delinquency
General delinquency
Official arrests
Commitment
Involvement
Psychologicat stress
Peer use
Attachment to parents
School attachment
Belief in conventional morality
Peer associations
Perceived certainty of punishment
Delinquent beliefs
Moral evaluations
Excuse acceptance
Parental supervision
Perceived certainty
Deviant beliefs
Peer attitudes
Peer behaviour
Delinquent peers
Delinquent attitudes
Self-esteem
Unemployment
Source: Thornberry (1996).
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2.1.9 Wealth, economic growth and economic system
According to the economic crime theory and the routine activity/ lifestyle theory higher wealth
measured by gross domestic product per capita or mean family income is associated with
more valuable targets for (potential) offenders. Therefore, both theories expect a positive im-
pact of economic growth on property crime.17 This view is supported by country specific mul-
tivariate (see the discussion of the studies by Ehrlich (1973) and Entorf and Spengler (1998)
in Section 2.1.3) as well as by international descriptive evidence (see Figure 4). Figure 4 de-
picts a scatter plot of general wealth against the theft rate based on 12 member states of the
European Union plus Norway and Switzerland. It seems that higher wealth is associated with
1 Q
higher levels of theft . Put differently, the more rewarding theft is, the more theft occurs. It
has already been pointed out that some researchers interpret absolute wealth rather in terms of
higher legal (e.g. higher paid jobs) than higher illegal income opportunities. Figure 4 also pro-
vides some evidence in favour of this point of view. Considering Switzerland and Norway, it
is striking that these states have relatively low crime rates combined with very high levels of
wealth. This phenomenon could probably be explained by the existence of a hypothetical
turning point. Beyond a certain level of wealth countries provide sufficiently high legal in-
come opportunities (for example by means of social welfare benefits) to its at-risk groups, so
that these are kept away from delinquent behaviour. In spite of this, further evidence for a
positive relationship between wealth/ economic growth and crime can be gathered from a be-
fore-after reunification analysis of Eastern Germany. In 1987, i.e. three years before unifica-
tion, the East German general crime rate equalled 690 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants, at the
same time the crime rate in Western Germany was more than 10 times higher (7269 crimes/
100,000 inhabitants). Six years later, i.e. three years after the German unification, the crime
rate of the East German States (excluding former East Berlin) has risen to 9,748 and even ex-
ceeded the West German rate (8032 crimes/ 100,000 inhabitants). This means a multiplication
by 14 within a period of six years. Admittedly, the East German figures of 1987 might by
subject to severe underreporting of a socialist regime, however, it is very unlikely that under-
reporting accounts for the entire difference. To a certain extent (presumably to a large extent)
17
 For violent crimes, however, the impact of higher wealth is not straightforward (see Section 2.1.3).
18
 However, we would like a note of caution. Since our comparison is based on official data it might
suffer from differences in the shares of unreported crimes across the countries.
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the explosion of the East German crime rate is a result of the ad hoc change fronVa communist
planned economy to a free market economy with all its consequences for law enforcement,
social cohesion and, of course, availability of valuable targets. For evidence on crime in the
context of changing socio-economic environments see, for example, Borning (1991) and
Zvekic (1994). . . .
Figure 4: Theft and Wealth in Western Europe 1994
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2.1.10 Poverty and inequality
Sociological theories which conceptualise poverty (e.g. social disorganisation theory, strain
theory, opportunity theory etc.) agree about its expected impact on crime. Poverty - so the
unanimous opinion - increases crime. However, there is a certain disagreement about how
poverty may be measured. There are proponents of the "absolute" poverty concept who claim
that "the lack of some fixed level of material goods necessary for survival and minimum well-
being causes criminal activity (personal as well as property)" (Patterson 1991:755). Others
argue that "relative" poverty (i.e. economic inequality) is a more relevant variable to explain
variation in criminal behaviour. Considering the empirical literature, both absolute poverty as
well as relative poverty seem to be rather positively related to violent and property crimes.
However, results remain uncertain. Many studies find insignificant effects and some even in-
conclusively negative ones, though the latter case is rather exceptional (for surveys on the
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poverty/ crime literature see Patterson (1991) and Kovandzic, Vieraitis and Yeisley (1998).
An explanation of the relatively weak results may be the fact that criminologists are most in-
terested in the relationship between poverty and violent crimes, like murder. In our opinion,
poverty variables are more appropriately used as factors of property crime than for the expla-
nation of violent crime. This view is supported by the fact that statistical tests of the economic
theory of crime (see Ehrlich 1973, Entorf and Spengler 1998) find strong significant effects of
inequality measures on property crime. Ohlemacher (1995), who provides another example for
Germany, uses the ratio of social welfare recipients to total population as a measure of abso-
lute poverty (which might be a problem since eligibility depends on average income). He finds
evidence of a positive correlation between absolute poverty and robbery and theft.
2.1.11 Labour market
Most citizens belief that unemployment is the most important cause of crime. From the theo-
retical point of view this belief seems to be reasonable, since, according to the economic the-
ory of crime, unemployed individuals are per definition excluded from legal income opportu-
nities, and, thus, ceteris paribus more likely to commit crimes than people who have a job. Or,
put differently, "unemployment will make crime more attractive if the alternative is a life in
poverty" (Eide 1997:17). Apart from this exclusively economic argumentation, unemployment
might also have psychological consequences that foster delinquency. If, for example, unem-
ployment is perceived as deeply unjust and society is hold responsible for the own misery, a
break with social norms and thus a higher propensity of delinquent behaviour might be the
consequence. However, there also exists the opposite view (from lifestyle/ routine activity
theory) which states that unemployment increases guardianship of home and (deviant) chil-
dren and thus decreases the time spent in the "unsafe" public (statistically, unemployed spend
more time at home than those employed). A third point of view would be that in countries
with a distinctive social safety net, criminal behaviour which is motivated by economic rea-
sons (i.e. property crime) could remain largely unaffected due to replacement rates which are
equal or only slightly below the ordinary legal income. In order to find out which explanation
meets reality best, the empirical evidence of the unemployment/ crime relationship (UCR) has
to be taken into account.
We first consider empirical investigations at the individual level, since this is the level where
crime decisions are made. Freeman (1995) puts the advantage of micro-level research in the
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following words: "Studies that compare the economic circumstances of individuals who
commit crimes with those who do not commit crimes, or the criminal behavior of the same
person in different economic circumstances, potentially offer the best way to assess how the
job market affects crime" (Freeman 1995:183). A first impression of the UCR can be derived
from a simple descriptive statistics. Holzman (1983) in a U.S. study of habitual robbers and
burglars based on the 1974 Survey of Inmates of State Correctional Facilities reports that at
the time of their latest offence approximately 25 per cent of offenders were unemployed. This
is more than four times the U.S. unemployment rate in the survey year (5.6 per cent). In a re-
cent study Tauchen, Witte and Griesinger (1993) report that adolescents who were employed
for a larger percentage of a year are less likely to be arrested than those employed for a shorter
percentage.
However, these results may "simply reflect the fact that the criminal population consists of
people who are unable to succeed in society because of 'personal characteristics'[which are]
the cause of both the poor labor market record and criminal activity" (Freeman 1995:184).
Freeman discusses three ways in which researchers can take advantage of micro-data in order
to detect the causal effect from unemployment on crime. First, one can look at the same per-
son in different periods. If he commits more crimes in times of unemployment than in times of
employment this would suggest that unemployment caused the delinquent behaviour. By do-
ing so Farrington, Gallagher, Morley, Ledger and West (1986) found evidence in favour of a
positive UCR. Second, one could employ the unemployment rate of the area where the indi-
vidual resides. This macro indicator is presumably independent of individual characteristics
and thus a suitable variable to assess perceived legal income opportunities. However, three
studies which have carried out this approach (Lee 1993, Good, Pirog-Good and Sickles 1986
and Trumbull 1989) have found inconsistent results. Third, one can estimate labour supply
relations between criminal participation and legal income opportunities (i.e. actual or pre-
dicted wages) and illegal income opportunities (i.e. criminal wages or perceptions of the at-
tractiveness of crime). This way, however, requires highly sophisticated data, which have only
been collected once within the 1980 National Bureau of Economic Research Inner City Youth
Survey (see Freeman and Holzer 1986). Viscusi (1986), who carried out the estimations,
found that "youth who belief that they 'make more on the street than on a legitimate job' were
far more likely to engage;in crime than others and that estimated differences in income from
crime and legitimate work also significantly affected crime behavior" Freeman (1995:185).
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Unfortunately, even when data requirements are met, there still remains a potential source of
bias, which is "interaction". Using LISREL Thornberry and Christenson (1984) indeed found
instantaneous effects from unemployment to crime (U —» C) as well as instantaneous and 1-
and 2-year-lagged effects from crime to unemployment (C —> U). All instantaneous effects
from unemployment to crime are significant (U2 —> C2 = 0.1319, U3 —» C3 = 0.35, U4, —> C4
= 0.48). The effect from crime on unemployment is primarily evident in the lagged coeffi-
cients. All five are significant, ranging from C2 —» U3 = 0.10 to Cl —» U3 = 0.18. Whereas
the first two instantaneous effects from crime to unemployment are negligible, the last one is
sizable C4 -> U4 = 0.36. Thornberry (1996:214/215) concludes, that "overall, it appears that
unemployment does increase the chances of criminal behavior and that criminal behavior in
turn increases the chances of unemployment."20 Finally so-called "ethnographic" or "case
studies", which are based on qualitative information gathered from potential or real offenders,
also provide strong evidence for a labour market interpretation of the decision of young men
to engage in crime (see Fargan 1992).
We now turn to the evidence on the UCR based on aggregated data. Chiricos (1987) has car-
ried out a large meta-study which investigates 288 estimates of the UCR stemming from 63
macro studies (no individual level studies are included in the meta-study). Chiricos findings
are displayed in Table 10. He reports that 31 per cent of all estimations investigating the UCR
found a significant positive coefficient for the unemployment variable and that only 2 per cent
got a negative significant result. Ciricos points to what he calls is the "conditional nature of
the UCR". This means that the results show a wide variation with respect to the type of crime,
the period and structure of the data set. Considering only estimations which use data from the
1970s and after, generally yields higher percentages of significance (exceptions robbery and
murder). This is presumably due to the fact that in western countries post-war unemployment
rates prior to 1970 were constantly low and thus did not exhibit enough variation for the iden-
tification of the UCR. The conditional nature also becomes apparent when looking at different
crime categories. Considering estimations based on 1970s data, it can be inferred from the last
19
 This expression can be read as: the causal effect of unemployment in period 2 on personal delin-
quency in period 2 is estimated to be 0,13 (Thornberry 1996:212).
20
 In spite of the fact that he concedes the plausibility of Thornberry and Christenson results, Freeman
(1995:188) is leery of reading much into it: "Absent knowledge of what in fact influenced the individual's
decision, which the data do not provide, any division of the relation between the variables is likely to
depend critically on the particular structural model used to make the estimates."
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column of the table that 60 per cent of all property crime estimates show positive, significance,
whereas this is the case for only 30 per cent of the violent crime estimates. This is a reason-
able result, since property crime is directly related to legal income opportunities, which have
been lost due to unemployment.
Table 10: Central results from Chiricos' (1987) meta-study
All Crimes
Property Crimes
Violent Crimes
Burglary
Larceny
Auto Theft
Rape
Robbery
Murder
Assault
Alfestimations (70s and earlier)
Number of esti-
mations
288
125
138
42
32
28
17
41
38
25
Per cent significant
positive/
per cent significant
negative
31/2
40/3
22/2
52/2
47/3
21/7
35/0
22/2
16/5
12/0
Estimations using 1970s data
Number of estima-
tions
113
55
47
18
16
10
7
20
8
7
Per cent significant
positive/
per cent significant
negative
48/1
60/0
30/2
78/0
75/0
40/0
86/0
20/0
0/0
14/0
Source: Chiricos (1987), own representation.
Different levels of data-aggregation and the dimension of the data set provide further exam-
ples for the conditional nature of the UCR (not presented in Table 10 ). As a rule, estimations
relying on lower levels of data aggregation (e.g. city rather than national level data) and/ or
rather on cross-sectional than on time-series data, show higher frequencies of positive signifi-
9 i
cance. 14 (36) per cent of the time-series based property crime estimations considered by
Chiricos (1987) show negative (positive) significant coefficients, whereas estimations relying
on cross-sectional data never exhibit negative significance. Freeman (1995:178) doubts the
reliability of time-series based assessments of the UCR, since "all too often, addition of fur-
ther observations or of another explanatory variable, or choice of statistical technique, sub-
stantively changes results". This instability of results in time-series investigations can be
demonstrated by referring to the work of Entorf and Spengler (1998). Using a panel from 11
German states and covering a period of 22 years (i.e. with a dominant time-series dimension),
two out of eight coefficient estimates of the unemployment rate showed negative significance
and only one coefficient turned out to be positive and significant. Later in the paper the
Data-aggregation and data-dimension, however, are not independent, since national level studies
are always based on time-series data.
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authors tried another panel which has a dominant cross-sectional dimension (16 states, 4
years). The interesting result is that now six out of eight coefficients have turned out to be
positive significant, and that no negative estimate remained.
Reconsidering the evidence from micro and macro studies we conclude that unemployment is
very likely to be an important cause of crime. On the other hand, however, there is also some
evidence that the relationship is not unidirectional, but rather bi-directional.
In spite of the fact that unemployment is an important factor of crime, it cannot account for
the majority of delinquent acts. Actually, most crimes are committed by individuals who are
still involved in the educational system (pupils, students or apprentices) or who have legal
work. Above mentioned figures by Holzman (1983) indicate that the portion of unemployed
among offenders under investigation was four times the unemployment rate. But this also
means that 75 per cent of the offenders were employed at the time of their last offence. Thus,
it is unlikely that for them unemployment was the cause of their delinquent act. This differ-
ence becomes even more striking if a less "criminal" or representative sample is considered.
Using the 1980 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, and considering 1,134 youth aged 17-
23 who were neither at school nor in the forces, Grogger (1998) reports that only 6 per cent of
those who admitted to have gained any income from crime were unemployed in the respective
year. This gives raise to the supposition that the labour market may bear further crime-
enhancing aspects besides unemployment - for example, wages, wage inequality and labour
conditions.
Considering wages first, Grogger (1995) finds by means of a sophisticated theoretical and
empirical model that a 10 per cent increase in the wage would lead to a 1.8 percentage point
reduction in the crime participation rate. This result is consistent with the economic theory of
crime which predicts that ceteris paribus higher legal income opportunities (i.e. higher legal
wages) lead to a decrease in delinquency. However, in a recent macro study by Willis (1999a)
22
 An extensive discussion of the reciprocal relationship between crime and the labour market can be
found in Section 2.2.2.
23
 Ehrlich (1973) provides an argument against this conclusion. According to him, it is possible that
unemployment also affects the crime decision of employed individuals. For them, the unemployment
rate can be regarded as the average "job-loss probability". Thus, future legal income is no longer cer-
tain, but - like illegal income - also subject to uncertainty. As a consequence expected legal income
will decrease with higher unemployment rates, what in turn renders delinquency more likely.
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who uses panel data on the 50 states covering 1979 to 1992, the evidence in favour of a crime-
reducing effect of higher minimal wages is weaker. Trying four minimum wage measures in
regressions for three index crimes (burglary, larceny-theft, and auto-theft), only two wage
measures turn out to be significant, and both are found in the regressions for auto theft.
Another possible link between the labour market and delinquency might be wage inequality.
From a theoretical point of view the effect of inequality24 on crime is straightforward. Ac-
cording to the economic crime theory higher economic inequality renders crime more re-
warding for those at the lower end of the wage/ income distribution. For these groups crime
becomes more likely. In the field of criminology, inequality is covered by means of the con-
cept "relative deprivation". "Relative deprivation is based upon the pervasive need for com-
parison between individuals or groups within a society. Comparison of one's position relative
to that of others (or one's past) is a way of assessing how satisfied one is" (Fowles and Merva
1996:164). Despite the positive relationship postulated between economic inequality and
crime by theories from different disciplines, empirical research has not so far yielded unambi-
guous results. In a recent study using panel data from the 28 largest U.S. Metropolitan Statis-
tical Areas covering 1975-1990, Fowles and Merva (1996) find a significant positive impact
of inequality on the violent crimes of murder and assault, but no evidence is found linking
inequality with robbery and burglary. For larceny/ theft, motor vehicle theft, and forcible rape
the results are even counterintuitive. Nevertheless, estimates more often turn out to be conclu-
sive than inconclusive. Fowles and Merva (1996) provide a summary of seven studies testing
the inequality/ crime effect. 18 out of 20 estimates have the expected (positive) sign, and 11
show significance. The two inconclusive negative estimates are not significant at the 5 per
cent level.
Finally, there might be a relation between job quality and crime. Using state-level data from
1977-1988, compiled from raw arrest data of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports and from the
Census Bureau's annual March Current Population Survey, Allan and Steffensmeier (1989)
investigate the effects of job availability and job quality (e.g., inadequate pay and hours) on
the arrest rates of juveniles and young people. They find that inadequate pay and working
24
 In the course of the present study the authors will not distinguish wage from income inequality. We
are aware of the fact that wage inequality and income inequality are not the same. However, in crime
research a differentiation would be of minor importance, since the arguments put forward in order to
explain the link between both kinds of inequality and crime are identical.
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hours are associated with high arrest rates for young adults for all four crime categories under
consideration (robbery, burglary, larceny and auto theft). In another study using data from 121
Seattle census tracts from 1979-1981, Crutchfield (1989) could not find any significance for
the "full time work" variable in the regressions for murder, assault, rape, and robbery.
2.1.12 Social security
Since social security is financed by social welfare contributions and taxes which in turn may
disturb the optimal allocation of resources, many economists demand cutting back the welfare
state. Such reductions do not necessarily have solely wanted effects. Predictions based on the
economic theory of crime suggest that a certain number of disadvantaged people who have
benefited from the welfare state, may now find delinquency a more tempting option. Moreo-
ver, the absence of social welfare payments leads to a higher inequality so that people who are
at the lower ends of the income distribution will have less chances to find legal income op-
portunities (see 2.1.3). Thus, for high-risk groups incentives of committing a crime increase.
There are four recent papers assessing this interesting trade-off, two of which are solely theo-
retical (Demougin and Schwager 1998 and Sala-I-Martin 1997a) and two of which are mainly
empirical (DeFronzo 1997 and Zhang 1997). Using cross-sectional U.S. state data of 1987,
Zhang (1997) investigates the impact of eight different welfare measures on property and
violent crime. Zhang employs indicators which are related to concrete welfare programs as
well as general welfare variables:
Individual welfare program measures:
• Aid to Families with Dependent Children payments and recipients (AFDC)25,
• Medicaid payments (Medicaid),
• National School Lunch Program payments (School Lunch),
• Public Housing Assistance expenditures (Public Housing).
General welfare:
• Sum of all welfare payments divided by state population (W1),
• number of recipients of all welfare programs divided by state population (W2),
• ratio of maximum AFDC benefit over AFDC need standard for a three-person family
(W3),
• sum of all welfare payments divided by state population (W4).
25
 AFDC is a program administered and funded by Federal and State governments of the United States
to provide financial assistance to needy families.
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Zhang finds that property crime can be reduced by increasing per capita welfare payments
(Wl), recipient-population ratio (W2) or maximum benefits (W3) in a state. Moreover he
states that individual programs available to both genders (e.g. public housing) have a larger
effect on crime than programs primarily directed towards women (like AFDC). Concerning
violent crimes, Zhang could not find any significant impact of welfare programs. In contrast to
that, DeFronzo (1997) finds in his study based on 141 U.S. cities an independent, direct nega-
tive impact of AFDC on homicide rates and a separate indirect negative relationship to homi-
cide rates through AFDCs association with household status.
2.1.13 Family
In the discussion of the social disorganisation and social control theory (see Sections 2.1.1 and
2.1.5), factors based on family attachments have already been revealed to be an important
factor of crime. As regards the empirical literature specialised in the family/ crime relation,
studies in this field of research are almost exclusively concerned with the families' impact on
child delinquency. Loeber and Stouthamer-Loeber (1986) provide an enormous survey of the
literature. They identify three categories of family failure which are central to the understand-
ing of child delinquency. "The neglect paradigm focuses on measures of supervision and the
amount of interaction between parent and child. [..,] The conflict paradigm deals withthe ade-
quacy of parental discipline or punishment and mutual rejection of parent and child. [Finally,
the deviant behaviour and attitudes paradigm] focuses on parental behavior that encourages
delinquency by positive example or by the failure to respond negatively to clearly deviant be-
haviour of the child" (Hirschi 1995:125/126). However, there are also a few studies which are
concerned with other consequences of family failure than child delinquency. In two recent
papers the consequences of marital status and social isolation on homicides are investigated.
Using data from the 1992 U.S. Mortality Detail File, Breault and Kposowa (1997:217) find
that divorced females were 55.3 per cent more likely to be homicide victims than married fe-
males. But single women did not differ from married women with respect to homicide risk,
and widowed women were significantly less likely to be homicide victims than married
women. In a similar study Kposowa, Singh and Breault (1994) investigate the effects of
marital status and social isolation on male adult homicide. Kposowa et al. (1994:227) report
that "single persons were 1.9 times, and divorced, separated or widowed persons were 1.7
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times more likely to die from homicide than married persons. Socially isolated persons were
1.6 times more likely to become homicide victims".
2.1.14 Peers and gangs
The importance of delinquent peer relations for one's criminal behaviour has already been
stressed in the discussion of differential association and interactional theory (see Sections
2.1.4 and 2.1.8). As regards the influence of peers, researchers agree that delinquent peers do
increase delinquent behaviour. Meanwhile, it is also accepted that delinquent peer relations
and own delinquency are reciprocally related. Using data from the National Youth Survey and
estimating a cross-lagged panel model, Matsueda and Anderson (1998) find that "delinquent
peer associations and delinquent behavior are reciprocally related, but the effect of delin-
quency on peer associations is [even] larger than that of peer associations on delinquency
(Matsueda and Anderson 1998:269). By means of the Rochester Youth Development Study
data, Thornberry, Lizotte, Krohn, Farnworth and Joon Jang (1994:47) detect a further recipro-
cal relationship between delinquent peers and delinquency. "Association with delinquent
peers leads to increases in delinquency via the reinforcing environment of the peer network.
Engaging in delinquency, in turn, leads to increases in associations with delinquent peers".
Employing the same data set, Thornberry, Krohn, Lizotte and Chard-Wierschem (1993) find
that entering a gang reinforces crime and leaving the gang reduces delinquency. However, if
one considers peer relations other than delinquent ones ("good" friendships), the effect on
criminal behaviour is expected to have the opposite direction. Particularly social control the-
ory (see 2.1.5) stresses the crime reducing effect of "attachment" (see also the significant
negative impact of "density of friendship" in Table 1).
2.1.15 Social class
Social class or socio-economic status (SES) is generally determined in terms of income and/
or education of the individuals under investigation. In the case of youth, crime research usu-
ally applies the SES of parents. Among scholars who are engaged in research on the SES/ de-
linquency relation, there is disagreement about the relevant SES scale. "Some [...] have pro-
posed that it is only at the very lowest point on SES continuum that differences in delinquency
can be found. They argue that research using gradational measures, which array respondents
on a continuum, are inappropriate for examining the SES/ delinquency relationship, and they
50
propose instead a two category measurement that delineates 'underclass' from all others"
(Tittle and Meier 1990:273). The empirical literature about the influence of the socio-
economic status (SES) of individuals on crime reveals ambiguous results. In their survey of
the SES/ delinquency literature, Tittle and Meier (1990:271) conclude that "the results do not
support any of the conditional hypotheses about SES and delinquency, and they again chal-
lenge the idea that a negative SES/ delinquency relationship is general and pervasive". In the
opinion of the authors of the present EU-study, this view is somewhat biased, as the clear
majority of the presented studies produced negative SES/ crime estimates (i.e. the higher the
social class of an individual is the lower is his delinquency). Tittle and Meier, however, often
declared these results to be invalid because of methodological shortcomings.
2.1.16 Mobility and Community Change
A high rate of mobility is expected to increase institutional disruption and weaken community
controls. Therefore, mobility is one of the central variables employed in tests of the social
disorganisation theory (see Section 2.1.1). Contrary to expected effects, mobility showed the
worst performance among all social disorganisation variables. Therefore, it is appropriate to
consider further empirical studies which employed mobility as an explanatory variable of
crime. We do this by borrowing from Sampson's (1995:195) survey: "Block (1979), for ex-
ample, reports large negative correlations between residential stability and the violent crimes
of homicide, robbery, and aggravated assault. Victimisation data from the National Crime
Survey also show that residential mobility has significant positive effects on rates of violent
crime (Sampson 1985). Even after adjusting for other neighbourhood-level factors, rates of
violent victimisation for residents of high mobility neighbourhoods are at least double those of
residents in low mobility areas (Sampson 1985:30, 1986:44)". From this additional evidence
one can conclude that the use of a mobility indicator in empirical studies of crime is advisable.
2.1.17 Age, gender and nationality / race
If one considers the distribution of a population with respect to age, gender and nationality /
race, and if one compares these distributions with the respective distributions of suspects of
crime, striking differences emerge. To give an example, in Germany (in 1996) the share'of
men in the population was 49 per cent, but the share of male offenders was larger than 75 per
cent; the share of citizens aged 6-24 in the population was 21 per cent, but 40 per cent of all
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offenders belonged to this age group; one forth of the suspects of crime were foreigners,
whereas their population share equalled only 9 per cent. These figures do not represent Ger-
man peculiarities, but can be observed in a similar manner across all western countries. One
might suspect that this strong relation between age, gender, nationality and crime is simply
spurious evidence which will presumably vanish in a multivariate context. However, this ob-
jection is not correct. Most multivariate studies which use age, gender and nationality or com-
binations of them as explanatory variables find highly significant coefficients with expected
signs (see for example Ehrlich 1973, Entorf and Spengler 1998). Since consistent explanations
of the direct effects of age, gender and nationality/ race are lacking, the robust finding of sig-
nificance for these variables in crime regressions must be due to the absorption of unobserv-
able heterogeneity and the omission of correlated relevant (observable) variables. Thus, age,
gender and nationality/ race are useful control variables which should be included in crime
regressions. On the other hand, there also exists U.S. evidence for a reciprocal relationship
between crime and racial composition of the urban population. Whereas racial composition
strongly affects the change in violent-crime rates, robbery rates appear to play a significant
role in the white urban flight from central cities (Liska and Bellair 1995).
2.1.18 Urbanity
What has been said about age, gender and nationality/ race in some respect also holds true for
urbanity. Measures which account for urbanity, like population density, often turn out to have
a significant positive effect on crime. But it is not obvious why urbanity per se should directly
affect crime. Glaeser and Sacerdote (1996) report that 27 per cent of the urban crime effect
(i.e. the difference between rural and urban crime rates) in the United States is due to higher
pecuniary benefits for crime in cities, 20 per cent is explained by lower arrest probabilities and
lower probabilities of recognition, and the remaining 45-60 per cent of the effect can be re-
lated to observable characteristics of individuals in cities. Thus, according to Glaeser and Sa-
cerdote the whole urban crime effect can be explained by other variables than by urbanity it-
self. However, Roncek (1981) provides an explanation of how urbanity (i.e. high population
density) may directly affect crime. If the population density increases, the number of residents
who do not know each other but share common living space becomes higher, and thus, resi-
dents are less able to recognise their neighbours, to be concerned about them or to engage in
guardianship behaviours (Roncek 1981:88). There also exists evidence for a reciprocal rela-
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tionship between crime and urbanity (see the papers of Burnell 1988, Bursik 1986, Cullen and
Levitt 1999, Frey 1979, Grubb 1982, Liska and Bellair 1995 and Sampson and Wooldredge
1986). According to this studies higher crime rates are an important cause of (white) popula-
tion flight from central cities in the U.S..
2.1.19 Law enforcement
Law enforcement or deterrence variables have been introduced to crime research by econo-
mists. Variables/ indicators representing law enforcement are covered by probabilities of ar-
rest, clearance, conviction and conviction given arrest, and by the number of police. Further
examples are the variables related to type and severity of punishment. Empirical research on
law enforcement started with the seminal paper of Ehrlich (1973) and did not lose its impor-
tance until today (see for example Levitt 1997). Since today the empirical literature has
reached an enormous size, it is reasonable to rely on the excellent survey of Eide (1997) in
order to assess the importance of deterrence variables for variations in crime. Eide (1997:16)
concludes that "as a whole, criminometric studies clearly indicate a negative association be-
tween crime and the probability and severity of punishment". But he also points to the fact
that few studies find insignificant (see for example Witte 1980) or even inconsistent positive
effects. The latter, however, might by the result of potential interactions between deterrence
and crime variables (see the discussion in Section 2.1.3). Levitt (1997) has presented a widely
discussed paper that takes into account potential simultaneous interactions between the num-
ber of police and the crime rate. Based on a panel of large U.S. cities, he tackles the interac-
tion problem by applying econometric instrumental variable techniques. Relating variations in
police size and electoral cycles, he comes to the conclusion that more police significantly re-
duce crime. A considerable number of earlier papers has missed to show this relation - pre-
sumably because estimates have been corrupted as a consequence of ignored interactional
relations.
2.1.20 Private crime prevention
Compared to empirical assessments of the law enforcement/ crime relation, the impact of pri-
vate security measures on crime hasxbeen neglected. Presumably, this is rather a consequence
of lacking access to appropriate data than an indication for the minor relevance of this sector.
For the United States Philipson and Posner (1996) estimate that private expenditures to reduce
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crime are $300 milliard annually. If this figure represents a reasonable estimate, it would
equal three times the amount the government spent for criminal justice in 1995 which was
almost $100 milliard. Two recent empirical studies on private security (Ayres and Levitt 1998
and Miethe 1991) find significant crime reducing effects of private security measures. Ayres
and Levitt (1998) investigate the impact of a new electronic car retrieval system ("Lojack")
which is invisibly hidden in the car. They report that the availability of Lojack (Lojack was
subsequently introduced in the United States) is associated with a sharp fall in auto theft and
extraordinarily high positive externalities. According to Ayres and Levitt, the marginal social
benefit of an additional unit of Lojack exceeds the marginal social costs in high crime areas by
a factor 15. Miethe (1991) investigates the crime-reduction benefits of safety precautions and
whether either displacement (i.e. other people get victimised instead of those who protect
themselves) or positive externalities characterise how the target-hardening activities of imme-
diate neighbours influence risks of burglary, property theft, and vandalism. Miethe finds that
only the personal risk of burglary victimisation were significantly reduced by protection ac-
tivities. No externalities were found i.e. neighbours did neither suffer nor profit from the pro-
tection measures.
2.1.21 Media
There is a substantial body of empirical research by psychologists investigating the relation-
ship between television (and video) violence and aggressive behaviour (for a survey of the
literature see Donnerstein and Linz (1995)). This literature has been analysed by three large
U.S. meta-studies in three different decades (Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Commit-
tee on Television and Social Behavior 1972, National Institute of Mental Health 1982, Ameri-
can Psychological Association 1993). The central core of the results across the three meta-
studies can be summarised as follows: "High levels of television viewing are correlated with
aggressive behavior and the acceptance of aggressive attitudes. Furthermore, these correla-
tions are fairly stable over time, place, and demographics. An examination of hundreds of
experimental and longitudinal studies supported the position that viewing violence in the mass
media is causally, related to aggressive behavior. More important, naturalistic field studies and
cross-national studies supported the position that the viewing of televised aggression leads to
increases in subsequent aggression and that such behavior can become part of a behavioral
pattern that lasts well into adulthood" (Donnerstein and Linz 1995:248). In order to provide a
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concrete example, Phillips and Hensley (1984) examined the patterns of more than 140,000
U.S. homicides from 1973 to 1979 before and after publicity about prizefights, murder acqui-
tals, life sentences and executions. Using daily data and regression analysis Philips and Hen-
sley report that the number of homicides show a significant increase several days after the
fight. Phillips (1983) replicates and refines these results by finding that this increase primarily
occurs in the population belonging to the race of the defeated prizefighter. Further findings
reported by Phillips and Hensley (1984) are that the number of homicides taking place after
publicised stories about death sentences, life sentences, and executions was lower for several
days following these events. There is also some macro-evidence of the impact of television
violence on homicide rates stemming from a comparison of the United States, Canada and
South Africa. Whereas in the two American countries television was introduced in the early
1950s, South Africans had to wait until 1975, and, thus, were excluded from the exposure to
television (violence), for approximately 25 years. Centerwall (1989) puts forward the hypothe-
sis that this difference in the exposure to media might be reflected in the homicide rates of the
three countries. And indeed, from 1945 to 1974, the white homicide rate in the United States
and Canada increased by 93 and 92 per cent respectively, whereas that of South Africa de-
clined by 7 per cent. In order to strengthen his results Centerwall accounted for several other
factors (civil unrest, antiwar and civil rights activity, age distribution, urbanisation, alcohol
consumption, capital punishment, and the availability of firearms) that could drive the results,
but came to the conclusion that none of these provides a viable explanation of the phenome-
non. Nevertheless, Centerwall can be criticised for several reasons. It might be questioned
whether the United States, Canada, and South Africa are comparable countries after all (for a
discussion of the suitability of international crime data see Lynch (1995)). Finally, in order to
be complete, one has to recognise that there is also a different view of the influence of televi-
sion exposure on criminal behaviour. In this context we want to recall the routine activity/
lifestyle theory (Section 2.1.2) according to which watching TV is regarded as a crime-
reducing at-home activity.
2.1.22 Religion/ Religiosity
Advanced empirical research on the impacts of religion on crime started with the study "Hell-
fire and Delinquency" by Hirschi and Stark (1969). In contrast to common beliefs, Hirschi and
Stark found that frequent church attenders and students who believe in the Devil after death
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do not differ significantly in their delinquent behaviour from students who do not believe in a
supernatural world (Hirshi and Stark 1969:210). Subsequent research (Higgins and Albrecht
1977, Jensen and Erickson 1979 and Rohrbaugh and Jessor 1975), however, has indeed found
an effect of religion on various forms of deviant behaviour, including crime. The results of
this earlier research might be best summarised in the words of Grasmick, Bursik and Cochran
(1991:251): "Sociologists have concluded that at least some aspects of religion inhabit at least
some kinds of illegal behavior at least under some conditions". This assessment seems to be
also appropriate when recent contributions are taken into account (see for example Benda
1997, Cochran, Wood and Arneklev 1994 and Evans, Cullen, Dunaway and Burton 1995).
Using self-report data from a sample of approximately 1,600 high school students in Okla-
homa, Cochran et al. investigate the effect of 3 religion variables (religious participation, re-
ligious salience and Protestant fundamentalism) on 6 types of deviant behaviour (interpersonal
delinquencies, property-theft delinquencies, property-damage delinquencies, illicit drug use,
use of legalised drugs, and truancy). As additional explaining variables, Cochran et al. use the
common control variables (age, race, gender and urbanity), six variables stemming from social
control theory and three so-called arousal-variables. The regression results provide only weak
evidence for a crime-reducing effect of religiosity. Only three out of 18 coefficients turn out to
be significant - Protestant fundamentalism reduces illicit drug use, religious participation has
an negative impact on the use of legalised drugs, and religious salience negatively effects tru-
ancy. Evans et al. (1995) investigate the effect of three religiosity variables (denominational
conservatism, religious networks and personal religiosity, where the latter is a joint measure
of religious activities, hellfire beliefs and religious salience) on general delinquency. They test
four different model specifications and find that two out of 12 coefficients are significantly
different from zero. The central result of the study is that personal religiosity only affects gen-
eral crime when the former is measured by religious activities alone. In contrast to all other
studies about religion and deviance, Benda (1997) also takes interactional relationships into
account. Benda reports significant bi-directional relations between religiosity and drug use
and between religiosity and crime. The relationship between religiosity and alcohol use, how-
ever turned out to be unidirectional (from alcohol use to religiosity). To our opinion, if avail-
able, religion indicators should not be omitted from empirical investigations of crime, though
the significance of religion in criminometric studies might arise from unobserved heterogene-
ity rather than from true religious differences.
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2.1.23 Weather
Considering weather as a potential factor of crime is not as bizarre as it might appear at first
glance, because from a routine activity/ lifestyle perspective (Section 2.1.2) weather is a vari-
able that might influence decisions on time allocation: time could either be spent at "unsafe"
public places or at "safe" home. According to Cheatwood (1995:51) of all weather variables
which have been under investigation, temperature turns out to be the most important. An in-
crease in temperature has been found to correlate with an increase in assault (see for example
Anderson 1989, Harries 1990, Lab and Hirschel 1988), homicide (Kohfeld and Sprague
1991), violent crime in general (Cotton 1986), rape (Michael and Zumpe 1983) and police
calls for service (Cohn 1991, LeBeau and Langworthy 1986). The relationship between tem-
perature and crime seems to hold across time and space. Cheatwood (1995:53) provides ex-
amples for correlations between alternative weather variables and crime: Pakiam and Lim
(1984) found that robbery decreases in Singapore during periods of rain, but increased cloud
cover seems to be positively associated with assault (Lab and Hirschel 1987) and general
criminal violence in Korea (Chang 1972). McFarland (1983) also suggests that severe cold
reduces homicide. In a recent study on England and Wales, Field (1992) finds that tempera-
ture has a positive effect on most types of property and violent crime, because higher tem-
peratures cause people to spend more time outside (save) home. It has to be emphasised, how-
ever, that there are other studies which do not find significant relations between weather vari-
ables and crime (see LaRoche and Tillery 1956, Pokorny and Davis 1964 and Olsson and
Wikstrom 1984).
2.2 Summary of research on the negative impact of crime on economic performance
2.2.1 On the importance of bi-directional crime models
Traditional modelling of crime sought to understand how economic variables can lead to
crime. The most recent development of criminological and economic literature, however, con-
siders ways in which crime itself might lead to economic problems. The overwhelming ma-
jority of studies focuses on labour market performance. Section 2.2.2 presents a survey. Given
its obvious importance for economics there is surprisingly little evidence on how location de-
cisions of firms and households might be affected by crime and criminal neighbourhood. Re-
cent articles by Cullen and Levitt (1999) and Willis (1999b) provide remarkable exceptions
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(see Section 2.2.3). Estimating the costs of crime is important for the efficient use of public
policy. Section 2.2.4 provides more details. Among the costs of crime, illegal drug use plays a
prominent role. Illegal drug use causes about 20 per cent of the total crime costs in the U.S.
and might cause poverty (see Section 2.2.5). Finally, we draw attention to the consequences of
corruption and organised crime, though little empirical evidence apart from anecdotal evi-
dence is available (Section 2.2.6).
2.2.2 Labour market outcomes
2.2.2.1 Loss of future employment: Three obvious reasons
It has become increasingly clear that employment and crime relate to each other in several
ways. For instance, Freeman (1991, 1995) presents evidence that a prison record has a sub-
stantial quantitative adverse effect on future employment. Using U.S. data of the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), it turned out that a young man incarcerated in 1979
worked about 25 per cent less in the ensuing eight years than a young man who has not been
in prison. What might be the reasons for this massive loss of future employment? Freeman
(1991) decomposes the effect into three possible effects. The first is recidivism. For the U.S.,
Freeman mentions a recidivism rate in the order of two-thirds of state prisoners aged 18-34
that have been re-arrested within three years. Persons who have been in jail are more likely to
be in jail in later years as well. The same holds for European data. German data, for instance,
reveal that 27 per cent of all releases on probation ending in 1994 ended because of recidivism
(Statistisches Bundesamt 1998).
The second possibility is that persons who went to jail reject work in favour of crime after
their release. Sviridoff and Thompson (1983), who interviewed 61 adult male misdemeanants
before and after their release, report a typical quotation that supports the economists' claim
that crime is based on rational choice and on the weighing of the relative merits of risky crime
and working life: "They were making $200 a day in the street, $150 a day, gambling, stealing.
And now they gonna work, ten hours a day, seven days a week for $125?" (Sviridoff and
Thompson 1983:210). According to Sviridoff and Thompson, the problem with ex-offenders
who were involved in property crime is that they seem to be particularly aware of crime and
.employment as competing alternatives. The problem is reinforced by the recent improvement
of criminal skills at the expense of legitimate skills. Thus, employment must be good enough
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to be accepted. According to Sviridoff and Thompson (1983), this kind of calculus gives rise
to alternation between employment and crime. They consider this behaviour as the prevalent
model for high-risk youths.
The third possibility is that employers are unwilling to hire ex-offenders. Sampson and Laub
(1997) claim that formal labelling by the criminal justice system in adulthood will directly
cause employers to exclude ex-offenders from employment opportunities. As can be seen
from a survey by Bushway (1998:455), such exclusion is associated with job instability, which
has shown to increase offending (see e.g. Cook 1975, Farrington et al. 1986, Needels 1996,
Sampson and Laub 1993).
A distinction has to be made between labelling and signalling. Employers can make use of a
criminal record as a signal about the qualification of a job (Jensen and Giegold 1976, Bush-
way 1998). Examples of using a criminal history as a signal rather than a label include re-
stricting convicted drunk drivers from jobs as a truck driver or restricting an individual ar-
rested multiple times for child molestation from working in a child care centre.
2.2.2.2 Reasons for job instability: Criminality, conviction or third factors?
Evidently, employers label potential employees on the basis of their criminal record. How-
ever, the existence of labelling does not prove to be the true source of significant job instabil-
ity (see Bushway 1998, for a recent survey of the criminological literature and many of the
following arguments). A delinquent youth might have problems maintaining a stable employ-
ment anyway (see Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). Or, as Hagan (1993) notes, problems with
job stability following an arrest could actually be the result of the criminal activity itself. A
process which he calls "social or criminal embeddedness" leaves delinquent youths without
human and social capital that would be necessary to start a regular career job. This reasoning
is obvious according to the definition of "social capital". Social capital consists of three com-
ponents (Coleman 1988, see Williams and Sickles 1997, for an application in economics):
Networks for disseminating and obtaining information (e.g. about job opportunities), a reward
and punishment system, and a system of reciprocal debts and obligations. Hagan (1993) found
support for his hypothesis using Farrington's London data (Farrington et al. 1986). He con-
trolled for individual heterogeneity with a long list of observed measures of individual be-
haviour. Nevertheless, self-reported delinquency at the ages of 18 and 19 had an impact on the
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probability of experiencing a spell of unemployment at the ages of 21 and 22. Hagan
(1993:482) interprets his result to mean that the "embeddedness in youth crime more than
official convictions [...] is influencing unemployment at this stage".
However, Hagan (1993) seems to be the only well known study that has found that offending
rather than contacting with the criminal justice system leads to employment problems. For
instance, Sampson and Laub (1993) using U.S. data (1000 boys from Boston) conclude (after
controlling for excessive drinking, gender, age, race and delinquency) that the length of incar-
ceration as a juvenile has a significant impact on job stability. Contrary to Hagan (1993),
Sampson and Laub (1993) have not found any significant effect of self-reported delinquency.
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that official (serious) contact with the criminal
justice system has a negative impact on future employment and job stability. Freeman (1991),
Nagin and Waldfogel (1995) and Bushway (1998) are further examples confirming the latter
view of the link between crime and job instability.
Latest developments in the field of criminology are characterised by attempts to control for
unobserved individual heterogeneity using panel data (see Grogger 1995, Nagin and Waldfo-
gel 1995, Bushway 1998). This is the most recent stage in terms of adequate statistical tech-
niques. During the eighties, researchers were primarily concerned about simultaneity and
overestimating causal effects due to a potential simultaneous equation bias. For instance,
Liska and Reed (1985) using LISREL and individual data on youths in transition questioned
the traditional model assuming a recursive causal structure of social attachment on delin-
quency. Their results suggest that, with the exception of blacks, parental attachment affects
delinquency, but that likewise delinquency affects school attachment, and that school attach-
ment affects parental attachment. Using data of the birth cohort of 1945 and also using
LISREL, Thornberry and Christenson (1984) found simultaneity between crime and unem-
ployment (see also Sections 2.1.8 and 2.1.11).
Despite the progress made with respect to generalising simple unidirectional modelling, the
problem may arise that causal effects are not the only means by which correlation between
labour market measures and arrest records can be judged. An individual's probability to com-
mit a crime may be correlated with unobservable "third factors" which likewise might cause
employment opportunities (see, for instance, Albrecht (1988) for a conjecture of this kind).
Grogger (1995:66) gives a stylised example. Suppose that schooling, which is highly corre-
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lated with labour market productivity, is missing in the data. People with little schooling will
receive low wage offers. Thus, they might find it more attractive to spend their time commit-
ting crime. Over time, this would leave them to have a spotty employment record and many
arrests, but the correlation arises from unobserved schooling rather than from any causal effect
of the arrests. Such problems of "unobserved individual heterogeneity" can be tackled by us-
ing panel data and methods like fixed-effect modelling (Grogger 1995) or "differences in dif-
ferences" (Nagin and Waldfogel 1995, Bushway 1998). Coming back to the question "con-
viction versus criminality", Sampson and Laub (1993), Nagin and Waldfogel (1995) and
Bushway (1998) show that arrests lead to job instability even when controls for unobserved
heterogeneity are included in the model. The solely study in favour of criminality (Hagen
1993) only has controls for observed heterogeneity.
2.2.2.3 On magnitude, sign and durability of crime effects.
There is no doubt that persons whose criminal behaviour has brought them into prison have a
significantly lower employment rate and a higher job instability in the future than those who
do not commit crimes. Freeman (1991, 1995) estimates a reduction of employment of about
25 per cent within eight years after incarceration (see above). According to Bushway's (1998)
model of differences in differences, arrest decreased the longest time spent at a job by 10.78
weeks a year. This is large compared with the 1986 average for the sample of 41.89 weeks
worked for a major job. This results in a reduction of 25.73 per cent which is comparable with
Freeman's study as well as with estimates presented by Nagin and Waldfogel (1995), who
report a reduction of 32.8 per cent for 19-year-old youth.
In contrast to most studies on the effect of crime and conviction on income, Nagin and Wald-
fogel (1995) find that conviction might have a positive effect on the legitimate income of
young offenders. The authors explain the surprising results appealing to a human capital ex-
planation of workers' pay. Two types of jobs are available for young entrants to the labour
market: spot market jobs and career jobs. Career jobs require an apprenticeship and certain
skills. The human-capital theory predicts rising wage profiles and the prospect of long-term
employment. Wages will start from a low level and the individuals will receive part of their
compensation as training and pay for tenure and work experience. However, only spot market
jobs are offered to young offenders. They work as labourers, their job does not require training
and will tend to have flat wage profiles. The human capital theory suggests that job stability is
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lower for spot market jobs. Spot market job dismissal for poor performance is easier and less
costly to the firm, since loosing them does not imply significant losses of previous investment
in firm-specific human capital.
An important question for the future performance of western societies is whether involvement
with the criminal justice system has long-term effects or whether there are only short-lasting
deviations from the behaviour of non-criminals. Freeman (1991) and Sampson and Laub
(1997) conclude that incarceration had substantial long-term effects on earning and employ-
ment. Grogger (1995:70), however, finds that the effects of arrests on employment and earn-
ings are "moderate in magnitude and rather short-lived". His analysis suggests that most of the
negative correlation between arrest records and labour market success stems from unobserv-
able characteristics (which he controls for by using fixed effects). Freeman (1995:189) sum-
marises his own previous research by noting that probation might be considered as a "critical"
measure that might be used to discriminate between long-run and short-run effects: "In the
NLSY and two other data sets I found that anything short of probation has no discernible ef-
fects on the future employment of youths".
Though there is clear evidence of negative effects of crime on job stability, it has to be
stressed that crime and employment are no mutually exclusive activities. In other words,
working does not exclude simultaneous activities in the illegal sector. Freeman (1995:188)
reports that in the NLSY of 1979 and 1980, 59 per cent of those who were out of school and
unemployed said they had committed a crime, compared with 53 per cent of those out of
school and employed. Thus, there is only a small difference. These findings confirm Sviridoff
and Thompson (1983:201-203), who have drawn special attention to respondents of their
qualitative study for whom work is a way of expanding and enhancing criminal activities.
Furthermore, results by Ploeger (1997) suggest that employment, not unemployment, is re-
sponsible for the exposure to delinquent peers, so that employment and crime are positively
correlated.
2.2.2.4 What is the aggregate effect?
All studies mentioned above are based on individual data. The massive loss of individual em-
ployment probabilities can only translate into discernible aggregate effects when a significant
proportion of the population has a criminal history. There are only a few studies that test bi-
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directional causality between unemployment and criminality (Freeman 1983, Corman, Joyce
and Lovitch 1987, Yamada et al. 1991, Reilly and Witt 1992). All studies confirm a unidirec-
tional causality of unemployment on crime.
It has to be questioned, however, whether this result will hold in future. Given the massive
increase of prison population in western societies during the most recent years, there will be
an unprecedented share of ex-prisoners in society. Freeman (1995:172) reports that for U.S.
men aged 18 to 34, the ratio of those incarcerated to the labour force was 3.1 per cent in 1993.
The corresponding ratio of those under supervision of the criminal justice system was 11 per
cent. These figures come close to or even exceed the unemployment rates. For minorities the
ratios are much larger. For black men aged 18 to 34 the ratios to the workforce are 12.7 per
cent incarcerated and 36.7 per-cent under supervision (Freeman 1995:172). Time series analy-
sis that has to rely on historical data cannot fully reflect these unprecedented developments, so
that forecasts based on previous studies will be of limited use only.26 Thus, to summarise ag-
gregate effects, we are sceptical of reading much into previous findings. In respect of fore-
casting future developments, individual studies are likewise important. They present reason-
able pathways of influence that might also be found in future aggregate data.
2.2.3 Location decisions and crime
A further disadvantage of highly aggregate studies is that they do not cover the economic
situation of particular regions, urban areas and special industries which might be subject to
substantial crime distortions. It is natural to think that urban crime and job losses of cities are
related. In fact, city crime rates have risen steadily while jobs have moved to the suburbs.
However, rigorous statistical investigations on the hypothesis that crime actually drives out
jobs are rare. Cullen and Levitt (1999) use data of 137 U.S. cities from 1976 till 1993 to ana-
lyse the relationship between crime and "urban flight". They find that each additional reported
crime in a central city is associated with a net decline of about one resident. The economic
consequence is reinforced by the drain of high income households: These households are five
times more responsive than those of the poor, and the households with children are twice as
responsive as those without children. Where do those people leaving central cities go? The
26
 This problem is well known to economists as the so-called Lucas-critique, and also addressed in the
criminological literature by Chiricos (1987), who pointed at the "conditional" nature of the unemploy-
ment-crime relationship (see Section 2.1.11).
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analysis by Cullen and Levitt (1999) shows that 70 per cent remain within the metropolitan
area. Further studies investigating the impact of crime on (white) population flight from cen-
tral cities which find similar results are Burnell (1988), Bursik (1986), Frey (1979), Grubb
(1982), Liska and Bellair (1995) and Sampson and Wooldredge (1986).
Willis (1999b) provides evidence at a high level of spatial detail. He estimates employment
density as a function of violent and property crime for a sample of 629 neighbourhoods (mu-
nicipalities) in the city of Los Angeles. Controlling for fixed neighbourhood effects and si-
multaneity between employment and crime, he finds that violent crime is negatively related to
employment. Specifically, an increase of one per cent violent crime is associated with a de-
crease of 14 jobs per square mile. Two of these 14 jobs are lost in the relatively attractive
manufacturing sector and nine are lost in services and other employment. One of each group is
lost in wholesale trade and public utilities. The employment in retail trade and in construction
seems to be insensitive to crime.
Willis (1999b) uses crime measured as crimes per square mile. The traditionally used crime
rate (crimes per inhabitant) may be inappropriate at this level of spatial detail, since the resi-
dent population matches poorly with the pool of potential victims. Using the density measure
property crime seems to be statistically unrelated to employment. However, in robustness
checks Willis (1999b) applied the traditional crime rate rather than the crime density. The
results suggest that also property crimes may indeed have an important role in explaining job
location.
Though the idea that crime may drive business away is not new (see, for instance, Polumbo
and Hutton 1987 and Gottlieb 1995), Willis paper gives many new insights in this field. For
instance, he draws attention to the fact that the theoretically expected sign of the relationship
between firm location and crime is ambiguous. Since rents are negatively correlated with
crime, "firms will choose to locate where the marginal damage from crime equals the mar-
ginal saving in rent" (Willis 1999b:3). Thus, location decisions are expected to differ by the
factor intensity. Land-intensive firms would experience greater relative gains than labour-
intensive firms do. Moreover, firms carrying expensive inventory (e.g. jewellery stores) are
naturally very vulnerable to crime.
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Further evidence on firms' attitude towards crime is extremely scarce. Sampson (1995) men-
tions a study of 62 manufacturing firms that moved from New York City to New Jersey (Inter-
face 1985). Many of the surveyed firms perceived safety concerns. For example, 9 per cent
said that crime was the most important reason for moving, and 21 per cent cited crime as one
reason among several others. 19 per cent mentioned less crime as one of the factors that in-
crease the attractiveness of New Jersey rather than the outer boroughs of New York City.
Comparing the urban flight of residents and firms, Sampson (1995:204) concludes that
"...business decisions appear to be less sensitive to crime rates than do residential ones, they
are not immune from the social disorganization, fear, and social incivilities associated with
street violence".
Seitz and Pohl (1997) provide some evidence on the crime burden perceived by German
firms. The study is based on a survey containing 541 responding firms in two cities and one
municipality of the state Saarland (Saarlouis, 40,000 inhabitants, Neunkirchen, 54,000 in-
habitants and Freisen, 9400 inhabitants). About 10 to 14 per cent of firms consider crime as a
major handicap for their workaday routine, whereas about 50 to 60 per cent consider crime of
being only of marginal importance. The survey also contains information about pecuniary
damages of businesses due to crime per year (average of the years 1994 and 1995). The aver-
age damage is DM 100 per worker, which would result in the rough estimate of about 1 per
cent of German GDP (with the proviso of uncertain representativity).
Besides damages which have to be covered by firms, further general economic consequences
of urban flight are falling property values (see also Buck, Hakim and Spiegel 1991) and the
reduction of city taxes. Thus, in order to fund a given level of city services, crime does not
only imposes costs on victims but on all city residents as well.
2.2.4 Costs of crime
The assessment of the overall economic impact of crime is an essential basis for policy and
decision making. From one perspective, costs of crime are simply part of the overhead of run-
ning a modern society. A certain amount of costs is unavoidable, since the society spends just
enough so that, in a social optimum, the marginal Euro spent for crime control equals the
27
 It has to be noted, however, that used data cannot be considered as a representative sample of all
German firms. Firms in larger cities are expected to have more serious problems.
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marginal revenue from reduced crime (Becker 1968). From another perspective, however,
spending money on crime is pure waste.
In order to calculate the burden of crime, a comparison could be made with an ideal state in
which there is no occurrence of criminal behaviour defined by existing law. "Economic costs
of crime arise when crime causes society to divert time, energy and resources from more pro-
ductive resources" (Walker 1997:2). However, estimates of costs of crime are difficult to
make. Costs of crime do not only include property losses, medical costs and pay losses due to
injury. They also include costs of public and private efforts made to prevent and reduce future
crime rates, as well as costs of the criminal justice system. Moreover, there are intangible
costs such as those resulting from shattered lives and from a lack of full participation in life
because of fear of crime.
Despite these difficulties, estimating the costs of crime is indispensable. Cost estimates are
closer to the truth than official statistics. Official crime statistics simply count monetary val-
ues of "lost" property . Crime policy based on official statistics would be misleading, since
costs such as those for child abuse and rape, for instance, would be measured as zero.
Estimates are based on victim surveys and on certain assumptions. The latter are necessary to
calculate intangible costs. For instance, the lost quality of live is the largest cost component
for crimes of violence. This cost component is also subject to most uncertainty. Miller, Cohen
and Wirsema (1996) estimate the cost of a murder victim by $1.9 million. This does not mean
that anyone would give his life away for $1.9 million. The number is arrived at by estimating
the incremental amount that individuals are willing to pay for a reduced risk of death, not
death itself: "If 100,000 people would collectively pay $30 each to reduce their risk of dying
from 1/100,000 to 0, one would say that this values the 'statistical life" that is likely to be
saved by $3 million ($30 x 100,000 people)" (Miller, Cohen and Wirsema 1996:15).
According to Miller, Cohen and Wirsema (1996) the cost of crime to victims amount to $ 450
milliard annually, which is about 6 per cent of GDP in the US (1995). Not included are costs
of reducing the risk of becoming a victim (prevention), costs of operating the criminal justice
system and opportunity costs. The latter include the loss of potential worker's productivity of
individuals held in jail. The most comprehensive bill for tangible and intangible costs has
been presented by Anderson (1999). Beyond expenses of the legal system, victim losses and
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crime-prevention agencies, the burden of crime includes the opportunity costs of victims' ,
criminals', and prisoners' time, the fear of being victimised, and the cost of private deterrence.
Anderson's (1999) estimate for the annual burden of the U.S. society is $ 1.1 billion. This
would be equivalent to 13 per cent of GDP!
Sound estimates of the costs of crime are also available for France (Palle and Godefroy 1998)
and for Australia (Walker 1997). According to Walker's estimate, it appears that crime costs
Australians at least $18 milliard per annum, or 4 per cent of GDP. Freeman (1996), too, pres-
ents figures which amount to 4 per cent of the GDP of USA (2 per cent lost to crime and 2 per
cent spent on controlling crime). Even Becker (1968) gave a rough estimate of about 4 per
cent for the US, though this estimate is based on much lesser crime rates of the sixties.
2.2.5 Drug abuse
Besides "value of lost life" (439,880 million) and "occupational fraud" ($ 203,952 million),
"drug trafficking" ($ 160,584 million) is the third biggest single item in Anderson's (1999)
cost bill. With the cost of prenatal drug exposure and federal, state, and local drug control
efforts, the combined cost of drug-related activities is about $ 200 milliard. Moreover, there is
conventional wisdom that (illegal) drug use causes poverty. Empirical evidence supporting
this view is given by Kaestner (1998). He also gives pathways of influence, where deteriora-
tion of human capital plays a central role. Poverty also arises via the loss of family attach-
ments (marriage and fertility).
Kaestner's analysis is based on two US samples of young adults (National Household Survey
of Drug Abuse, and NLSY). The author has obtained a variety of estimates of the effect of
marijuana and cocaine use on poverty. Drug users have lower family incomes and are more
likely to participate in public-assistance programs than non-users. Including family back-
ground measures into the regressions had little influence on the effect of drug use on poverty.
This result is surprising since disadvantaged family backgrounds are often associated with
both drug use and poverty. In terms of mediating factors, the effect of drugs on female poverty
mainly works through the effect on marriage and fertility (once included in the regression, the
residual effect of drug use was insignificant). Among males, marriage and fertility had no sig-
nificant effect. Here, education played a more important rule. As a note of caution (added by
the author himself), there might be empirical limitations on general conclusions from Kaest-
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ner's article. Since the analysis is based on a cross-section, measurement error and unobserved
heterogeneity may have confounded the effect of drug use on poverty.
2.2.6 Corruption and organised crime
Corruption and organised crime have important economic consequences. However, for obvi-
ous reasons empirical evidence escapes detection. Thus, not surprisingly, the discussion is
mostly theoretical and anecdotal. There are two recent exceptions carried out by IMF staff
members (Mauro 1998, Tanzi and Davoodi 1997). Both studies use the "corruption index" of
the "International Country Risk Guide", covering the 1982-95 period for more than 100 coun-
tries, published annually by Business International and Political Risk Services, Inc.. Mauro
(1998) presents evidence of a negative, significant, and robust relationship between corruption
and government expenditure on education. This is a reason for concern since education is
known as a main factor of long-run economic growth (see, for instance, Levine and Renelt
1992).
Mauro's (1998) analysis provides the first cross-country evidence that corruption does indeed
prevent the optimal allocation of government expenditures. The negatively associated rela-
tionship between government expenditure on education and corruption is robust to a number
of changes in the specification. For instance, controlling for the ratio of population aged be-
tween 5 and 20 to total population (indicator for the need of education) raises the coefficient
on corruption by around one third. Moreover, the association is rather unaffected by including
an indicator of political stability. Finally, it is worth noting that the association broadly re-
mains the same when estimated in sub-samples of developed or developing countries.
As a possible interpretation of the correlation, Mauro (1998) argues that his results are con-
sistent with the hypothesis that education provides more limited opportunities for rent-seeking
(Krueger 1974) than other items do. Large bribes are available in markets where the degree of
competition is low, and where corrupt officials will choose goods whose exact value is diffi-
cult to monitor (Mauro 1998:264). Thus, specialised high-technology goods (Shleifer and
Vishny 1993) and international trade in aircraft (Hines 1995) will be particularly sought after.
Education might not be free from patronage, but, as Mauro (1998:264) puts it "... it will be
easier to collect substantial bribes on large infrastructure projects or highly sophisticated de-
fense equipment than on textbooks and teachers' salaries".
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Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) show how, corruption in public investment hurts growth. The
authors test and confirm the following hypotheses using regression analysis: Other things be-
ing equal, corruption can reduce growth by increasing public investment while reducing its
productivity, high corruption is associated with low government revenue, corruption can re-
duce growth by reducing the quality of the existing infrastructure, and high corruption is asso-
ciated with low operation and maintenance expenditure.
2.3 Summary of crime related indicators
In this^ section we provide a tabular summary of our survey with special regard to the indica-
tors proposed in our literature (see Table 11). The table is organised as follows: Column 1
contains variables which are of central importance to empirical crime research. The expected
impact of the respective variable on crime based on theoretical and empirical knowledge is
depicted in column 2, where "+" ("-") means that a higher value of the variable is expected to
increase (decrease) crime. The same logic applies to column 3, where the feedback effect of
higher crime on the respective variable is considered. Apart from "+" and "-" , the cells of
columns 2 and 3 may also be empty (an effect does not exist), or they may be filled with a "?"
(no evidence could be derived from our literature). In cases in which the cells contain a com-
bination of +~and - , crime theories provide ambiguous predictions. In such cases we put those
effects first which are more likely according to empirical findings. (Example: Routine activity
theory expects a negative sign of the impact of unemployment on crime. Economic and other
theories expect a positive sign. Looking through empirical results there are mainly positive
effects. Thus, in Table 11 we code the effect of unemployment on crime with "+/-"). Column
4 contains measures which are generally used as indicators of theoretically motivated vari-
ables. When a cell remains empty, measuring this variable is straightforward (e.g. unemploy-
ment). Column 5 gives a general characterisation of the type of variable. Finally, in column 6,
we refer to the corresponding discussions in the subsections of Section 2.1.
It has to be stressed that our list of indicators is organised according to the de-
manded macro focus of the present EU-study. In the project description (European
Commission 1998) it is emphasised that empirical research has to be carried out
using data from official statistics. Thus, indicators which are explicitly tied to the indi-
vidual level (for examples, see Sections 2.1.4-2.1.7) are not included in Table 11.
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Table 11: Summary of crime related indicators proposed in the literature
Variable
(1)
Wealth (absolute)
Poverty
Inequality
Social Security
Wages (in general)
Youth wages
Minimum wages
Job quality
Unemployment rate
Educational attainment
I->C
(2)
+/-
+
+
+/-
-
-
-
+/-
C-»l
(3)
-
+
+
?
-/+
-/+
?
-
?
Indicator proposed in the literature
(4)
Median family income,
Gross domestic product per capita etc.
Percentage of population below the poverty line
Percentage of families below half of median family income
Share of social welfare recipients in the population
Infant mortality rate
Percentage of individuals aged 25 with less than five years of education
Percentage of individuals below 18 years of age living with one parent
Unemployment
Female headed households etc.
Gini coefficient
Ratio of the percentage of total income received by the top 20 per cent of fami-
lies to the percentage received by the lowest 20 per cent of families
Share of income received by the top 20 per cent etc.
Sum of all welfare payments divided by state population
Number of recipients of all welfare programs divided by state population
Sum of all welfare payments divided by state population etc.
Mean wage in the population etc.
Mean youth wage etc.
Mean wage for low skilled workers etc.
Wages
Working hours per day etc.
Share of the college educated in the population
Share of illiterate individuals in population
Share of school dropouts in the population etc.
Variable type
(5)
Economic
Economic
Economic
Economic
Labour market
Labour market
Labour market
Labour market
Labour market
Labour market
Relevant sections
(6)
2.1.2,2.1.3,2.1.9
2.1.2,2.1.3,2.1.10
2.1.2,2.1.3,2.1.10,
2.1.11
2.1.3,2.1.12
2.1.2,2.1.3,2.1.11
2.1.3,2.1.11
2.1.3,2.1.11
2.1.3,2.1.11
2.1.3,2.1.11
2.1.1,2.1.15
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Occupational status of residents
Female labour force participation
Clear-up rate
Conviction rate
Imprisonment rate
Recognisance rate
Fine rate
Average sentence
Private crime prevention
Mobility of residents
Ethnicity
Family disruption
Household size/ crowding
Urbanity
Friendship network (not delinquent)
Organisational participation
-
+/-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
+
+
+
+/-
+
-
-/+
-
?
-/+
-/+
?
?
?
?
+
+
?
+
?
?
-
Share of individuals in professional and managerial positions etc.
Percentage of the female civilian labour force
Proportion of crimes cleared by the police
Proportion of those arrested who either plead guilty or are convicted
Proportion of the guilty persons who are imprisoned
Proportion of the guilty persons who are placed on recognisance
Proportion of the guilty persons who are fined
Average length of the court imprisonment sentence for those imprisoned
Turnover of private security firms per capita
Employees of private security sector per x inhabitants
Influx
Move
Percentage of residents brought up in the area where they currently live
Percentage of households that have been in the area for less than three years
etc.
Share of foreigners in the population
Probability that two randomly selected individuals of an area would be members
of different ethnic groups
Nationality dummies
Black/ white dummies etc.
Proportion of divorced and separated adults among those who have ever mar-
ried
Percentage of households with single parents with children
Number of children etc.
Mean household size
Persons per room etc.
Population per square kilometre
Share of population living in big cities
Share of multiplex dwellings in all dwellings etc.
Number of friends who reside in the local community
Percentage of residents who participated in meetings of committees and clubs
Labour market
Labour market
Deterrence
Deterrence
Deterrence
Deterrence
Deterrence
Deterrence
Deterrence
Demographic/ Social
cohesion
Demographic/ Social
cohesion
Demographic/ Social
cohesion
Demographic/ Social
cohesion
Demographic/ Social
cohesion
Social cohesion
Social cohesion
2.1.1,2.1.15
2.1.2,2.1.3,2.1.5,
2.1.11
2.1.3,2.1.19
2.1.3,2.1.19
2.1.3,2.1.19
2.1.3,2.1.19
2.1.3,2.1.19
2.1.3,2.1.19
2.1.3,2.1.20
2.1.1,2.1.16
2.1.1,2.1.17
2.1.1,2.1.5,2.1.13
2.1.1,2.1.2
2.1.1,2.1.18
2.1.1,2.1.5
2.1.1,2.1.2
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Institutional control
Religiosity
Public transportation
Public leisure activities
Weather (the better, the more crime)
Number of dark hours during a day
Media consumption
Age
Gender (male)
Young male population
-
+
+
+
+
+/-
-
+
+
-
?
Number of committees and clubs per x inhabitants
Percentage of population that attends high school or college
Percentage of population in the civilian labour force
Number of families per city population etc.
Share of members of a church in the population etc.
Per cent of the employees who use public transportation
Expenditure on public transportation
Presence of subways etc.
Average sales of eating and drinking establishments per resident
Concentration of Taverns and Lounges
Supply (absolute or relative) of sports and entertainment establishments
Number of sports clubs etc.
Average temperature (on a monthly or quarterly basis)
Total rainfall (on a monthly or quarterly basis)
Total sunshine (on a monthly or quarterly basis etc.)
Populations' mean TV viewing intensity etc.
Share of males in the population
Male/ Female dummies
Share of the young aged 15-25 in the population
Social cohesion
Social cohesion
Infrastructure
Infrastructure
Environment
Environment
Techno-economic
Demographic/ control
Demographic/ control
Demographic/ control
2.1.1,2.1.5
2.1.22
2.1.2
2.1.2
2.1.2,2.1.23
2.1.2,2.1.23
2.1.2,2.1.21
2.1.17
2.1.17
2.1.17
Source: Own representation.
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3 Development of the parameterised model
3.1 The Methodology
3.1.1 Criminometrics
The terminus "criminometrics" has first been introduced by Eide (1994). In accordance to the
definition of econometrics provided by Maddala (1988:1), criminometrics can be defined as
the application of statistical and mathematical methods to the analysis of crime data, with the
purpose of giving empirical content to criminological theories and verifying them or refuting
them.
The nature of criminometrics can be even better understood with the help of the schematic
description depicted in Figure 5. Analogous to econometrics which is based on economic the-
ory, criminometrics builds on crime theory. How do we get from Box 1 to Box 2? This can be
best explained with the help of an example. As we have already expounded in Section 2.1.3,
the economic crime theory states that the number of crimes committed in a society is nega-
tively related to the level of deterrence. It is argued that ceteris paribus higher probabilities of
conviction and more severe punishments reduce the expected utility of illegal activities for
potential offenders. Consequently, illegal activity becomes less attractive in comparison with
legal work and, thus, individuals reduce their involvement in delinquent behaviour and the
crime rate falls. The formal representation of this connection can be written as follows:
O = O(p,f,U) with O = — <0 and Of= — < 0 , where O - the "supply" or number of
dp df
offences in society - is a function of the probability of conviction ( p ) , the money equivalent
of the punishment ( / ) and a vector of other factors (U). Op and Of are the partial deriva-
tives of the supply of offences function with respect to p and / , which express mathemati-
cally the negative relationship between higher deterrence (i.e. higher values of p or / ) and
the number of offences. One possible criminometric representation of the theoretical state-
ment above is O = a + J3{p + J32f + y'U + £, where a is a constant term always included in
estimations, /?, and /?2 are the coefficients of p and / , y" is the vector of coefficients be-
longing to U and e is the error term. After having translated the theoretical model in a crimi-
nometric specification the coefficients of the latter have to be estimated using adequate data.
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In our example the estimation requires data about p , f and U. If such data is not available it
should be collected in future (arrow from Box 2 to Box 3).
Figure 5: Schematic description of the steps involved in a criminometric analysis of
crime models
Crime theory
Criminometric model Data
Estimation
Specification testing and
diagnostic checking
Using the model for
predictions and policy
Source: Adapted from Maddala (1988:6).
Provided the required data is at our disposal, we are ready for the estimation (Box 4), which
will be carried out with a computer using suitable software packages28. After having run the
estimation one has to check whether the criminometric model is well-specified. There are sev-
eral sources of misspecification which may, for instance, concern the validity of the assump-
tions made about the error term or the choice of the explanatory variables.29 Now there are
two possibilities: If our tests indicate misspecification, we have to return to Box 2 and specify
a new model, which has to be estimated and tested again. If, on the other hand, our model is
28 The most popular software packages for econometrics/ criminometrics are (in alphabetical order)
EViews, Gauss, Limdep, SAS, SPSS, Stata and TSP.
29 An intuition for some of these problems is provided further below, an extensive discussion, however,
would go beyond the scope of this report. An excellent econometric textbook which discusses the
types and sources of misspecification is Maddala (1988).
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well-specified, we can use it to perform tests of any hypotheses. Usually tested hypotheses
follow directly from the theory under consideration. For instance, the central hypothesis of the
economic crime theory is that the signs of px and /?2 are expected to be negative. Another
interesting hypothesis to be tested is the theoretical finding according to which the crime re-
ducing effect of a percentage increase in the probability of conviction is higher than that of an
equal percentage increase in the severity of punishment (see Becker 1968). If these hypotheses
are confirmed, the theory seems to be appropriate, otherwise, it should possibly be revised
(arrow between Box 10 and Box 1). Other testable hypotheses concern the predictive power of
the model. The quality of the predictive power of a model hinges on its ability to produce es-
timates of the dependent variable which are as close as possible to actual values. Depending
on whether the aim of the prediction is to reproduce past realisations or forecast future values
of the variable of interest, we speak about ex-post or ex-ante-prediction. Note that it is possi-
ble to test the ex-ante-forecasts of a model solely on the basis of the ex-post-data. Provided we
are interested in the ex-ante-prediction of the theft rate and that we dispose of crime data from
1975 to 1998. We can now estimate our model using data from 1975 to 1996 and then forecast
theft for the years 1997 and 1998 on the basis of the estimated coefficients. Since actual val-
ues of theft in 1997 and 1998 are known, they can be used as the benchmark for the ex-ante-
predictive power of the model.
The most commonly used tool in criminometric/ econometric research is regression analysis.
"Regression analysis is concerned with describing and evaluating the relationship between a
given variable (often called the explained, or dependent variable) and one or more other vari-
ables (often called the explanatory, or independent variables" (Maddala 1988:27/28). Figure 6
contains an example of a simple regression of car thefts per 100,000 inhabitants (dependent
variable) on cars per 1,000 inhabitants (independent variable) based on 1994 cross-sectional
data from 22 OECD countries. The estimated relationship which is also depicted in the figure
as regression line is car thefts = -79.8 + 1.17* cars. This implies that one additional car per
1,000 inhabitants augments the car theft rate by 1.17. The advantage of regression analysis is
straightforward. It condenses information of many observations (note that 22 could just as
well be 100, 1,000 or more) to one coefficient, which - provided the model is correctly speci-
fied - represents the partial effect of the particular independent variable on the dependent vari-
able. This is one important reason why the indicator system to be developed below will be
based on regression analysis.
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Figure 6: Car thefts and the number of cars in the population
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Source: Interpol, World Bank (1998), own representation.
Note: Data is from 1994 (the last year available at the time of preparation of this report for which the
number of cars is reported by the World Bank). Car thefts contain cases of "taking and driving away".
For Iceland, Korea, Mexico and Switzerland at least one of our data sources contains no information.
Japan and Austria have been excluded from the analysis because of different definitions of car thefts
(cases of taking and driving away are not included), Luxembourg has been excluded because of its
small population size.
However, in almost every empirical analysis and especially in crime research simple bivariate
examinations will not properly account for the complexity of the dependent variable. Thus,
the above analysis probably suffers from biases induced by the omission of relevant variables.
It is, for example, reasonable to assume that not only the quantity of cars has an effect on the
number of car thefts, but also the quality of the vehicles. On the other hand quantity and qual-
ity of cars in a society are very likely to be related. Omitting one of these (relevant) variables
in the analysis would lead to a bias in the estimated coefficient of the other variable, since the
included variable would take over the impact of the excluded variable.
As the problem of an omitted variable bias is a very important one in criminometrics/ econo-
metrics, it is advisable to consider it in more detail. For this purpose we have constructed a
fictitious example with simulated data. In order to illustrate crucial points, it might be helpful
to interpret simulated variables of this example as property crime, unemployment and income
(per capita). We have constructed these variables under the assumption that property crime
only depends on two variables (unemployment and average per capita income) and that higher
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values of both variables lead to a higher incidence of property crime. We further assumed that
the correlation between unemployment and income is highly negative. As a logical conse-
quence of this data generating process, in a regression for property crime, both explanatory
variables show a highly significant positive sign (Table 12, regression 1). What happens if we
would omit the income variable? If we run a regression of property crime on the unemploy-
ment rate alone (Table 12, regression 2), we obtain a coefficient with an implausible negative
significant sign, implying that higher unemployment reduces property crime. How could this
dramatic change happen? The reason is that the unemployment rate would take over the effect
of the income variable. Since both the correlation between the unemployment rate and the
average income and the impact of the average income on property crime are (per assumption)
very large, the coefficient of the unemployment rate would not only change its magnitude but
would also change its sign. We can summarise that the higher the influence of the omitted
variable on the explained variable and the higher the correlation between the included and the
excluded variable are, the higher will be the omitted variable bias of the estimated coefficient
of the included variable.
Table 12: Bias as a result of the omission of relevant variables (a fictitious example)
Dependent variable
Independent variables
Constant
Unemployment rate
Per capita income
Adjusted R-squared
Property crime rate
(1)
0.12
(1.71)
1.17
(4.45)
3.09
(19.31)
0.83
Property crime rate
(2)
-0.08
(-0.64)
-3.22
(-14.5)
-
0.51
Source: Own calculations based on simulated data, number of observations is 200.
Do omitted variables always disturb coefficient estimates? This must not necessarily be the
case. Coefficient estimates remain unaffected by the influence of omitted variables if the latter
do not correlate with other explanatory variables in the model. Nevertheless, omitted variables
have a negative effect in any case, because they will enlarge the error term, and larger error
terms, in turn, negatively affect the predictive power of the model. Since the major task of the
present study is the development of an indicator model suitable for predictions of crime and
its consequences, the omission of relevant variables has to be avoided as far as possible. At
this point it should also be mentioned that the inclusion of irrelevant variables (variables
without any impact on the dependent variable) in a regression does not negatively affect the
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coefficients of the relevant explaining variables. But the inclusion of irrelevant variables also
comes at a cost, because it augments the standard errors of the relevant coefficients30 and it
also diminishes the forecasting power of estimated models. It has to be stressed, however, that
compared with the omission of relevant variables the inclusion of irrelevant regressors is of
minor importance.
Unfortunately, in practise it is rarely the case that all relevant variables are at the researchers
disposal. Omitted variables are rather the rule than the exception. Variables may not be in-
cluded due to a lack of measurement or oversight whereas the former reason is by far the more
frequent one. A special case of omitted variables which is due to a lack of measurement is that
of "unobserved heterogeneity". This problem is most virulent in analyses based on data sets
with a cross-sectional component.31 Imagine that we want to investigate factors of theft on the
basis of a data set from EU member states. Now, we have to cope with the situation that be-
tween countries such as Sweden and Spain there are very large differences in the volume of
reported crime. According to Interpol (1996) the official theft rate in Spain equalled 1,869
cases per 100,000 inhabitants in 1996, whereas that of Sweden was approximately 4 times
higher (7,865 thefts/ 100,000 inhabitants). These descriptive statistics give raise to the suspi-
cion that there might be differences in the general attitude towards (property) crime (including
the populations' propensity to report (property) crimes to the police) across countries which
cannot be fully explained by discrepancies in GDP, unemployment, demography or deter-
rence. Presumably a part of this variation can be attributed to different norms and tastes of the
Spanish and Swedish society. Since a reliable measurement is hardly possible, norms and
tastes can be regarded as an important source of unobserved heterogeneity. As unobservable
factors can be correlated with explanatory variables, estimation results might be biased. For-
tunately, empirical researchers are not powerless in the face of this threat. Having panel data
at our disposal and applying appropriate estimation techniques, we can fully account for time
constant components of unobservable heterogeneity. Technically speaking, this is done by
30
 Econometrically speaking the inclusion of irrelevant variables produces unbiased but inefficient esti-
mates.
31
 In contrast to time-series which consider one observational unit (individual, firm, region etc.) at sev-
eral points in time, cross-sections deal with several units at one point in time. Panels or longitudinal
data sets combine both dimensions when considering several units at several points in time.
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including country specific constants - so-called fixed effects - in the estimation. Again,
properties and benefits of fixed effects can be best explained with the help of a (fictitious)
simulated example.
For illustrative reasons, we start by assuming that we were interested in the effect of the social
welfare system on property crime. Motivated by this idea, we have simulated a 10-periods
(years) panel of three (hypothetical) countries. We compare two different ways of looking at
the data (see Figure 7). First we run a simple regression of (a fictitious) property crime vari-
able on (likewise fictitious) social benefits per capita, ignoring the fact that data come from
different countries. This estimation produces a positive significant coefficient of the explana-
tory variable, indicating that a more pronounced welfare system causes higher levels of prop-
erty crime (see the thin regression line in Figure 7). This implausible result is obviously an
artefact of not having accounted for country specific unobserved heterogeneity.33 If we include
fixed effects and if we also allow for country specific coefficients of the explaining variable,
the result changes substantially. The three bold regression lines which represent fixed effect-
estimation (with country-specific slopes) all show the expected negative slope and thus con-
firm the hypothesis according to which higher legal income opportunities (especially for the
economically disadvantaged) ceteris paribus reduce the incidence of property crime.
One may object that the problem of unobservable heterogeneity across statistical units is a
problem which can be easily avoided by carrying out the investigations on the basis of time
series of homogeneous units (as Figure 7 suggests) rather than on cross sections or panels.
However, there is a fundamental problem with time series analysis. Because of a lack in
measurement in the past or due to changes in definitions or registration modalities in the
course of time, the number of observations in time series is often small, which in turn may
preclude the use of regression analysis. If we were, for example, interested in investigating the
factors of crime in East German districts ("Kreise"), a multivariate time-series analysis for one
32
 Note that fixed effects cannot be used in pure cross-sectional data sets. Introducing fixed effects in a
cross section would result in a perfect prediction of the dependent variable. Each country constant
would exactly adjust to the value of the respective realisation of the dependent variable. Thus, we
would have a perfectly predicting but meaningless model, since the coefficients of all explaining vari-
ables would be set to zero by the software package.
33
 Note that our example is based on simulated data and only aimed at demonstrational purposes. In
reality a bivariate model like the one presented in Figure 7 would of course not only suffer from unob-
servable heterogeneity but also from the omission of observable variables.
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particular district would fail because reliable crime data is only available for 6 years.34 On the
other hand, if we used a panel containing all 111 East German districts, we would have 666
observations at our disposal and a multivariate analysis could be performed. Apart from the
fact that time series are often simply too short, they may also be inappropriate for the topic
under investigation. When assessing the impact of, say, religion on crime, it is mainly the
cross sectional dimension and not the time dimension from which deeper insights might be
expected. To sum up, neither pure time-series nor pure cross sections are appropriate for
criminometric investigations. It is the appropriate use of panel data that copes with problems
arising in empirical crime research. For a report like this it might be important to know that
the authors have documented their previous experience in the field of panel econometrics by
articles in scientific journals of international standing (see, for instance Entorf (1997) for a
theoretical paper on potential misinterpretations due to spurious panel regressions, and Entorf
and Kramarz (1997), Entorf, Gollac and Kramarz (1999) as well as Entorf and Spengler
(1998) for empirical work).
Figure 7: The benefits of fixed effects (a fictitious example)
Q.
o
Social benefits per capita
Source: Own representation based on simulated data
34 The first post-reunification year for which reliable data for East Germany is available is 1993.
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3.1.2 A real-world example using data from EU member states
In order to finish our methodological discussion with a practical example, we have performed
estimations based on a panel of five EU member states from 1977 to 1996. The countries in-
cluded in the analysis are Austria, France, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden (data from the
Netherlands are available since 1979). Note that the choice of countries is not made randomly,
but rather motivated by the hope of benefiting from the heterogeneity of northern, southern,
central and western European experiences and by the need of constructing a coherent cross
section of time series.35 In a first step (see regression 1, Table 13), we ignore the panel struc-
ture of the data and simply regress the theft rate on the unemployment rate. We obtain an in-
conclusive negative coefficient for the explanatory variable implying that higher unemploy-
ment reduces crime. This result is obviously subject to a misspecification of the regression
model. We have seen above that one source of misspecification stems from the lacking con-
sideration of (time constant) unobservable heterogeneity. For that reason we add fixed effects
to our specification (see regression 2).36 As expected, all country specific constants turn out to
be significant, thus, indicating that unobservable heterogeneity exists.37 The more striking
result, however, concerns the coefficient of the unemployment rate. Just as in the simulated
example presented above (see Figure 7) the introduction of fixed effects changes the sign of
the coefficient of the explanatory variable.38 Finally, in regression 3, where further explana-
tory variables (GDP per capita, female labour force participation, clear-up rate) are added to
the model, the other source of misspecification previously discussed becomes apparent. Obvi-
ously the coefficient of the unemployment rate in regression 2 (0.36) is subject to an omitted
35
 A persistent shortcoming of international crime data sets is the erratic reporting behaviour of most
countries to the supranational institutions. Even most of the five countries under consideration in our
criminometric analysis show some gaps in their time series of theft (the exception is Austria). This
gaps, however, where rather rare and small (two years at most) and could therefore be closed by
means of interpolation.
36
 It is common in econometrics/ criminometrics to leave out the fixed effect for one country and to use
a general constant term instead. This approach has the appealing, property that all included country
effects can be interpreted relatively to the left out country which thus, serves as a reference. Our refer-
ence country is Sweden because it has the highest theft rate of all countries. The fact that all the fixed
effects turn out to be significantly negative implies that Sweden will still have a higher theft rate when
the effect of unemployment on theft is eliminated.
37
 Note that the country specific effects at this early stage of the analysis in which only one explaining
variable is included do not only measure unobservable heterogeneity but also the effect of observable
variables which are not yet included.
38
 This implies that our simulated example, where the switching sign was intended for the purpose of
demonstration, was not simply an artefact but has indeed a high practical relevance.
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variable bias, because it substantially differs from the respective coefficient in the more com-
plete specification (0.10 in regression 3). The reason for this supposition may be the follow-
ing: As the unemployment rate (UR) and the female labour force participation rate (FLFPR)
are positively correlated and because both variables have a positive impact on theft (see re-
gression 3), the omission of FLFPR from regression 2 causes the UR to (partly) take over the
effect of FLFPR on the theft rate. As a consequence the coefficient of UR in regression 2 is
biased upwards. It should be noted that regression 3 is still far away from being perfect with
respect to all wanted indicators (see Table 11). Nevertheless, the explanatory power of this
small illustrative example is quite high, as can be seen from the so called "R-squared statis-
tic".
The R-squared statistic is shown in the last row of Table 13. The R-squared statistic must be
between 0 and 1, and it measures the proportion of the total variation in the endogenous vari-
able that is accounted for by the variation in the explaining variables. It takes the value of zero
if all estimated coefficients (except the constant term) are zero. In this case the "explaining"
variables do not have any explanatory power. In a bivariate regression R2 = 0 produces a
horizontal regression line. The other extreme (R2 = 1) occurs if the variation in the independ-
ent variables perfectly explains the variation in the dependent variable. Then the error term is
a zero vector and - as far as the bivariate case is concerned - all value pairs of the dependent
and independent variable lie exactly on the regression line (Greene 1997:252/253). In order to
sum up, we may conclude that the R-squared can be understood as an indicator which tells us
how well the regression model predicts the movements in the dependent variable, or to ex-
press it more plainly, how well the model fits reality.
Whereas the R-squared expresses the fit of a regression in terms of a number, it is also possi-
ble to investigate the predictive power of a model graphically. In Figure 8 we present the rele-
vant information which is necessary for such a graphical analysis. Dashed lines represent ac-
tual values of the dependent variable, dotted lines depict predicted values of the dependent
variable, and the solid lines below portray the prediction error i.e. the difference between ac-
tual and predicted values of the dependent variable. Note that Figure 8 is based on the estima-
tions presented in Table 13 and that each vertically separated section in the graphs contains
yearly information about the respective country running from 1977 to 1996 (the only excep-
tion is the Netherlands for which the considered period is 1979 to 1996). For regression 1 we
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now see from the low R-squared of 0.14 in Table 13 and from the large difference between the
actual and fitted values of the dependent variable in Figure 8 that the model virtually has no
predictive power and obviously suffers from severe misspecification. Adding fixed effects to
the model significantly improves the fit. The R-squared increases to 0.84 and the dotted lines
have approached the dashed lines.
Table 13: Different criminometric specifications based on data from five EU member
states
Dependent variable
Independent variables
Constant
Austria
France
The Netherlands
Spain
log(unemployment rate)
log(GDP per capita)
log(female labour force partici-
pation)
log(clear-up ratio)
Adjusted R-squared
Log (theft rate)
(1)
8.74
(51.98)
-
-
-
-0.33
(-3.88)
-
-
-
0.14
log(theft rate)
(2)
8.49
(109.74)
-1.15
(-16.34)
-1.06
(-11.86)
-0.59
(-7.09)
-2.26
(-20.35)
0.36
(6.71)
-
-
-
0.89
log(theft rate)
(3)
5.61
(3.78)
-0.54
(-10.30)
-0.63
(-12.51)
-0.02
(-0.23)
-1.24
(-11.70)
0.10
(3.70)
-0.17
(-1.05)
1.71
(6.50)
-0.64
(-8.32)
0.98
Source: Own estimations based on OECD and processed Interpol data. Number of observations is 98.
However, a single explanatory variable seems to be insufficient to fit the curvature of the read
line. Therefore, in regression 3, additional explaining variables are included. Since this larger
set of regressors is able to explain a higher fraction of the variation in the dependent variable,
the dashed and dotted lines are now roughly congruent and the R-squared has risen to 0.98.
Therefore, we have found numerical - as well as graphical - evidence for the good predictive
power of regression 3.
Before turning to the development of the parameterised model a brief summary of our meth-
odological discussion is appropriate. At the beginning we have stated that regression analysis -
as the major tool of criminometrics - is a powerful tool in order to condense complex data.
With the help of regression analysis it is possible to reduce extensive (time-series, cross-
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sectional or panel) information about variables to explicit relationships expressing the impact
of changes in the explanatory or independent variables on the change of an explained or de-
pendent variable. In particular we have shown that crime - and the same holds also true for the
consequences of crime39 - can only by adequately investigated in a multivariate context using
a large set of explaining variables. Therefore, bivariate considerations should only be used in
the preparatory stage of the analysis, because they are very likely to suffer from severe omitted
variable biases. We have also pointed out that empirical crime research should be carried out
on the basis of panel data, since panel data analysis benefits from both time series and cross
sectional information. In contrast to cross sectional data, panel data allows us to control for
(time invariant) unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, we have expounded how the predictive
power of criminometric estimations may be assessed.
Figure 8: (Ex-post) Predictive power of different criminometric specifications based on
data from five EU member states
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
1
-1-
1 J 0.2
0.0
-0.2
A A A
Residual Actual Fitted
Source: Own representation based on OECD and processed Interpol data.
3.2 The parameterised model
Simple crime indicators have already been identified in the first project phase. The central
results are summarised in Table 11. Since many factors are relevant for a proper understand-
ing of crime, we need to condense this information in order to yield general indicators of
39 It has to be stressed at this point that even when our examples exclusively used measures of crime
as the dependent variable the presented methodology is no less relevant when crime is used as a ex-
plaining variable in regressions explaining indicators of economic performance.
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crime and economic performance. Using the methodology described above, we are going to
construct
• Factors of Regional Criminality,
• Leading Criminality Indicators, and,
• Criminality Indicators of Economic Performance.
3.2.1 General framework
Our approach starts with the parameterisation of the criminometric model, which will take
into consideration known results drawn from previous research on the interactions among
social cohesion, criminality and economic performance. However, the scientific literature is
silent about the time delay of causes and effects. The time lag of crime with respect to eco-
nomic causes is unknown. It has to be estimated with our data and needs to be implemented in
our model. Presumably, the effect of economics on crime can be observed in a relatively short
run (about 0 to 2 years, depending on crime categories and economic variables under consid-
eration), whereas the feedback from crime to economic performance might happen in a
somewhat longer run. Thus, the model should be based on multivariate methods and gestation
lags.
The description of the problem leads to the following stylised version of the parameterised
model:
Equation 1 (Crime) Ct=a+
Equation 2 (Feedback) GmZt_m+vt,
where
C
Y
X
Z
t
T
CO
a,y
£ V
ct' y i
"crime",
"economic performance",
(vector of) explanatory variables, containing economic factors, factors
of social cohesion, demographic variables, deterrence etc.,
(non-crime) factors explaining economic performance,
time index,
lag of crime with respect to X,
lag of economic performance with respect to C and Z
constants,
residuals (at time t),
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p = (Pl,...,PKy,S = {8x,...,8j,0 = {Ox,...,GMy = parameters of the model, factor
weights.
Equation 1 and Equation 2 will be used as linear regression models. In the following this
model will be specified in more detail according to the objectives and restrictions to be fol-
lowed in the present project. Equation 1 will be the basis for the quantification of the main
factors of crime, i.e. Indicators of Criminality. We will employ the feedback Equation 2 in
order to evaluate the link from crime to economic performance and to identify Criminality
Indicators of Economic Performance.
3.2.2 Construction of Factors of Regional Criminality and of Leading Criminality In-
dicators
Prior to the construction of crime indicators, relevant explanatory variables have been identi-
fied (which has been done in Section 2), they have to be implemented in the model, and the
model has to be estimated. Panel econometrics (see above) will produce numerical parameter
values of the following more detailed version of Equation 1:
Equation 3 Cit = at + fiXttxUjt_T + P2jx2it_r +... + PK,rxKit_r + eu,
r r r l
where (in addition to the previous notation)
/ = region, i = \,...J,
Cit = crime in region / at time t,
£it = residual (error term) of region / at time t,
aj = region-specific factor of crime (unobserved heterogeneity),
xk, k = 1,..., K = explanatory variables (see above), number of factors = K,
Pk, k = \,...,K = parameters of the model, to be estimated.
Using the estimation results from Equation 3, relevant (i.e. statistically significant) factors of
crime can be identified. Moreover, when optimising the validity of the model (i.e. maximising
the adjusted R-squared), some of the relevant factors of crime will show up with a nonzero
lead r so that we are able to identify leading criminality indicators. These are the indicators
sought-after which anticipate crime in region / at time t + T, i.e. C.
 t+T.
It is important to note the following points:
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• Crime, here generally denoted as Cit, is measured by the most common types of crime
(robbery, theft under aggravating circumstances, fraud, murder, rape, assault, drug of-
fences etc.).
• The lead-lag structure (concerning both T and co) could be generalised by forming factor-
specific leads (since, for instance, the lead of output over crime might differ from that of
unemployment).
• Region-specific constants a( cover unobservable heterogeneity. Since we are dealing with
official data sources by restriction, the presence of at is indispensable in order to cover
different shares of unreported crimes among regions. From an econometric point of view
this fact requires the use of fixed-effect panel estimation techniques.
Despite considering region-specific factors, the aggregate estimation of Equation 3 might be
too rigid to cover differences given by nationality, culture or other grouping criteria, or simply
because relevant data for all regions and all time periods of the model are not available.
Therefore, instead of performing a single aggregate estimate using all regions, we will esti-
mate the model nation by nation. This allows the estimation of more flexible weights Pk:
Equation 4 Cft = af + PIx{.t_r + fi{x[u_x +... + # * £ , , , _ , + £Jit ,
X X X
where j = l,...,J. J is the number of nations.
It should be noted that it would be very difficult to estimate the crime equation for each disag-
gregate region / separately. Since there were only few observations in many cases, it would be
impossible to implement the large number of factors xk of crime found in the literature. Sta-
tistically speaking, there would be a lack of degrees of freedom.
3.2.3 Identification of Criminality Indicators of Economic Performance
The feedback from crime to economic performance is modelled by Equation 2. "Economic
performance" will be measured by economic growth, and (under the proviso of data availabil-
ity) it could be replaced by employment, (youth) unemployment, (net) migration of workers,
number of new firms (location decisions) etc. Z represents standard factors of economic
growth (known from the economic theory of (endogenous) growth), and previous levels of
economic performance (i.e. lagged endogenous variables, justified by "habit persistence" of
economic development). Since "crime" is measured by N types of crime, Equation 2 will be
extended in order to identify Criminality Indicators of Economic Performance, i.e. those cate-
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gories of crime which are most important for future economic perspectives, given known eco-
nomic factors of growth:
Equation 5
A A A
=y+0 +8\ Cut +... + 8NCNJt,
where
i,t+co
z.• J
Future output growth (likewise unemployment, number of
new firms' patents, migration of workforce, etc.),
other explanatory variables, lagged endogenous variables,
types of crime.
Thus, the approach is suitable to provide the following results:
• Forecasts of (various types) of "economic performance" depending on (various types of)
crime,
• Identification of crime categories responsible for the deterioration of economic perform-
ance at regional levels.
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4 Validation of the parameterised model
4.1 Data availability
Before turning to the empirical results, a discussion about the availability of adequate data is
appropriate. As crimes are committed by individuals, it would be obvious to carry out empiri-
cal investigations at exactly this level. However, collecting individual crime data of a suitable
quantity is very expensive, and its reliability is still questionable, as it is based on the self-
reporting of potential criminals. On the other hand, with social disorganisation theory (see
Section 2.1.1), there also exists a major criminological theory that suggests the use of disag-
gregated macro levels (e.g. neighbourhoods, communities etc.) for a proper understanding of
criminality. Thus, performing the subsequent analysis by means of disaggregated macro data
is more than only a second-best solution.
Since it is aspired to perform the empirical analysis of the causes and consequences of crime
both for the highest possible number of EU member states, and on the highest degree of re-
gional disaggregation, the availability of supranational data sources would significantly sim-
plify the process of data acquisition. On what concerns regional crime data, unfortunately, no
such database does exist. As a consequence, these data had to be collected directly from the
member states. Regarding the needed socio-economic40 information, the situation is more
encouraging, since the Eurostat New Cronos database is an extensive source of statistical in-
formation about the EU member states, which also contains variables on three different levels
of regional disaggregation. However, there is a trade-off between the number of variables
available, and the degree of regional disaggreagtion, i.e., the lower the regional level is, the
less variables are available. We try to face this problem by not solely performing estimations
on the lowest regional level (Section 4.3), but by also considering the national level (Section
4.2), for which we can fall back to a rather extensive set of socio-economic variables.
40
 In this study we use the terminus "socio-economic" in order to distinguish non-crime variables from
crime variables. We are aware of the fact that crime variables may also be considered as "socio-
economic" variables.
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4.1.1 Socio-economic data
Apart from crime data, the third project phase also requires information on a large set of so-
cio-economic and demographic variables (see Table 11). There are two different (not mutually
exclusive) strategies to obtain such data. On the one hand, one might directly contact the na-
tional (and regional) statistical offices of the relevant countries. On the other hand, it is possi-
ble to rely on databases from supranational sources like IMF, OECD, World Bank and EU.
Using data from supranational sources has the great advantage that the researcher can benefit
from the efforts made by the respective organisations, which have assembled information
from different countries, and which have produced comparability by removing national pecu-
liarities41 (including the sheer language problem). Further advantages of databases from su-
pranational sources are their relatively moderate prices and the fact that, nowadays, they are
all available in electronic form. The shortcomings in comparison with the national sources are
the much smaller number of available variables and the considerable lack of regionally disag-
gregated information.
4.1.1.1 Regional data
To our knowledge, the solely supranational source which contains highly disaggregated socio-
economic information on the EU-member states is the Eurostat New Cronos Regio database.42
The database is built on the following 8 subject areas: agriculture and forestry, demographic
statistics, economic accounts, energy statistics, community labour force survey, research and
development and patents, tourism statistics, transport statistics and unemployment.
The lowest regional level for which data is available is the so called NUTS43 3 level. The
NUTS 3 level corresponds, for instance, to the German "Kreise", the French "Departements"
41
 Here, the authors spontaneously think about the peculiar way the German unemployment rate is
calculated. Whereas all other countries calculate the unemployment rate by dividing the unemployed
by the overall labour force, the Federal German Employment Office employs the civilian dependent
labour force in the denominator.
42
 Eurostat New Cronos Regio is one part of the Eurostat New Cronos database, which is a very infor-
mative and monthly updated database for the EU member states. It is split up into 9 themes (General
statistics (theme 1), economy and finance (theme 2), population and social conditions (theme 3), en-
ergy and industry (theme 4), agriculture and fishery (theme 5), external trade (theme 6), trade, services
and traffic (theme 7), environment (theme 8) and research and development (theme 9)), whereas, the
Regio part is contained in theme 1.
43
 NUTS is a spatial structuring scheme for the EU member states established by Eurostat. The abbre-
viation stands for "Nomenclature des Unites Territoriales Statistiques".
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and the British "Counties". A summary of the whole structuring scheme is presented in Table
14. From the last two columns of the table one might infer the mean size of the respective
NUTS 3 units with regard to population and land area. According to the large differences in
the indicators, some countries seem to be more suitable for the analysis of criminality than
others. For example, Belgian "Arrondissements" and German "Kreise" turn out to be more
compact (i.e. have a lower average population and land area) and, thus, are presumably more
homogeneous than Spanish "Provincias" and French "Departements".
As already mentioned, the use of NUTS 3 level data comes at a cost, since there exists a trade-
off between the number of available variables on the one hand, and the degree of regional dis-
aggreagtion on the other hand. At the beginning of the project we intended to complete the
Eurostat variables with data from national sources in order to obtain as much of the indicators
from Table 11 as possible. However, some requests directed to national statistical offices
quickly revealed that this strategy was not compatible with the budget and running time con-
straints of the project. Thus, our empirical investigations in Section 4.3 exclusively rely on
data from the Eurostat New Cronos Regio database.
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Table 14: NUTS structure of the EU member states
NUTSO
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
The Netherlands
Austria
Portugal
Finland
Sweden
UK
EU15
NUTS1
Regions
-
Bundeslander
Group of Development
Regions*
Agrupacion de
comunidades autonomas*
Z.E.A.T. + Departements
d'outre mer
-
Gruppi di regioni*
-
Landsdelen
Gruppen von
Bundeslandern*
Continente + Regioes
Autonomas
Manner-Suomi/
Ahvenanmaa
-
Standard Regions
3
1
16
4
7
8+1
1
11
1
4
3
1+2
2
1
12
75+3
NUTS 2
Provinces
-
Regierungsbezirke
Development Regions
Comunidades autonomas +
Ceuta y Melilla
Regions + DOM
-
Regioni
-
Provincies
Bundeslander
Comissaoes de Coordenac.ao
Regional + Regioes Autonamas
Suuralueet
Riksomraden
Counties, Groups of counties*
11
1
40
13
17+1
22+4
1
20
1
12
9
5+2
6
8
36
202+7
NUTS 3
Arrondissements
Amter
Kreise
Nomoi
Provincias +
Ceuta y Melilla
Departements + DOM
Regional Authority Regions
Provincie -
-
COROP-Regio's
Gruppen von Politischen
Bezirken*
Grupos de Concelhos + Regioes
Autonamas
Maakunnat
Lan
Counties/ Local authority
regions
43
15
440
51
50+2
96+4 ,
8
103
1
40
35
28+2
20
21
133
1084+8
Population /
# NUTS 3
236,209
350,800
186,084
205,196
755,192
583,800
452,625
557,990
418,000
387,350
230,286
331,167
256,250
423,857
441,970
341,777
Land area /
# NUTS 3
763
2,829
794
2,527
9,605
5,501
8,611
2,855
2,586
/ 848
2,364
3,065
15,230
19,601
1,817
2,871
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat (1999).
Note: If NUTS 0, NUTS 1 or NUTS 2 categories have no sub-categories they are also counted on the deeper levels (see for example Luxemburg).
* put together for the purpose of Eurostat REGIO.
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4.1.1.2 National data
There is a great variety of national level statistics provided by supranational and academic
organisations. Most of these statistics are even obtainable free of charge on the Internet. This
applies, for instance, to the Freedom House data on political rights, civil liberties and freedom
status, to the IMF statistics on government finance, to the Penn World Tables on national ac-
counts, to the UNESCO data on education and to the World Bank's Global Development Fi-
nance & World Development Indicators. Furthermore, there are extensive databases from Eu-
rostat (New Cronos) and from the OECD (Statistical compendium) which do not cover all but
only a selected group (EU and OECD respectively) of nations.44 Because of its focus on the
EU member states and because of our need for detailed labour market variables and indicators
of social cohesion (see Table 11), which are rather rare in most other international data sets,
Eurostat New Cronos revealed to be by far the most suitable basis for our empirical investiga-
tions on the "Europe of Nations" (Section 4.2). The most relevant indicators for the present
research, which are contained in New Cronos, can be gathered from Table 17. However, in
Section 4.2.3, where we are going to reconsider the effect of crime on economic performance
by means of a larger cross-section of nations,1* an exclusively European database, like New
Cronos, is not sufficient. There, the socio-economic information stems from the Global De-
velopment Network Growth Database. The latter has been designed within the context of the
Economic Growth Project of the World Bank's Research Group, and is intended for investiga-
tions on the relationship between national policies and economic growth. The Global Devel-
opment Network Growth Database brings together more than 130 variables from different
subjects45 and different sources (e.g. IMF, Penn World Tables, World Bank etc.). The data-
base is available free of charge from the World Bank's Web site.
44
 In contrast to the databases mentioned above, the EU and OECD data is not free of charge but also
available in electronic form.
45
 The database contains general macro indicators (GDP, investment, population etc.), government
finance indicators (taxes, public revenues and expenditures), social indicators (school enrollment, life
expectancy, telephone mainlines, general strikes, revolutions etc.) and a variety of fixed factors (re-
gional and income level dummies, dummies about ethnic fractionalisation etc.).
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4.1.2 Crime data
4.1.2.1 Regional data
As no common source for European regional crime data does exist, we had to contact each
member state directly. 46 Before doing so two fundamental points had to be carefully consid-
ered: the choice of the crime categories and the regional level for which this information is
requested. As regards the first point, we borrowed from Interpol (see also Section 4.1.2.2 be-
low), when selecting the following crime categories:47
1. Murder
2. Sex offences (including 2.1)
2.1 Rape
3. Serious assault
4. Theft (all kinds of theft i.e. 4.1+4.2+4.3)
4.1 Aggravated theft (4.1.1+4.1.2)
4.1.1 Robbery and violent theft
4.1.2 Breaking and entering
4.2 Theft of motor cars
4.3 Other thefts
5. Fraud
6. Counterfeit currency offences (not requested)
7. Drug offences
8. Total offences
As regards the suitable level of regional disaggregation, it has to be taken into account that
crime data and socio-economic data can only be linked meaningfully if they are available for
identical observational units. As already mentioned, the lowest regional level for which socio-
economic statistics are available from official sources is the NUTS 3 level. It was straightfor-
ward to request crime data for exactly this level.
After having settled these crucial questions we sent a letter to the crime data collecting insti-
tutions48 of all EU member states excluding Luxembourg49. A general form of this letter can
46
 For Germany the case was even more complicated, because due to the fact that - with the exception
of organised crime and terrorism - police falls almost exclusively in the responsibility of the states
("Lander"), we had to contact 16 State Criminal Police Offices.
47
 At the t ime of our data request, we were not aware of the existence of the European Sourcebook on
Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics (CDPC 1999). Otherwise we would rather have chosen the cate-
gories of the Sourcebook. However, the problem of incompatible national offence definit ions, which
might severely distort investigations on the international level, is less serious when country specific
analyses are carried out by means of regional data.
48
 Contact persons (with addresses) are listed in Table 51 in the Appendix.
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be gathered from the Appendix (Letter 2). Our requests were kindly supported by a covering
letter (see Letter 1 in the Appendix) from the German Federal Criminal Police Office (Bun-
deskriminalamt, BKA), which did not fail to have the desired effect, since the majority of
member states submitted their data. The results of the data acquisition process are summarised
in Table 15. . _
Column 2 of Table 15 shows whether there exists any regional crime data in the respective EU
member state at all. This is the case for all states except Ireland.50 Column 3 informs about
those countries for which regional crime data of any kind were made available to us. These are
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, Swe-
den51 and the United Kingdom52. Columns 4-6 contain information on the form, period and
suitability of the submitted data. Finally, for those countries which did not meet our request
(France and Austria), column 7 reports our (fruitless) efforts concerning communications and
co-operation with respective national institutions.
Unfortunately, the crime data submitted by Belgium and Portugal are not utilisable for our
empirical investigations. For both countries disaggregated police statistics are only available
for areas which are incompatible with the NUTS regions. To a lesser extent this problem also
exists for the UK; here we could only use part of the submitted crime data. In Belgium re-
gional crime data are collected for 28 judicial "Arrondissements" which, according to our cor-
respondent, can not be exactly matched with the 43 administrative "Arrondissements" consti-
tuting the Belgian NUTS 3 level (see Table 14). Furthermore, regional crime statistics for
Belgium are still in the start-up phase. 1995 is the first year for which reliable data is avail-
able. The regional crime data from Portugal is based on 13 police directions/ inspections,
49
 For Luxembourg there is no other NUTS level than the NUTS 0 level (see Table 14). National data for
Luxembourg are included in the international data sets mentioned above (see Table 16).
50
 Until today, Ireland did not collect regional crime data. However, after the ongoing change of the
statistical system has been finished, regional data will be available.
51
 In order to be precise, our Swedish correspondents did not submit their data but, instead, pointed to
the Internet site (http://www.brottsforebygganderadet.se/extra/statistics/extra_index?lang=se) where
the requested data can be downloaded. By the way, Sweden is the only country which offers such a
service.
52
 There are no common crime statistics for the United Kingdom. Instead, analogous to the police sov-
ereignty, crime statistics fall in the responsibility of England & Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland. In
order to ensure consistency of the crime categories between the NUTS regions we decided to solely
consider/ request data from England & Wales. Thus, throughout the present study the use of both
country names "United Kingdom" and "England & Wales" is based on data from England & Wales.
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whereas the Portuguese NUTS 3 level consists of 28 "Groupos de Concelhos" (see Table 14).
We directed an inquiry to our correspondent in order to clarify whether the NUTS 3 regions
might possibly be aggregated, so that they match the police directions. Since this request re-
mained unanswered, we infer that this is rather not the case. In the UK regional crime statis-
tics are generated for 43 police force areas. Thus, there are much less police force areas than
NUTS 3 regions (133), and slightly.more police force areas than NUTS 2 units (36, see Table
14). However, in contrast to Belgium and Portugal, we were able to use some of the British
data, since most police force areas are identical with counties which, in turn, constitute the
majority of the NUTS 2 regions. Precisely speaking, there are 19 exact matches between
NUTS 2 regions and police force areas usable for criminometric investigations. Finally, the
regional crime data from Greece could not be used in the project since it arrived after the
submission of the first draft of the present report.
Concerning Spain, we obtained provincial data on crime from the national police (Cuerpo
Nacional de Policia, CNP). However, according to the notes of our correspondent, the crimes
registered by the CNP represent only a fraction of the entire Spanish crime picture, since there
are two further police organisations (Guardia Civil and Policias Autonomicas), which are not
obliged to report offences within their responsibility to the CNP. Furthermore, the CNP data
only covers the reported crimes from provincial capitals and cities with at least 20,000 in-
habitants. In order to get a rough impression of the underreporting by the CNP, we compared
the sum of the crime categories across all regions with the national figures for Spain provided
by Interpol and found that on average the CNP data accounts for approximately 75% of all
crimes registered in Spain.53 When interpreting estimation results for Spain, these shortcom-
ings should always be kept in mind. Especially, if the share of crimes reported to the CNP by
the two other police forces is not constant over time, our empirical analysis would yield unre-
liable (i.e. biased) results.54
53
 The Interpol data is more likely to contain all reported crimes in Spain, since the figures for the re-
spective crime categories are always larger than the sums across the provinces based on the CNP
data alone.
54
 According to our correspondent, there are at least four provinces for which the requirement of time-
invariant reporting shares is not met. The affected provinces (Alava, Guipuzoco, Vizcaya and Gerona)
were, of course, excluded from the analyses in Section 4.
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Finally, some remarks on German data are necessary. As a consequence of the police sover-
eignty of the states, crime data had to be collected directly from the 16 State Criminal Police
Offices. With one exception, all states could provide NUTS 3 level data.55 Further information
on the submitted data (period and form of submission) can be gathered from the footnote to
Table 15. We decided to base our estimations on an exclusively West German data set, be-
cause reliable data for the East German regions are not available for the years prior to 1993,
and because time series of some important socio-economic variables (e.g. GDP) currently
ended in 199(5. This would imply only 3 observations per East German region. If, as in Section
4.3.1, first and second order lags were used in our criminometric analysis, there would have
been only one observation per region.56 Moreover, we excluded Berlin because of obvious
structural breaks in its evolution of crime and socio-economic time series.
55
 The State of Thuringia does not collect crime data on the NUTS 3 level. For some Bavarian regions
the time series for some crime categories are incomplete due to mainframe problems of the Bavarian
Criminal Police Office. -
56
 The state of Saxony-Anhal t , wh ich d isposes of regional c r ime data only s ince 1997 (see note of
Table 15), cou ld not be inc luded at al l .
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Table 15: Availability of regional crime data from the EU member states
Country
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
The Netherlands
Austria
Portugal
Finland
Sweden
UK
Does the
country collect
regional crime
data?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Did the country
deliver regional
crime data on
request?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
—
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Data were deliv-
ered in which
form?
Electronically
Hard copy
Irregular*
Hard copy
Electronically
—
Electronically
Electronically
—
Hard copy
Electronically
Electronically
Hard copy
Available
period
1994-1998
1982-1998
Irregular*
1991-1998
1980-1998
—
1983-1998
1983-1998
—
1984-1998
1980-1998
1988-1998
1982-1997
Could pro-
vided data be
used in the
analyses?
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
—
Yes
Yes
—
No
Yes
Yes
Partly
Remarks concerning the non-availability of data
First NUTS 3 level data was promised and also announced; this data did never arrive; after
several inquiries NUTS 3 level data was refused, and NUTS 2 level data was promised
instead; until today no data has arrived.
Until today Ireland has not collected regional crime data; regional data will be available after
finishing the present change of the statistical system.
NUTS 3 and NUTS 2 level data was refused and NUTS 1 level data was promised; no data
has arrived until today.
Note: *With respect to the form and covered period the data delivered from the respective German states can be summarised as follows: Baden-Wurttemberg
(electronically, 1984-1998), Bavaria (electr., 1983-1998), Berlin (electr., 1980-1998), Brandenburg (hard copy, 1995-1998), Bremen (electr., 1980-1998), Hamburg
(hard copy, 1989-1998), Hessen (electr., 1984-1998), Mecklenburg-Vorpommem (hard copy, 1993-1998), Northrhine-Westfalia (electr., 1980/81-1998), Lower
Saxony (hard copy, 1980-1998), Rhineland-Palatinate (hard copy, 1994-1998), Saarland (electr., 1980-1998), Saxony-Anhalt (electr., 1997-1998), Schleswig-
Holstein (electr., 1980-1998), Thuringia (electr., 1993-1998).
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4.1.2.2 National data
Currently only four independent sources of international statistics on crime and criminal jus-
tice, which regularly include a large number of countries over an extended period of time, do
exist. These data sources are Interpol, the United Nations, the World Health Organization, and
the European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC).57 Table 16 summarises these data sets
with respect to their most important characteristics. It turns out that each data set uses differ-
ent definitions and procedures. The most important difference, however, is the lack of quality
control in three out of four data sets. Solely CDPC (1999:9) proves to be aware of the absolute
necessity of a thorough check of data delivered by the national sources: "Validation is often
the most important and in many cases the most forgotten stage of the data collection process.
As a first step the Group identified and discussed obvious problems relating to this process. It
then produced a series of check-tables to assist further validation. [...] This procedure resulted
in the need to go back to many national correspondents for clarification and additional cross-
_, checking".
Data inconsistencies, however, are only one of several potential distortions when generating
an international crime database. Other problems concern incompatible national offence defi-
nitions and, thus, incomparability of national crime levels. These problems reflect the fact that
"... nations differ widely in the way they organise their police and court systems, the way they
define their legal concepts, and the way they collect and present their statistics" (CDPC
1999:11).
On what concerns the tackling of incompatibility and incomparability problems, it is also the
CDPC which has made the most effort. "The group adopted the following procedure: For all
offences included in the Sourcebook, a standard definition was used and countries were in-
vited to follow the standard definition where possible". Countries which were not able to meet
this definition entirely are listed in the Sourcebook with reference to the affected definitions
(European Committee on Crime Problems 1999:6/7).
57
 There also exist two other international crime data sets, which have been generated by academics
(Gurr 1977 and Archer and Gartner 1984). However, both databases end in the 70s and are, thus, not
further considered (for more information on these sources see Bennett and Lynch 1990).
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Table 16: Comparison of cross-national data sets by selected factors
Attributes
Scope
Definitions
Quality Control
Source
Coverage0
Period
Data set
Interpol
Murder, sex of-
fences, rape, serious
assault, total theft,
aggravated theft,
robbery and violent
theft, breaking and
entering, theft of
motorcars, fraud,
counterfeiting, drug
offences
Broad classes de-
fined by Interpol
None
Official police agency
73 to 116 countries
1977d-present
WHO
Homicide
Causes of death as
defined by WHO
Minimal post facto
edits
Death certificates
42 to 78 countries
1921-present
UNa
Intentional homicide,
non-intentional homi-
cide, assault (total and
major), drug crimes
(total, drug trafficking,
drug possession),
rape, robbery, theft
(total and major),
burglary, fraud, em-
bezzlement, briberyb
Broad classes defined
by UN
None
Official police agency
51 to 123 countries
1970-1975 (1st wave)
1975-1980 (2nd wave)
1980-1985 (3rd wave)
1986-1990 (4th wave)
1990-1994 (5th wave)
1995-1997 (6th wave)e
CDPC
Intentional homicide (total,
completed and as recorded in
health statistics), assault, rape,
robbery (total and armed), theft
(total), theft of motor vehicles,
bicycle theft, burglary (total
and domestic), drug offences
(total, drug trafficking, serious
drug trafficking)
Broad classes defined by the
CDPC
Various consistency checks,
queries with national corre-
spondents and corrective
actions if necessary
Country correspondents
36 European countries includ-
ing all EU member states
1990-1996
Source: Adapted from Bennett and Lynch (1990), own modifications and updates.
Notes: a T h e UN data is downloadable from the Internet at
http://www.uncjin.org/Statist ics/WCTS/wcts.html.b Scope of 1990-1994 survey. c Northern-Ireland,
Scotland and England and Wales counted separately. Interpol's International Crime Statistics exist
since 1950, but cr ime was first split up in more precise components in 1977. e Sixth wave not yet com-
pleted.
It is obvious that among all sources presented in Table 16 the CDPC data is by far the most
reliable. For that reason we base most of our analyses in Section 4.2 ("The Europe of Na-
tions") on these data. The only exception is Section 4.2.3, where we investigate the conse-
quences of crime not only by means of a European sample, but also by employing a much
broader cross-section of nations containing countries from all continents. For this purpose
we decided to rely on Interpol data. Whereas the WHO data does only contain one crime cate-
gory (homicide), our experience of using UN data, based on an earlier investigation (Spengler
1997), turned out rather unsatisfactory. It appears that the UN data even more severely suffer
58 Using such samples is the common practise in growth research (see Section 4.2.3.1 for references).
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from data inconsistencies than the Interpol data.59 However, one disadvantage of the Interpol
data is that they have to be fed into the computer by hand, whereas UN data are available from
the Internet60.
4.2 Empirical results based on national data ("The Europe of Nations")
4.2.1 Causes of crime: Evidence from panel data of the EU member states
4.2.1.1 Data
The following estimation results are based on data of the "Draft European Sourcebook of
Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics" (CDPC 1999) and the "New Cronos Database" (Eu-
rostat 1999). These data sets cover national time series from the 15 EU member states of the
period 1990 to 1996. Using national data from the nineties allows us to include a rich variety
of socio-economic, demographic, cultural and crime data, which are close to the definitions of
crime related variables presented in the survey of the scientific literature (see Table 11). The
evidence from this data set contrasts with the disaggregate data set used in Section 4.3, where
we analyse longer time series and regional data at the NUTS 3 and NUTS 2 level to enable the
identification of regularities within the "Europe of Regions". The analysis of the present sec-
tion takes a global view, and we try to identify crime related indicators which hold for the
"Europe of Nations". The complete picture emerges when putting both parts, i.e., the local and
the global view, together.
The following crime related variables have been tested, and they are measured by the follow-
ing indicators (descriptive statistics of these variables are presented in Table 17):
59
 However, in their comparative study -Bennett and Lynch (1990:153) find that "for studies seeking
aggregate descriptions of world crime or analytic explanations of cross-national crime rates, differ-
ences in the data sets do not make a difference in the results". It should be added that the WHO and
the Archer and Gartner databases are also included in this statement.
60
 http://www.uncjin.org/StatisticsA/VCTS/wcts.html
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Table 17: Descriptive statistics
Indicator
Real GDP p.c.
Unemployment rate
Youth unemployment rate '•. '.
Share of long-term unemployed (> 12 months)
Male labour force participation rate, 15-64_
Female labour force participation rate, 15-64
Labour force participation rate, 15-24
Male labour force participation rate, 15-24
Share of female workers with fixed-term contracts
Share of male workers with fixed-term contracts
Share of female workers working part-time
Share of male workers working part-time
Ratio of high qualified to low qualified labour force
Share of foreigners, 15-24
Age of males at time of first marriage
Divorces per 100 marriages
Net reproduction rate
Age of women at childbirth
Ratio of social security payments to GDP
Total theft
Theft of motor vehicles
Burglary
Robbery
Assault
Intentional homicide
Drug offences
Mean.
14547
9.0
• 18.5 .
44.2
78.1
54.6
49.7
52.7
12.8
9.7
26.3
5.1
74.7
7.3
28.6
34.8
76.2
28.7
25.3
4060.5
474.5
1266.6
82.9
237.4
5.9
146.8
Maximum
24173
24.1
. 45.0
68.9
87.1
82.4
73.8
77.0
39.1
33.2
68.5
17.0
195.4
42.6
32.0
68.1
101.0
30.2
36.6
8627.0
1163.0
3272.0
283.0
616.0
22.5
467.0
Minimum
8537
1.7
3.2
16.7
71.3
57.3
32.8
35.6
3.1
2.0
7.2
1.0
17.8
0.1
26.0
7.9
54.0
27.2
13.6
431.0 "'
. 68.0
265.0
11.0
15.0
0.5
15.0
Stand.
Dev.
3316
4.7
10.1
13.1
4.0
1
 7.0
11.7
11.6 .
8.0
7.0
15.5
4.0
55.2
10.2
1.36
16.1
11.6
0.82
5.0
2617.4
31.0.2
862.4
52.1
172.2
4.6
108.8
Observa-
, tions
104
105
102
90
89
89
89
89 .
88
88
89
89
66
81
98
98
104
: 105
86
90
97
91
94
98
93
84
Note: Shares, fractions and ratios are measured as percentages. Crime is measured as number of
offences per 100,000 inhabitants.
• Wealth: Gross Domestic Product per capita (in national prices of 1990 and purchasing
power standards, i.e. transformed to ECU by assuming purchasing power parity).
• Social cohesion (poverty, labour market): a) Unemployment rates, b) youth unemployment
rates, c) long-term unemployment as percentage of total unemployment, labour force par-
ticipation (male and female) of population aged 1 5 - 2 4 and 15 - 64, d) Share of male
(female) workers working part-time, e) share of male (female) workers with fixed-term
contracts.
• Inequality: Ratio of high qualified labour force to low qualified labour force.
• Social security: Ratio of total social security payments to GDP.
• Job quality: a) Share of male (female) workers working part-time, b) share of male (fe-
male) workers with fixed-term contracts.
• Educational attainment, occupational status of residents: Ratio of high (low) qualified la-
bour force to total labour force.
• Female labour force participation: a) Share of women aged 15-64 participating in the la-
bour market, b) share of female workers working part time, c) share of female workers
with fixed-term contracts.
• Ethnicity: Share of foreigners in total population.
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• Family disruption, social control: a) Divorces per 100 marriages, b) share of extramarital
births, c) net reproduction rate, d) mean age of men at the time of first marriage, e) mean
age of women at childbirth.
• Demographics: Share of young men (15 - 24) in the population.
• Drug related crime: Number of drug offences per 100,000 inhabitants.
4.2.1.2 Estimation strategy
All results are based on fixed-effect panel estimation. As explained in Section 3.1, introducing
country-specific effects is a "conditio sine qua non" of criminometric studies, since they allow
us to control for unobserved heterogeneity. This heterogeneity mainly arises because of differ-
ent shares of crime reported to the police, and due to slightly different definitions of crime
categories among EU member states.
Including all potential variables at once turned out to be an unsuccessful way of testing the
contribution of single variables, because we ran into problems of multicollinearity. Therefore
we followed a sequential testing procedure, and we only present significant (and sometimes
weakly significant) results as well as selective results if they show the performance of com-
peting theories. Thus, if variables mentioned above do not show up in the following tables, it
can be concluded that they are not confirmed as significant indicator of the crime category
under investigation.
Not all of the variables presented in Table 17 are available for all countries (for instance, data
on foreigners are missing for Italy, and the number of drug offences are lacking for Spain,
England and Wales), so please note that different model specifications in Table 18 to Table 24
imply different samples. Our estimations are based on unbalanced panels. The reasons for
deviating samples are explained in table notes. However, it has to be stressed at the outset that
the presented results turn out to be robust, irrespective of sample settings.
4.2.1.3 Estimation results
s
4.2.1.3.1 Interpretation of results
In Table 18 to Table 24 we present our criminometric estimation results. Conventional t-
values are given in parentheses. The share of variance explained by the statistical estimate is
shown as "R-squared" statistic (which is adjusted for the number of explanatory variables
involved in the estimation equation). Please note that for expository reasons all ratios, rates
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and shares are measured as percentages in Table 17, whereas estimations presented in Table
18 to Table 24 are based on fractions (for instance, the average unemployment rate is 9.0 in
Table 17, but it is used as 0.09 in the estimation procedure). The dependent variable is meas-
ured as "log (crime)" of seven types of crime (with "crime" measured as "number of offences
per 100,000 inhabitants"). This procedure means obeying some general rules of interpretation:
a) If the explanatory variable is a share (or ratio, fraction, rate), estimates represent semi-
elasticities. Thus an estimated coefficient of, say 10,0, means that increasing the explanatory
variable by 1 (percentage) point would increase crime by 10.0 per cent. Let us consider the
unemployment rate as an example. Assuming a rise of the unemployment rate from 5% to 6%
would increase crime rates from, say, 2000 to 2200 per 10.0,000 inhabitants. Note, however,
that increasing the unemployment rate from 5% to 6% means an increase of the unemploy-
ment rate by 20 per cent, so that the estimated coefficient 10 would imply a much smaller
(dimensionless) (point-) elasticity of 10/20=0.5.
b) If the explanatory variable is a logarithmic variable, as for instance log (GDP per head),
then: estimated coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. If the estimated coefficient is b,
then increasing the explanatory variable by 1 per cent means a rise of crime by b per cent. For
example, if b is 1.5, then increasing GDP per capita from, say, 30,000 EURO to 30,300
EURO would change crime from 2000 to 2030.
c) Finally, the reader will find direct measures of variables such as age. For instance, if we
observe an estimated coefficient of "age at the moment of first marriage" of 0.07, then an in-
crease of age by one year (say from 26 to 27) implies a raise of crime by 7 per cent.
4.2.1.3.2 Total Theft
The regression results for total theft are documented in Table 18. The first column is esti-
mated without fixed effects, and demonstrates the importance of country specific effects by
comparing it to column 2, which differs in considering so-called country specific dummy
variables. Here, the impact of some variables has vanished (e.g. the influence of the female
labour force participation rate), and other variables change their sign. For instance, "divorces
per marriage" switches from a negative to a positive sign.
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Table 18: Total theft
Independent variables
Constant
log (Real GDP per head)
Youth unemployment rate
Share of long-term
unemployment
Male labour force participation rate,
15-64
Female labour force participation
rate, 15-24
Share of female workers with fixed-
term contracts
Share of male workers with fixed-
term contracts
Share of female workers working
part-time
Divorces per marriage
log (drug offences)
Country effects
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared
(1)
-8.76
(4.41)
1.14
(5.87)
2.42
" (4-07)
2.30
(4.98)
...
(7.94)
(14.12)
—
-2.98
(2.13)
2.39
(7.88)
-1.48
(3.97)
...
no
65
0.914
Dependent variable
(2)
—
...
1.70
(2.40)
0.50
(2.48)
2.94
(2.35)
...
5.67
(3.87)
-5.44
(4.18)
-3.78
(3.94)
1.08
(2.85)
...
yes
66
0.995
(3)
—
...
1.41
(1.97)
0.46
(2.34)
2.68
(2.09)
...
5.90
(4.12)
-5.83
(4.57)
-4.26
(4.40)
1.53
(3.61)
...
yes
58
0.995
: log (theft)
(4)
—
...
0.94
(1.21)
0.56
(2.58)
2.04
(1.51)
„ .
5.84
(3.98)
-6.08
(4.56)
-3.21
(3.24)
1.02
(2.59)
0.08
(1.49)
yes
59
0.995
1
 (5)
—
—
—
0.54
(2.49)
0.99
(0.95)
...
5.48
(3.79)
-6.48
(4.96)
-2.53
(3.08)
1.18
(3.18)
0.09
(1.77)
yes
59
0.995
Notes: Ireland and Spain are excluded because of missing data. In columns 1 and 2, data for Belgium,
Austria, Finland and Sweden are missing for the years 1990-1994. Columns 3 to 5 are based on sam-
ples without these countries.
The number of divorces per marriage - which is 35 % on average for our European sample
from 1990-199661 - is used as indicator of "family disruption". Estimated coefficients in
Table 18 suggest that an increase by one point would increase the number of thefts by 1 to 1.5
per cent. This result and the rising number of divorces in Europe are in accordance with sev-
eral theories of criminal behaviour:
a) social disorganisation, differential association/ social learning theory: a substantial share
of divorces is most likely associated with low parental supervision of youth,
b) social control theory: less and less people do believe in conventional values and norms,
c) self control theory: more and more people act in own short-term self interest, and
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d) interactional theory: low family attachments of children.
All these lines of thought are also confirmed by the estimated coefficients of the "share of
female workers with fixed-term contracts" (average of the European sample: 12.8 %). The
impact of this indicator on theft is positive (with coefficients ranging from 5.5 to 5.9), hence it
seems reasonable to interpret it as indicator of family disruption. The same interpretation ap-
plies to the female participation rate, which is positively associated with criminality according
to previous results in the scientific literature. In case of Table 18, however, the female labour
force participation rate has become insignificant after including the share of women with
short-term contracts and female part-time working.
At first glance, the crime-preventing effect of female part-time working (sample average: 26%
of the female work force, range of estimated coefficients: -2.5 to -4.3) seems to contradict the
effect of female jobs with limited period contracts. Contrary to (fixed-term) full time jobs,
part-time jobs apparently leave sufficient time for parental supervision and effective child-
hood socialisation (which both are crime preventing from the viewpoint of social control the-
ory, social disorganisation theory, and differential association/ social learning theory). Moreo-
ver,, part-time jobs for females improve the legal income opportunities of the family. As pre-
dicted by the economic theory of crime, better legal income opportunities would decrease the
number of crimes.
The-behaviour of male labour market variables differs from that of their female counterparts.
A higher share of male workers with fixed-term contracts (sample average: 9.7%) reduces
crime, (range of estimates: between -5.4 and -6.5). This result cannot be seen isolated from the
crime enhancing effects of both the youth unemployment rate (average: 18.5, estimates: be-
tween 0.9 and 1.7), and the share of long-term unemployment (average: 44.2, estimates: about
0.5). It seems to be important to bring men back into work, in particular young men (who are
exposed to criminal risks to a higher extent than older people), and those who suffer from
social exclusion.
Unemployment plays a central role in many theories. It serves as an indicator of lacking social
cohesion, i.e. poverty, low economic status (social disorganisation) and relative deprivation,
61
 The average annual growth rate of this period amounts to 5.5 %.
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and it represents the gap between aspiration and expectation (strain theory) as well as low
legal income opportunities (economic rational choice theory). Whereas the positive sign of the
coefficient on unemployment is in line with all these theories, it contradicts the theory of life-
style and routine activity, according to which higher unemployment would imply higher
guardianship and less exposure to potential dangers and would thus result in a reduction in
crime.
Lifestyle/ routine activity theory is partially confirmed by the role of the male labour force
participation rate (sample average: 78.1, range of estimates: between 1.0 and 2.9). The higher
the share of the "active" population is, the higher is the probability that potential offenders
meet their victims.
The effect of the "male labour force participation rate" in the sense of lifestyle/ routine activ-
ity is also confirmed through its interaction with drug offences (these are included in columns
4 and 5 of Table 18). Including the number of drug offences per 100,000 inhabitants as an
indicator of unfortunate lifestyle/ routine activity situations renders the effect of the male par-
ticipation rate insignificant. The same holds for the youth unemployment rate, indicating that a
substantial share of thefts committed by young people might be drug related. Looking at the
total effect of drug related thefts, we can conclude that a 10 per cent increase in the number of
drug offences increases the number of thefts by about 1 per cent (exact elasticity estimates:
0.08 and 0.09). From a statistical point of view, however, these estimates are only weakly sig-
nificant. This might come as a surprise to those readers who expect a highly significant impact
coming from illicit drug use. However, one has to keep in mind that our estimates represent
the excess effect of drug offences, i.e. the measurable effect which remains after including all
other potential sources of crime, many of which also belong to the causes of drug offences
themselves (see Table 24).
4.2.1.3.3 Theft of motor vehicles
Theft of motor vehicles represents an important subgroup of total thefts. Moreover, car theft
statistics can be regarded as highly reliable since the share of unreported cases is very low
across countries (this can be concluded from victim surveys). Therefore car theft might be the
most suitable theft category for international comparisons. In Table 19, estimation results are
summarised. Some interesting deviations from total thefts can be observed. Here the role of
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the family is not linked to the female participation rate or to divorces (which both are insig-
nificant), but to the age of males at the time of their first marriage. As "divorces per mar-
riage", this alternative indicator can also be interpreted in the sense of social disorganisation,
social control or other theories that focus on the central role of conventional family attach-
ment. Later marriage means that young males delay the time at which they take responsibility
for the well-being of a young family. Thus, later marriage means extending the period during
which young men are exposed to risk groups and are more likely to act in own short-term self
interest rather than in the long-term interest of social groups.
Table 19: Theft of motor vehicles
Independent variables
log (Real GDP per head)
Youth unemployment rate
(Youth unemployment rate)2
Male labour force participation rate, 15-24
Share of foreigners, 15-24
Age of males at time of first marriage
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared
Dependant variable:
(1)
0.94
(2.45)
8.89
(4.85)
-13.00
(4.67)
2.14
(2.54)
™ \
. . .
80
0.972
log (theft of motor vehicles)
(2)
0.59
(1.55)
5.96
(3.07)
-8.34
(2.81)
2.11
(2.56)
4.42
(3.50)
...
73
0.976
(3)
...
5.90
(2.75)
-9.07
(2.93)
2.28
(2.74)
3.89
(3-10)
0.09
(2.15)
68
0.978
Note: All estimates include country-specific constants. Italy is excluded in estimations 2 and 3 because
of missing data.
The role of the active labour force, which, of course, is also the active one in the illegal sector,
is confirmed for theft of motor vehicles. Here, the group of young men older than 15 and
younger than 25 turns out to be a significant indicator of theft of motor vehicles.
It becomes very clear that car theft is first of all a matter of the young (men), a result con-
firmed by the influences stemming from unemployment and ethnic heterogeneity (see below).
In the case of unemployment significant effects can be identified only for youth unemploy-
ment, not for general unemployment. Here, unlike total thefts, motor vehicle thefts are deter-
mined by a non-linear impact, revealing a concave (first strongly rising, than flattening) shape
of the impact curve (with a maximal value, and zero change for youth unemployment rates at
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about 30 to 40 per cent, which means that most observable figures of about 10 to 20 per cent
increasing youth unemployment rates imply the danger of further increasing thefts).
Finally, both ethnic heterogeneity measured by the share of young foreigners in a society and
higher wealth increase the number of motor vehicle thefts. Wealth is measured by real GDP
per capita. The positive sign of this indicator suggests that GDP should be interpreted as a
measure of illegal income opportunities. A higher GDP per capita means a higher number of
lucrative targets.
The effect of ethnic heterogeneity is in accordance with results known from social disorgani-
sation theory (see Section 2.1.1). Nevertheless, the underlying reason for this result should be
interpreted with care. There are many reasons why foreigners are over-represented in the
group of suspects. First, they may be more often suspected wrongly than the native popula-
tion. Second, there are some laws like the foreigner and asylum laws which can, by definition,
only be broken by foreigners. Third, foreigners who reside in Europe are to a higher percent-
age young men. Fourth, some foreigners may be in European countries after fleeing their
homeland because they were offenders there. Finally, most foreigners enter European coun-
tries because they had no economic success in their home country. The latter may be due to
factors that foster crime, for example, lack of education. Since, in our econometric specifica-
tions, we are interested in the pure crime-effect of being a foreigner in a European member
state, all the points mentioned above are potential sources of bias. These points should be kept
in mind when judging the coefficients of the foreigner variable in our estimations.
One of our motivations to use a foreigner variable is its supposed connection with norms,
tastes and social interactions (Eide 1994). A low adherence to norms may be the consequence
of, or a reaction to discriminating tendencies against foreigners by the native population (see,
for instance, Krueger and Pischke (1996), who analyse crime against foreigners in Germany).
Moreover, concerning crime-enhancing social interactions, foreigners are presumably more
likely to become offenders, since (especially young) foreigners spend more time in cliques.
Apart from norms, tastes and social interactions, the young-men and foreigner variables may
also be related to deterrence variables and legal and illegal income opportunities. Young men/
people, especially when they are less than 18 years of age and/ or first-time offenders, would
not be punished severely. Moreover, young men/ people who are pupils, students or job-
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beginners with low wages have relatively low legal income opportunities. The same holds true
for foreigners who may have low-paid jobs due to language problems or lack of education.
4.2.1.3.4 Burglary, Robbery
The analysis of crime against property is completed by burglary and robbery. Table 20 and
Table 21 confirm the key role of social exclusion for the understanding of property crime.
Burglary is positively associated with general unemployment, whereas high robbery rates are
more likely associated with both high long-term unemployment and youth unemployment.
Table 20: Burglary
Independent variables
Unemployment rate
Female labour force participation
rate, 15-64
Share of male workers with fixed-
term contracts
Share of foreigners, 15-24
Divorces per marriage
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared
(1)
2.02
(4.13)
...
...
...
...
91
0.924
Dependent variable:
(2)
4.93
(6.33)
1.96
(3.59)
-1.57
(2.23)
—
...
74
0.992
(3)
4.14
(4.10)
1.18
(1.66)
-1.98
(2.74)
...
0.69
(2.55)
67
0.993
log (burglary)
(4)
4.31
(3-77)
1.23
(1.59)
-1.97
(2.55)
...
0.60
(1.49)
59
0.993
(5)
4.05
(3.60)
...
-1.69
(2.35)
2.24
(3.49)
0.72
(2.96)
59
0)994
Notes: All estimates include country-specific constants. Spain is excluded because of missing data on
burglary. Columns 3-5: without Ireland (no data on marriages). Column 5: without Italy (no data on
foreigners). Columns 3-5: without Belgium, Finland and Sweden (sparse data).
The merits of increasing female labour force participation might come with the unpleasant
cost of higher crime rates. Recently, a number of authors have pointed at this important and
often overlooked cause of crime: see Donohue and Siegelman (1998), Greenwood (1998),
Wilson (1998), and Witt and Witte (1998). According to them, the influx of women into the
labour market (without a simultaneous fall of the male participation rate) bears the danger of
lacking parental supervision and ineffective childhood socialisation and hence the increasing
supply of potential criminals. This conjecture is confirmed by our panel estimates. Estimated
coefficients range between 1.2 and 2.0 (burglary), and 2.5 (robbery) meaning, for instance,
that an increase of the average share of female labour force participation from 0.53, to 0.54
would increase burglary by about 1 to 2 per cent (respective point-elasticities: 0.6 and 1.1) and
robbery by 2.5 per cent (point-elasticity: 1.3). Thus, female labour force participation might be
linked to a growing absence of conventional formal and informal associational ties rooted in
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family life and ongoing socialisation processes (social disorganisation theory and social con-
trol theory), to missing parental supervision (lifestyle/ routine activity) and the learning of
legal norms by communication in intimate personal groups (differential association/ social
learning) and to ineffective childhood socialisation (social control, self-control).
Table 21: Robbery
Independent variable.
log (Real GDP per head)
Unemployment rate
(Unemployment rate)2
Youth unemployment rate
(Youth unemployment rate)2
Share of long-term unemployment
Female labour force participation rate,
15-64
Share of male workers with fixed-term
contracts
Share of male workers working part-
time
Net reproduction rate
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared
(1)
0.97
(3.05)
3.88
(1.96)
-24.76
(2.71)
...
...
...
...
—
...
...
93
0.967
Dependent variable:
(2)
1.01
(3.05)
...
...
5.55
(3.20)
-11.26
(3.47)
0.61
(1.74)
...
—
...
...
69
0.973
log (robbery)
(3)
0.71
(1.97)
...
...
4.63
(2.69)
-10.39
(3.29)
0.73
(2.14)
2.47
(2.17)
—
...
...
77
0.974
(4)
...
...
...
5.55
(4.29)
-14.56
(6.10)
...
...
-3.50
(3.37)
12.29
(4.31)
-1.90
(3.65)
76
0.983
Notes: All estimates include country-specific effects. In column 2 Belgium, Austria, Finland and Swe-
den are excluded (sparse data).
As for total thefts, divorces per marriage have crime enhancing effects on burglary rates,
though the effect is somewhat smaller than in Table 18. In the case of robbery, the variable
"net reproduction rate" remained significat after performing our sequential estimation and
testing procedure and after carrying out tests of robustness. The negative sign indicates that
societies with only few children per family seem to have more serious crime problems. We
link this result to the more general set of indicators representing family disruption, and the
erosion of traditional ties rooted in family life. Falling net reproduction rates are associated
with lower needs for social protection, which are more likely guaranteed by the legal and so-
cial status of the family. In turn, individualistic behaviour becomes dominant over social be-
havioural norms. Individualistic behaviour is more likely linked to the individual rational of-
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fender (as is argued in the economic theory of crime) and to a higher probability of contact
with criminal peers.
Obviously it is very important to create new jobs for male workers, unless these jobs are part-
time jobs. This conclusion arises from the role of the indicator "share of male workers work-
ing-part time". Column 4 of Table 21 suggests that an increase by one percentage point (sam-
ple average = 9.7 %) increases the robbery rate by 12.3 per cent (point elasticity = 1.2),
whereas higher shares of male workers with fixed-term contracts lead to a significant reduc-
tion of crime (see Table 20 and Table 21). The effect of part-time working is fully consistent
with the well-known fact that legal and illegal activities do not represent mutually exclusive
alternatives (see Section 2.1.11). Micro studies reveal that a high proportion of crime is com-
mitted by employed offenders. To a certain extent this observation might be due to the fact
that employment exposes individuals to a wider network of delinquent peers (this view has
been followed in Ploeger (1997)). This view is reinforced by the fact that part-time workers
dispose of more leisure time than full-time workers. Since at the same time legal income op-
portunities of part-time workers are low, there is potential pressure to allocate available lei-
sure time to illegal activities.
Other causal links are possible. Besides the mere status of being employed or not, the labour
market bears further crime-enhancing aspects: Adequate pay, conditions of labour and ine-
quality, for instance. Thus, any indicator for the absence of full time work (i.e. underemploy-
ment) is expected to have a crime increasing impact. More full-time jobs for males, however,
even if they are of limited duration, reduce the number of potential offenders (see the negative
sign on "share of male workers with fixed-term contracts" in Table 20 and Table 21). In this
sense, our estimates confirm results presented in Allan and Steffensmeier (1989), who have
found that the effects of inadequate pay and hours are associated with higher arrest rates of
young adults.
As in the case of car theft, there is indication that higher wealth (measured by GDP p.c.) im-
plies a higher propensity to commit property crimes (see Table 21), though the estimated coef-
ficient becomes insignificant after including more specific labour market variables and the net
reproduction rate. The impact of ethnic heterogeneity (share of foreigners in the population
aged 15 to 24) is confirmed for burglary, but not for robbery.
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4.2.1.3.5 Crime Against the Person: Intentional Homicide and Assault
Crime against the person is covered by the categories "number of intentional homicides" and
"number of assaults", both measured as rates per 100,000 inhabitants. The results are summa-
rised in Table 22 and Table 23. Contrary to crime against property, higher wealth is associated
with less violent crime, at least with a lower number of intentional homicides. For assault the
direction of influence is ambiguous and insignificant. Thus, higher wealth might be associated
with higher moral norms or better protection from extremely violent crime.
Table 22: Homicide
Independent variable
Constant
log (Real GDP per head)
Labour force participation rate, 15-24
(Labour force participation rate, 15-
24)2
Share of foreigners, 15-24
Age of males at time of first marriage
Divorces per marriage
Country-specific effects
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared
(D
-12.26
(3.77)
—
29.89
(4.49)
-28.40
(4.53)
...
0.21
(2.64)
1.41
(2.80)
no
65
0.256
Dependent variable:
(2)
—
...
6.76
(2.12)
-5.53
(1.83)
...
0.07
(1.74)
1.71
(3.01)
yes
58
0.969
(3)
—
...
4.20
(1.29)
-3.55
(1.21)
2.50
(2.26)
0.05
(1.43)
1.27
(2.36)
yes
52
0.978
log (homicide)
(4)
—
-1.74
(1.76)
4.48
(1.41)
-3.66
(1.28)
3.47
(2.87)
0.12
(2.29)
1.31
(2.49)
yes
52
0.979
(5)
—
-1.76
(2.16)
5.92
(2.06)
-4.85
(2.05)
4.58
. (2.02)
0.12
(2.26)
1.32
(3.20)
yes
50
0.988
Notes: Portugal is missing because of lacking data on homicides. In column 2 Belgium, Ireland, Aus-
tria, Finland and Sweden are excluded because of missing or sparse data of explanatory variables.
Columns 3 and 4 present results in which additionally Italy is omitted (missing data on foreigners). Col-
umn 5 also excludes Luxembourg (check for robustness because of sparse data and a very high share
of foreigners).
In accordance with property crime, youth unemployment remains a significant indicator of
assault.62 Intentional homicide, however, is not associated with any indicator of labour market
tensions. Besides ethnic heterogeneity, indicators of family roots and family disruption are
important and statistically robust factors. The elasticity on "age of males at time of first mar-
riage" based on fixed-effect estimations in Table 22 and Table 23 varies between 0.05 and
62
 The concave total impact curve has a maximum at 20 (column 1), respectively 22 per cent (column
3), with strong effects for changes starting from small and medium youth unemployment rates.
0.12.63 Thus, postponing the time of marriage by another year would increase the number of
violent crimes by about 5 to 12 per cent.
The quantitative impact of divorces per marriage on homicides and assault is more or less the
same as for theft, though the reason might be different. Since a large share of total violent
crime emerges from marital rows among husband and wife, the significance of this parameter
estimate arises, at least to a certain degree, because of the immediate and harmful conse-
quence of family disruption itself, whereas for property crimes "divorces per marriage" more
probably serves as indicator of lacking social control and family attachment of children (see
the discussion of thefts above).
Table 23: Assault
Independent variable
log (Real GDP per head)
Youth unemployment rate
(Youth unemployment rate)2
Age of males at time of first marriage
Divorces per marriage
Number of oberservations
Adjusted R-squared
(D
-0.67
(1.28)
1.86
(2.08)
-4.99
(3-04)
0.11
(2.39)
...
88
0.991
Dependent variable: log (assault)
(2)
...
...
...
0.07
(3.00)
0.47
(1.40)
58
0.994
(3)
0.63
(1.68)
1.76
(2.80)
-4.12
(3.90)
0.05
(1.79)
0.64
(2.88)
83
0.996
Notes: All estimates include country-specific effects. Belgium, Austria, Portugal, Finland , Sweden and
Ireland are excluded from column 2 because of sparse data. Ireland is excluded from estimation 3.
4,2.1.3.6 Drug offences
The rate of drug offences was included as explanatory variable in all crime categories, but it
proved (weakly) significant only for theft. In Table 24 various estimates are performed to ex-
plain drug offences as endogenous type of crime. From column 1 it can be inferred that drug
offences are related to higher income levels. Column 2 then seems to suggest that societies
with more generous welfare payments foster drug related crimes. This view, however, turns
out to be short-sighted, since the ratio of social security payments becomes insignificant when
the true reason behind extensive security payments is considered, i.e., high unemployment
rates. Youth unemployment is highly significant and has a large numerical impact (see column
63
 The first column represents estimates without fixed-effects in order to demonstrate the correcting
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3): An increase of the youth unemployment rate by one percentage point leads to an increase
of the number of drug offences by about 2.7 per cent.
In column 4 of Table 24 other crime factors are included, which, however, cause the loss of
many observations (from 80 to 47 in column 3). Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that
divorces per marriage, part-time working, the ratio of high qualified to low qualified labour
force and the control for the active part of total population turn out to be more important fac-
tors than youth unemployment, and reasons that might stem from the abundance of rich socie-
ties (i.e. GDP p.a), which now become insignificant. Divorces per marriage, part-time em-
ployment of males and the male labour force participation rate have the same effects (same
signs) as they have for the other crime categories and should be interpreted in the same way as
above. A new variable, which here shows significance for the first time, is the ratio of high
qualified persons to low qualified persons in the labour force. We should interpret the result as
an achievement of educational attainment. Evidently, better education helps to reduce the
problem of drug abuse.
Table 24: Drug Offences
Independent variable
log (Real GDP per head)
Youth unemployment
Male labour force participation rate,
15-64 i
Share of male workers working
part-time
Ratio ,,high qualified" to ,,low quali-
fied" labour force
Divorces per marriage
Ratio of social security payments to
GDP
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared
(D
1.57
(2.67)
...
...
...
...
...
...
83
0.931
Dependent variable:
(2)
0.76
(0.97)
...
—
...
...
...
7.25
(3.36)
67
0.929
log (drug offences)
(3)
1.06
(1.98)
2.74
(4.23)
...
...
...
...
...
80
0.938
(4)
...
...
7.04
(1.64)
16.09
(2.19)
-0.33
(2.19)
2.59
(3-46)
—
47
0.967
Notes: Spain and England & Wales are omitted from the samples because of missing data on drug
offences. Data on social security are only available until 1995. Data on qualification (column 4) are only
available for the period 1992-1996. Ireland is omitted from column 4 (missing data on marriages).
influence of country-specific constants.
115
4.2.1.4 Summary of results
Table 25 gives a summary of "Crime in the Europe of Nations", i.e., of results based on a
cross-section of national time series. We summarise Table 18 to Table 24 with respect to rele-
vant indicators of crime, direction and magnitude of influence. For each relevant indicator we
present affected categories of crime. The magnitude of the effect is presented as (point) elas-
ticity. In those cases in which semi-elasticities were estimated, point-elasticities have been
calculated at the point of the sample average. It has to be taken into account that some entries
of Table 25 are based on results of "indicator plus indicator squared" (for instance, the effect
of youth unemployment on theft of motor vehicles). In such cases, the elasticity of individual
member states might differ substantially from that of the average, if, for instance, national
unemployment rates are much higher or lower than the European average. As a general rule, it
can be concluded that increasing the indicator by one per cent (not to be confused with a per-
centage point), and starting from initial values which are lower than the European average
would lead to higher elasticities than those presented in Table 25, whereas the opposite is not
necessarily true.64
The consistency of most results presented in Table 25 allows us to draw some general conclu-
sions. First, wealth (GDP p.c.) varies positively with crime against property and negatively
with intentional homicides. Drug abuse very likely is a problem of wealthy societies.65 It be-
comes very clear that underemployment is a crucial reason behind crime in Europe. Unem-
ployment, long-term unemployment and, in particular, youth unemployment increase the
number of property crimes as well as the crime rate of assaults. Juvenile delinquency also
seems to be the main driving force behind the positive variation of the share of young foreign-
ers with theft of motor vehicles, burglary and intentional homicide.
Higher male participation rates lead to higher crime rates. This result simply reflects the fact
that more active men magnify the pool of potential criminals. The crime enhancing effect of
the female labour force participation is somewhat more difficult to interpret. On the one hand,
the argument might be the same as for males, i.e. data on participation rates reflect nothing but
64
 The reason for this asymmetry is the location of the maximum of the polynomial impact curve which
lies above the national sample mean for most countries.
65
 Since drug offences are also positively related to youth unemployment, drug offences are also most
likely a problem of cities, where high wealth and high unemployment rates coexist.
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the part of the population that most likely is involved in criminal activities. Since, however,
only a small part of all criminals are females, the interpretation has to be different from that of
males. The positive sign rather indicates that a higher active share of females in the population
also provides a larger pool of potential victims.
Table 25: Indicators of crime in the Europe of Nations: Summary of results
Indicator Range of (mean) elasticities Endogenous crime categories
Real GDP p.c.
Unemployment
Youth unemployment
Long-term unemployment
Male labour force participation, 15-64
Female labour force participation, 15-64
Labour force participation, 15-24
Male labour force participation, 15-24
Female workers with fixed-term contracts
Male workers with fixed-term contracts
Female workers working part-time
Male workers working part-time
Ratio of high qualified to low qualified labour force
Young foreigners, 15-24
Age of males at time of first marriage
Divorces per 100 marriages
Net reproduction
Drug offences
0.6-0.9
0.7-1.0
-0.7 - 0.6
-1.8--1.7
0.8-1.1
0.4
0.01*
0.2-0.3
0.1*-0.2*
0.1*
0.2*
0.5
0.2
0.3
0.8-2.3
5.5
0.6-1.1
1.3
0.6*-1.0*
1.1-1.2
0.7-0.8
-0.6--0.5
-0.2
-0.3
-1.1--0.7
0.6
0.8
-0.2
0.3
0.2
0.2-0.3
2.6
1.4-3.1
1.4-3.4
0.4-0.5
0.2-0.3
0.2
0.4-0.6
0.9
-1.4
0.1
Theft of motor vehicles
Robbery
Assault
Intentional homicide
Drug offences
Burglary
Robbery
Total theft
Theft of motor vehicles
Robbery
Assault
Drug offences
Total theft
Robbery
Total theft
Drug offences
Burglary
Robbery
Intentional homicide
Theft of motor vehicles
Total theft
Total theft
Burglary
Robbery
Total theft
Robbery
Drug offences
Drug offences
Theft of motor vehicles
Burglary
Intentional homicide
Theft of motor vehicles
Assault
Intentional homicide
Total theft
Burglary
Assault
Intentional homicide
Drug offences
Robbery
Total theft
Note: Summary of estimates presented in Table 18 to Table 24. Preliminary results (e.g. results based
on estimations without fixed-effects) are omitted. Semi-elasticities are transformed to elasticities on the
basis of respective sample averages. *) indicates elasticities based on quadratic impact curves evalu-
ated at the sample mean of the indicator variable.
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On the other hand, however, there are arguments stressing the role of the increasing female
labour force participation for the decline of conventional family values associated with
changing social norms, lowering social attachments and deteriorating parental supervision.66
Other more direct indicators confirm the crucial role of causal crime factors embedded in
family disruption. Table 25 contains significant results for "age of males at time of first mar-
riage", "divorces per marriage" and "average age of women at childbirth". All estimates show
unanimous signs indicating that intensified family values would lead to lower crime rates.
Here "more family" more specifically means taking responsibility at younger age (as regards
marriage and childbirth) as well as sticking by the bonds of marriage. Coefficients on these
variables reveal substantial quantitative effects.
Finally, fixed-term contracts and part-time working have opposite effects for males and fe-
males. Whereas for males full-time jobs seem to be crime preventing, even if the duration is
limited by fixed-term contracts, part-time jobs seem to leave enough free time and "better"
possibilities for illegal work and worse possibilities for legal work. Female fixed-term work,
however, seems to take the effect of higher female participation rates. Thus, increasing the
number female fixed-term contracts leads to higher criminality (confirmed for total theft).
Part-time working has the opposite (negative) impact on crime. Again, these results can be
interpreted in the context of family integration. Unlike full-time work, part-time jobs seem to
leave enough time for the good upbringing of children, parental supervision and effective
childhood socialisation.
4.2.2 Assessing the negative impact of crime on economic performance
4.2.2.1 The testing strategy
Most studies confirming the reverse direction of causation from crime to economics are based
on individual data or data of an extremely high level of spatial detail (see Section 2.2). How-
ever, such data sej:s would not fit the basic requirement of our project proposal according to
which indicators evaluated in our study need to be updated using regular national and interna-
66
 Of course, some of the disagreeable effects of the increasing female labour force participation rate
discussed in our Report could perhaps be offset by a simultaneous fall of the male participation rate.
However, such cases escape from our analysis since they are not visible in aggregate data sets. Since
our empirical work has to follow a positive research strategy, we can only deal with and comment on
matters of statistical evidence.
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tional statistical sources. At first glance, additional research seems to be superfluous, since all
previous ^ studies based on aggregate data state a unidirectional causality from unemployment
to crime. However, reiterating previous arguments (Section 2.2.2.4), it seems unclear whether
this result would hold for more recent data, since most time series used in previous studies
date back to the sixties, seventies and early eighties. Since the massive increase of crime in the
seventies and eighties has accumulated an unprecedented potential pool of criminals in
Europe, a different picture might emerge when more recent data were used.
In this section we study the causal effects of several crime categories on GDP growth, em-
ployment growth and investment using recent panel data from the 15 EU member states of the
nineties (1990-1996). All crime categories used in this section are already presented in Table
17 (data source: "Draft European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics"
(CDPC 1999)). The analysis of the present section further includes economic variables related
to the economic theory of growth. The data stems from the New Cronos database (Eurostat
1999) and from the Global Development Network Growth Database Descriptive (World Bank
2000). Descriptive statistics of these variables are presented in Table 26. Please note that, as
before, Table 26 presents percentage shares, whereas subsequent estimates are based on ratios.
Table 26: Descriptive statistics of economic performance indicators
Indicator Mean Max. Min. Std. Dev. Observ.
Gross domestic investment (% of 21.3
GDP), 1985-1991
Telephone mainlines (per 1.000 406.2
people), 1985-1991
Growth of GDP p.c. in prices of 1.3
1990 and purchasing power
standard (%)
Percentage change in employ- 0.2
ment
30.6
691.0
10.2
15.0
145.0
-7.9
3.3
116.7
2.3
97
105
89
5.1 -7.0 2.1 104
The research strategy followed in this section combines tests of causality in the sense of
Granger (1969) with advances in the empirical literature on economic growth (Barro 1991, De
Long and Summers 1991, Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992, and Sala-i-Martin 1997b).
As known to everyone, correlation does not necessarily imply causation in any meaningful
sense of that word. The widespread Granger (1969) approach to the question of whether x
(criminality) causes y (economic performance) intents to investigate how much of the current
y can be explained by past values of y and then to reveal whether adding lagged values of x
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can improve the explanation, y is said to be Granger-caused by x if x helps in the prediction
of y, or equaly if the coefficients on the lagged xs are statistically significant. Thus, Granger
causality measures precedence and information content but it does not by itself indicate cau-
sality in the more common use of the term. Since, however, the general meaning of "causal-
ity" in its all embracing philosophical meaning most probably escapes any statistical feasibil-
ity, we content ourselves with this concept of causality based on time series analysis.
A common feature of empirical contributions to the economic growth literature is the consid-
eration of investment variables as explaining variables. Sala-i-Martin (1997b) has tested the
robustness of 59 indicators of growth in an international cross-section of nations and has
found investment to belong to the most robust variables.67 However, using investment as indi-
cator of growth can be criticised on grounds of simultaneity. Looking at standard investment
models such as the classical accelerator principle, it is obvious that investment itself is influ-
enced by economic growth very likely leading to a simultaneity bias in most empirical growth
models based on cross-sections (which is obvious but usually ignored). We avoid this problem
by merging lagged investment data to economic performance indicators. The time lag of tested
growth variables with respect to investment is 5 years. This time lag can be considered long
enough in order to relate variations of economic performance to previous investment efforts.
The basic specification of our test equation follows the principle of Granger causality tests.
Lagged investment variables serve as additional control variables. They are fixed in the sense
that they appear in all regressions. Thus, the basic model looks as follows:
growth{t) = a growth(t -1) + b crime(t -1) + c investment^ - 5) .
Here "growth" will be replaced by "growth of real GDP per capita" and "percentage change of
employment". The causal influence of "crime" is sequentially tested for the crime categories
murder, assault, robbery, total theft, theft of motor vehicles and drug offences. For reasons of
potential multicollinearity among several types of crime we have only used one crime cate-
gory per regression, instead of including all of them in one single regression. "Investment" is
67
 Sala-i-Martin (1997b) has run 32,509 possible regressions based on permutations of 59 explanatory
variables. In 99.97 % of all cases, equipment investment has shown statistical significance. Only the
fraction of population that follows Confucius Religion (100%) performed better. It very likely acts as a
dummy variable for East Asian miracle economies.
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more precisely measured as the percentage share of gross domestic investment in GDP. Since
previous investments in information and telecommunication techniques very likely represent
one of the main indicators of future growth, we have added a second predetermined growth
indicator, which is "telephone mainlines per 1000 people".
4.2.2.2 Results
Table 27 and Table 28 show estimation results. The parameter on "autoregressive influence",
i.e. the parameter a of the growth equation measures how much of the current y can be ex-
plained by past values of y. It fluctuates between 0.28 and 0.40 for GDP growth rates and
between 0.45 and 0.48 in case of employment growth. As expected, investments are important
for future GDP growth (confirmed by significant t-values in Table 27). However, in order to
achieve a growth of employment, it seems to be more important to invest more specifically in
communication technologies, as can be seen from Table 28. Here, previous investment is only
significant at a low probability level. The effect is dominated by previous variations of the
telephone infrastructure, which shows a highly significant positive association with current
employment growth rates.
Table 27: Testing the causal effect of crime on national GDP growth rates
Test of causal effects stemming from the following crime categories (in logarithmic form):
Dependent variable:
GDP growth rate
Autoregressive Influence
Crime (logcrime(-1))
Gross domestic investment (-5)
(share in GDP)
Telephone infrastructure (-5) (log
telephone mainlines(-5), per 1000
people)
Fixed effects
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared
Intentional
homicide
0.40
(3.6)
-0.027
(1.6)
0.44
(3.0)
0.06
(1.5)
yes
62
0.592
Assault
0.36
(3.4)
0.015
(0.6)
0.43
!(3-1)
0.06
(1.5)
yes
66
0.573
Robbery
0.34
(3-1)
-0.014
(0.8)
0.38
(2.7)
0.08
(1.8)
yes
63
0.577
Total
theft
0.35
(3.0)
-0.021
(0.6)
0.42
(2.9)
0.07
(1.5)
yes
60
0.586
Theft of
motor vehi-
cles
0.33
(3.1)
-0.024
(1.1)
0.44
(3-1)
0.06
(1.5)
yes
65
0.578
Burglary
0.33
(2.9)
-0.027
(0.9)
0.44
(3.0)
0.08
(1.8)
yes
61
0.592
Drug
offences
0.28
(2.3)
0.020
(1.8)
0.42
(2.8)
0.07
(1.5)
Yes
56
0.607
Note: t-values in parentheses.
Turning to the crucial question whether crime does Granger cause economic performance, the
answer based on the two tables has to be NO. None of the coefficients reveals t-values above
the standard critical value, which is 1.96. The largest effects can be observed for murder
(Table 27, t-value = 1.6), theft of motor vehicle (Table 28, t-value = 1.5) and drug offences
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(Table 27, t-value=1.8). "Intentional homicide" and "theft of motor vehicles" both have the
expected (negative) influences on economic performance, whereas the result for drug offences
even suggest that drug related crimes foster economic growth. As t-values are below usual
critical values, we should not read too much into these estimates.
Table 28: Testing the causal effect of crime on national employment growth rates
Test of causal effects stemming from the following crime categories (in logarithmic form):
Dependent variable:
Employment growth rate
Autoregressive Influence
Crime (log crime(-1))
Gross domestic investment (-5)
(share in GDP)
Telephone infrastructure (-5) (log
telephone mainlines(-5), per 1000
people)
Fixed effects
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared
Intentional
homicide
0.47
(4.2)
0.006
(0.5)
0.16
(1.3)
0.09
(3.3)
yes
74
0.588
Assault
0.47
(4.3)
-0.005
(0.3)
0.17
(1.4)
0.10
(3-7)
yes
78
0.586
Robbery
0.48
(4.3)
-0.002
(0.1)
0.17
(1.3)
0.10
(3.5)
yes
75
0.582
Total
theft
0.45
(3.9)
0.012
(0.5)
0.17
(1.4)
0.10
(3.7)
yes
71
0.591
Theft of
motor vehi-
cles
0.46
(4.3)
-0.019
(1.5)
0.20
(1.6)
0.10
(3.9)
yes
77
0.600
Burglary
0.46
(3.8)
0.006
(0.3)
0.17
(1.3)
0.10
(3.3)
yes
72
0.589
Drug
offences
0.45
(3.8)
0.011
(1.4)
0.018
(1.4)
0.08
(2.5)
Yes
66
0.602
Note: t-values in parentheses.
Table 29 more directly concentrates on the main driving force behind future growth, i.e. in-
vestment itself. Here, more backward lagging investment rates and telephone infrastructure
had no measurable impact. Thus, they are left out from the regression analysis. Testing the
Granger causal effect of crime on national investment/ GDP ratios in the usual way, theft of
motor vehicles proves to be a significant obstacle to future growth (t-value = 2.4). Burglary,
too, hinders investment, though the t-value (1.7) is somewhat smaller than necessary for usual
significance levels. All other crime categories turn out to be insignificant. Since the dependent
variable is measured as a ratio (the mean value of the sample according to Table 26 is 0.21),
the coefficient on "theft of motor vehicles" has to be interpreted as follows: According to our
estimate, increases of theft of motor vehicles by 10 per cent (say, from 400 to 440 per 100,000
inhabitants) would lead to a drop of the investment rate of the following year by about 0.2
percentage points (for instance, from 21 % to 20.8 %). In Germany, for instance, this estimate
would translate into a loss of investment of about 4 milliard Euro.
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Table 29: Testing the causal effect of crime on national investment/ GDP ratios
Test of causal effects stemming from the following crime categories (in logarithmic form):
Dependent variable:
Investment/ GDP ratio
Autoregressive Influence
Crime (log crime(-1))
Fixed effects
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared
Intentional
homicide
, 0.43
(6.5)
-0.005
(0.5)
yes
77
0.875
Assault
0.44
(7.12)
-0.010
(0.8)
yes
80
0.883
Robbery
0.44
(6.9)
0.004
(0.4)
yes
77
0.880
Total
theft
0.42
(6.5)
0.001
(0.1)
yes
73
0.884
Theft of
motor vehi-
cles
0.42
(7.0)
-0.022
(2.4)
yes
79
0.891
Burglary
0.36
(4.9)
-0.028
(1.7)
yes
74
0.890
Drug
offences
0.43
(5.9)
0.000
(0.1)
yes
68
0.875
Note: t-values in parentheses.
4.2.2.3 Summary
Only one out of 21 regressions has shown a significant feedback from crime to economic per-
formance. The only exception is theft of motor vehicles, which seems to withhold firms from
investment activities. Before we dismiss crime to be of no or only minor importance to eco-
nomic performance, more tests will be needed. We continue by looking at an even broader
international data set in the next section, before we finally investigate the growth-crime rela-
tionship of European regions at the NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 level.
4.2.3 Reconsidering the negative impact of crime on economic performance using a
cross-section of nations
4.2.3.1 Data and the empirics of economic growth
Many of the most significant empirical contributions to the vast literature on economic growth
are based on cross-country data from a large number of states (see, among many others, Barro
1991, Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992, and Persson and Tabellini 1994). We follow widely
used research strategies and focus on models developed to test conditional convergence of per
capita income (see Maniw, Romer and Weil 1992). Convergence is tested by including the
initial level of income^ which is expected to have a negative effect on growth rates. In our
sample (see Table 30 for descriptive statistics) we use real GDP per capita of 1977. Since un-
conditional models of economic convergence turned out to be rather unsuccessful, condition-
ing variables of educational and non-educational human capital have been added to the cross-
sectional regressions. The variables chosen are primary school enrolment in 1965, secondary
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school enrolment in 1977 and life expectancy in 1977 (as a non-educational human capital
variable). Estimations in Table 31 include at least one of the two educational human capital
variables as well as life expectancy. The crime impact can now simply be tested by adding
crime as an additional potential (negative) factor of growth. If statistical tests indicate its sig-
nificance, a genuine contribution of crime on economic growth is found.
Table 30: Descriptive statistics
Indicator
PRIM65: Primary school enrolment (% gross) in 1965
SEC77: Secondary school enrolment (% gross) in 1977
LIFEEXP77: Life expectancy at birth in 1977, total (years)
GDP77: Real GDP per capita in 1977 (international prices,
base year 1985)
MURDER: Median of murder per 100.000 inhabitants from
1977to1996(orsubsample)
SERIOUS ASSAULT: (see murder)
THEFT: (see murder) \
FRAUD: (see murder)
DRUG OFFENCES: (see murder)
Regional dummies:
- East Asia and Pacific
- East Europe and Central Asia
- East and North Africa
- South Asia
- West Europe
- North America
- Latin America and Caribbean
- Sub Sahara Africa
GRGDP: Average annual growth rate of per capita GDP from
1977to1996(orsubsample)
GDINV: Average from 1977 to 1996(orsubsample)ofthe
ratio of real domestic investment to real GDP
Mean
78.1
42.3
59.9
4248
7.8
105
1153
88.2
81.4
16.5
13.2
10.3
3.8
11.8
9.4
19.8
23.6
0.6
23.6
Median
90.0
42.0
61.8
2600
4.4
36.1
415.6
22.0
16.3
...
...
...
—
...
...
...
...
0.9
22.7
Max.
148
93.0
76.3
29605
91.3
1193
7630
12323
2377
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
8.4
55.1
Min.
7.0
2.0
31.2
306
0.01
0.14
3.7
0.01
0.04
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-11.4
7.3
Std. Dev.
33.4
28.5
11.4
4557
11.5
178
1590
191
255
37.2
33.9
30.6
19.1
32.3
9.7
40.0
42.6
3.1
7.8
Observ.
137
116
163
145
163
159
164
161
159
212
212
212
212
212
212
212
212
173
181
Note: The original sources of PRIM65, SEC77, LIFEEXP77 and GDINV are the Wor ld Bank's Global
Development Finance & Wor ld Development Indicators. GDP77 stems from Penn Wor ld Table 5.6.
We use a cross-section data set for 212 countries of the period 1977 to 1996.68 The socio-
economic variables are again taken from the Global Development Network Growth Database.
The crime data now stems from the International Crime Statistics of Interpol. The Interpol
data is less reliable than the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics
data used above, but is has the advantage to contain a much higher number of countries.
68
 Note, however, that countries with at least one missing value for a variable employed in a specific
regression will be automatically excluded by the statistical software package. As a consequence our
estimations are only based on approximately 100 countries/ observations.
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Whereas most socio-economic variables are based on averages, crime variables consist of
median values in order to account for possible outliers and highly skewed distributions. De-
scriptive statistics of the socio-economic and crime variables are presented in Table 30.
4.2.3.2 Results
Table 31 presents test equations in the spirit of modern growth theory. All estimates reveal a
negative sign for initial GDP (GDP77), in accordance with generally known results of the lit-
erature. The negative impact confirms the conditional convergence effect.69 Better health con-
ditions (higher life expectance) foster economic growth. This a priori belief is confirmed in
Table 31. Primary and secondary school enrollment of the working-age population of the pe-
riod 1977-1996 (approximated by PRIM65 and SEC77) vary positively with economic growth
(see column 1). However, including life expectancy renders schooling insignificant (column
2). "Conditions of health" seems to be a more immediate and direct growth factor than
schooling, which has more indirect channels of influence and, of course, includes life expec-
tancy in the long-run. Partly, the lack of measurable influence can be recovered by further
including regional indicators (dummy variables), to take account of specific growth features
(for instance, Latin America, the Caribbean, East Asia and the Pacific). Nevertheless, the net
effect of PRIM65 remains small and only weakly significant (see column 3). SEC77 is insig-
nificant and left out from further investigations.
Column 3 represents the basic specification of our empirical growth model. "Murder", "seri-
ous assault", "theft", "fraud" and "drug offences" have been added to this model in columns 4
to 8. As before, there is no significant effect of crime on growth, though signs are in line with
expectations. Hardly measurable effects can be detected for murder (a 10 per cent increase in
murder would reduce the average growth by only about 0.01 percentage points, t-value = 1.0),
serious assault (a 10 per cent increase reduces growth by 0.01 percentage points, t-value =
0.8), and fraud (same result as for serious assault).
Table 32 gathers information on estimating investment models, more precisely on estimating
explanatory factors of the ratio of real domestic investment to real GDP. We started by run-
69
 The calculation of the implied rate of convergence would require that our result could be interpreted
within the context of a fully specified conditional convergence model (as presented by Mankiw, Romer
and Weil (1992), for instance). This, however, is beyond the scope of the present report.
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ning the specification that proved successful for estimating growth models (column 1). How-
ever, "life expectancy" and GDP77 turned out to be insignificant. Interestingly enough, col-
umn 2 reveals that LIFEEXP77 shows significance when PRIM65 is left out from our analy-
sis. Unlike growth regressions presented in Table 2, education proves to be a better human
capital indicator of future investment than the non-educational indicator "life expectancy".
0
Table 31: Testing the influence of crime on national growth rates
PRIM65
SEC77
log (LIFEEXP77)
log (GDP77)
Regional dummies
log (Murder)
log (Serious assault)
log (Theft)
log (Fraud)
log (Drug Offences)
Number of observ.
Adjusted R-squared
(1)
0.022
(2.2)
0.036
(2.7)
...
-0.009
(2.6)
No
...
...
—
...
...
100
0.204
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of real p.c. GDP
(2)
0.002
(0.1)
0.004
(0.3)
0.085
(3.1)
-0.011
(2.8)
no
._
...
...
...
...
98
0.227
(3)
0.011
(1.3)
—
0.070
(3.6)
-0.011
(3-6)
yes
...
...
...
...
...
113
0.446
(4)
0.014
(1.6)
—
0.079
(3.7)
-0.014
(4.3)
Yes
-0.001
(1.0)
...
-
...
...
102
0.433
(5)
0.012
(1.3)
—
0.079
(3.5)
-0.013
(4.1)
yes
...
-0.001
(0.8)
...
...
...
99
0.419
(6)
0.013
(1.6)
—
•  0.075
(3.0)
-0.014
(4.2)
yes
...
...
0.000
(0.0)
...
...
102
0.427
, 1977-1996
(7)
0.019
(2.3)
...
0.074
(3.3)
-0.014
(4.6)
yes
...
...
...
-0.001
(0.8)
...
99
0.475
(8)
0.013
(1.5)
—
0.077
(3.4)
-0.013
(3.9)
yes
...
...
...
...
0.000
(0.1)
100
0.427
Note: All estimates include a constant term which is omitted from the table for reasons of space.
Growth rates and shares enter the equations as fractions (e.g. 0.02 instead of 2%).
Column 3 represents our basic specification. Besides taking account of human capital en-
dowments, we rely on conventional accelerator models of investment, according to which
accelerating income is a prerequisite of investment. According to our estimate, increasing real
GDP growth by one percentage point leads to an increase of the share of investment in GDP
by 1.4 percentage points.
As regards the effect of crime, no significant result arises. The highest t-value can be observed
for "fraud" (t-value = 1.2). However, the small coefficient of-0.005 implies that increases of
fraud by 10 per cent would decrease the average share of investment by only about 0.05 per-
centage points.
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Table 32: Testing the influence of crime on national investment rates
PRIM 65
log (LIFEEXP77)
log (GDP77)
GRGDP
Regional dummies
log (Murder) <
log (Serious assault)
log (Theft)
log (Fraud)
log (Drug Offences)
Number of observ.
Adjusted R-squared
Dependent variable:
(1)
0.066
(2.1)
0.092
(1.2)
-0.008
(0.7)
—
Yes
...
...
...
...
...
119
0.187
(2)
—
0.23
(4.0)
--0.010
(1.0)
—
yes
—
. . . •
. . .
. . .
. . .
127
0.198
Average of the ratio of real domestic investment to real GDP,
(3)
0.065
(2.7)
...
...
1.35
(4.0)
yes
...
...
...
...
...
125
0.270
(4)
0.063
(2.7)
...
...
0.95
(2.9)
yes
0.002
(0.5)
...
...
...
...
110
0.323
(5)
0.067
(2.7)
...
...
0.95
(2.8)
yes
...
0.000
(0.0)
—
...
...
106
0.318
(6)
0.066
(2.6)
—
...
0.94
(2.9)
yes
...
...
0.000
(0.1)
...
...
110
0.322
(7)
0.082
(3.1)
...
...
0.86
(2.6)
yes
...
--.
...
-0.005
(1.2)
...
107
0.330
1977-1996
(8)
0.066
(2.7)
—
...
0.95
(2.9)
yes
...
...
...
—
-0.001
(0.1)
107
0.317
Note: All estimates include a constant term which is omitted from the table for reasons of space.
Growth rates and shares ernter the equations as fractions (e.g. 0.02 instead of 2%).
4.2.3.3 Summary
Based on standard growth and investment models and using data from a cross section of 202
countries, we have tested whether the addition of further crime factors might hinder GDP
growth or investment. No crime influence has been detected.
4.3 Empirical results based on regional data ("The Europe of Regions")
Before turning to the results for the "Europe of Regions" some general remarks - applying for
both the investigations of the causes and the consequences of crime - are necessary.
As already mentioned above, the number of available variables on the NUTS 3 level in the
Eurostat New Cronos database is rather small. Table 33 provides a complete list of the infor-
mation available on the NUTS 3 basis.
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Table 33: Available information on the NUTS 3 level in Eurostat New Cronos
Subject area
Agriculture and forestry
Demographic statistics
Economic accounts
Energy statistics
Community labour force survey
Research and development, patents
Tourism statistics
Transport statistics
Unemployment
Variables
Structure of agricultural holdings
Total area of the regions
Annual average population (total, female)
Population density
Births (live births, gross birth rate)
Deaths (deaths, gross death rate)
Employment (by sector and employment status)
Gross value added at factor cost (by sector and currency)
Gross value added at market prices (by sector and currency)
Gross domestic product (by ECU/ PPP and total/ per capita)
...
...
European patent applications
Number of establishments (by activity)
Number of bedrooms (by activity)
Number of bed places (by activity)
...
Unemployment (by age and gender)
Unemployment rates (by age and gender)
Working population (by age and gender)
Source: Eurostat (1999).
Even from this short list we could not employ all variables, since the time series of some indi-
cators are very short and others contain a high number of missing values. The tourism statis-
tics, for instance, do not contain any information about the years prior to 1994, and most of
the gender and age specific variables (unemployment and working population) reveal an
enormous number of missing values - at least for some countries. Since it is one of our main
intentions to detect similarities and differences of the causes and consequences of crime
across the EU member states, we decided to use only variables which are available (or may be
calculated) for all countries.70 These variables are the following (abbreviations used through-
out the report in parentheses):
• Log of real GDP per capita (LRGDPPC)7'
• Unemployment rate (URT)
• Work force participation rate (WPOPTR)
70
 There is an exception to this rule which, however, does not affect a variable from the New Cronos
data base. We use the number the drug offences as a regressor for all countries except Spain and the
Netherlands. For Spain such a variable is not available and for the Netherlands it is excluded from the
analysis due to obvious inconsistencies.
71
 Real GDP per capita is not available for Italy on the NUTS 3 level. Here, we helped us by simply
filling up the empty data cells with the values of the belonging NUTS 2 regions.
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• Gross birth rate (GBIRTHRT)
• Share of employment in agricultural sector (AGRARERT)
• Growth rate of real GDP per capita (GROWTH)
• Growth rate of employment (DEMPLT)
As further regressors we use the frequency of drug crimes, lagged values of the endogenous
variable and, of course, country specific constants (fixed-effects).
When interpreting the regression results one should differentiate between two groups of na-
tions. On the one hand, we have Denmark, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. These are
countries without obvious shortcomings in their crime data.72 Furthermore, they are all ob-
served on the NUTS 3 level, and the respective number of regions is high (Germany, Italy and
the Netherlands), and/ or the average population size and land area of the regions is rather
low. For this group of countries one might be optimistic to obtain reliable results on the
causes and consequences of crime. On the other hand, we have a group consisting of Spain,
Finland, Sweden and the UK for which estimation results should be interpreted with care. As
has already been discussed in Section 4.1.2.1, regression results based on Spanish crime data
may severely suffer from the fact that only a certain, presumably time-variant fraction of those
crimes which fall under the responsibility of other police forces is reported to the national
police. As far as the UK is concerned, we are able to perform analyses on the basis of only 19
out of 36 NUTS 2 level regions, which is a consequence of the partial incompatibility between
the British police force areas and the NUTS system. For the UK the number of observations is
further reduced by a recent reorganisation of the whole British NUTS structure. For Sweden
our investigations are likewise restricted to the NUTS 2 level, since, as a consequence of a
recent change in the NUTS structure (the grouping of some NUTS 3 level regions), the re-
spective time series are not long enough to allow for the introduction of an adequate lag
structure. Using the NUTS 2 level for Sweden (8 regions) implies that one is left with only
approximately 30 observations. The problem of a small sample size does also emerge for
Finland, where the NUTS structure was likewise altered in 1998. The average number of ob-
servations in the regressions for Finland is approximately 100. Moreover, the Finish NUTS 3
level regions are obviously not at all compact as can be gathered from the very high average
land area (see Table 14).
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Finally, it should be mentioned that in order to check the robustness of our findings, we did
not only perform NUTS 3 level estimations, but we have also run regressions with identical
specifications on the NUTS 2 level. Unfortunately, this was only possible for Germany, Spain,
Italy and the Netherlands. Denmark does not have a NUTS 2 level, and the Finish NUTS 2
level does only consist of six regions and therefore, with regard to the short time series, does
not allow for a sound analysis.
4.3.1 Causes of crime
This section deals with two questions. On the one hand, we try to identify the factors of crime
and check whether they show similarities across the included EU member states. On the other
hand, we are going to determine the optimal lag structure of crime with respect to national
indicators of crime. This allows us to carry out forecasts of crime on the basis of past realisa-
tions of explanatory variables.
4.3.1.1 Determination of the optimal lag structure
We started by assuming that contemporaneous crime (represented by 11 Interpol crime cate-
gories excluding counterfeit and total offences) might be influenced by either contemporane-
ous (lag=0), one year lagged (lag=l) or two year lagged (lag=2) changes in the explaining
variables and by one year or two year lagged changes in the endogenous variable. We then
developed a computer program which systematically performed fixed effects regressions
country by country and crime category by crime category for all possible variable/ lag combi-
nations, in order to identify the specification which performs best with respect to the adjusted
R-squared. (The (adjusted) R-squared is a statistical measure which tells us how well the es-
timated model fits reality.) This might be best demonstrated by means of an fictitious exam-
ple, say, for theft in Germany:
The first regression out of all permutations is
72
 The exception is the data on drug offences for the Netherlands, which - according to our national
correspondent - is not reliable.
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LO4(t) = a LRGDPPC{t) + b URT(t) + c WPOPRT(t) + d GBIRTHRT{t)
+ e AGRARERT(t) + f 107 (0
(fictitious adjusted R2 =0.7)
and the final regression is
L04(O = a LRGDPPC(t -2) + b URT(t - 2) + c WPOPRT(t -2) + d GBIRTHRT(t - 2)
+ e AGRARERT(t - 2) + / LOl(t -2) + g LO4(t - 2)
(fictitious adjusted R2 =0.8)
Among these regressions there is the best fit, which, for example, could be
Z,04(O = a LRGDPPC(t -2) + b URT(t -\) + c WPOPRT(t) + d GBIRTHRT(t - 2)
+ e AGRARERT(t -1) + / 1 , 0 7 ( 0 + g LO4(t -1)
(fictitious adjusted R2 = 0.9)
Hence we have run z=xAy regressions per country and offence, where x ist the number of pos-
sible lags and y is the number of possible explaining variables. In our example, we have
z=3A7=2187. Thus, we have obtained in total 2187 regression results with their corresponding
R-squares. Concerning drugs, there are only 6 explanatory variables (drugs is endogenous), so
that 729 regressions have been run. The same holds for all regressions concerning Spain and
the Netherlands, because no (or no reliable) data on drugs are available.
Based on these regressions we have checked the robustness of the results by reporting the
shares of significant parameter estimates from each set of all 2187 (729) possible results, as
well as the corresponding directions of influence. This has been done in Table 34 and in Table
52 to Table 62 in the Appendix. Moreover, results performing best with respect to the R-
squared criterion are presented in Table 35 to Table 45. (On what concerns the rules of inter-
pretation of the estimated coefficients, the interested reader is referred to the explanations in
Section 4.2.1.3.1.) Finally, in Table 46 the most striking results from Table 35 to Table 45 are
summarised.
4.3.1.2 Results
Table 34 presents results out of which the most robust indicators of crime in Europe are ex-
tracted. The criterion for an indicator to be considered a robust European indicator of crime is
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that at least 50 per cent of its estimated coefficients across all countries need to be significant
at least at the 10%-level on either the NUTS 2 or the NUTS 3 level. Indicators which meet
this requirement for a certain crime category are depicted in bold type. According to the 50%-
criterion, real GDP per capita is identified as a European indicator for serious assault (+)73,
robbery and violent theft (+), theft of motor cars (+) and drug offences (+). The unemploy-
ment rate is a European indicator for serious assault (+), total theft (-), theft of motor cars (-),
and drug offences (+). The activity rate is a European indicator for breaking and entering (+)
and drug offences (+). The gross birth rate is a European indicator for fraud (-). The share of
employment in the agricultural sector is a European indicator for sex offences (-) and serious
assault (-). Finally, the number of drug offences per 100,000 inhabitants is a European indi-
cator for robbery and violent theft (+), breaking and entering (+) and fraud (+). One might
conclude that these results are largely in accordance with our expectations. Country specific
indicators are presented in Table 52 to Table 62 in the Appendix.
73
 "+" indicates that higher values of the indicator foster crime, "-" indicates that higher values of the
indicator reduce crime.
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Table 34: Factors of crime: Frequency distribution of coefficient estimates by sign and
level of significance
Crime category Factors
Murder LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
L07
Sex offences LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
L07
Rape LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
LO7
Serious assault LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
LO7
Theft (all kinds of theft) LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
, AGRARERT
L07
Aggravated theft LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
LO7
Robbery and violent theft LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
LO7
Breaking and entering LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
LO7
+10%
12
13
13
18
3
5
0
25
6
24
5
16
27
7
12
7
15
21
45
61
39
23
7
22
38
26
33
31
14
43
38
26
35
13
22
30
45
10
39
39
3
34
28
31
35
7
24
36
NUTS
+
36
47
60
26
31
31
32
41
35
35
13
16
16
43
62
45
16
43
23
23
38
23
14
42
13
20
26
37
27
33
22
18
26
27
37
38
16
25
51
22
26
35
19
24
34
25
46
28
3
-
42
30
22
39
44
54
53
31
51
31
20
57
39
43
24
44
49
22
19
13
15
29
20
26
24
18
28
25
31
20
22
22
24
31
18
26
26
36
10
22
36
29
20
23
28
35
24
32
-10%
10
11
5
17
22
9
15
3
8
10
62
11
17
7
o
5
20
14
13
3
8
25
60
10
25
36
13
7
29
4
18
33
15
29
23
6
13
30
0
17
35
2
33
23
3
32
6
4
+10%
16
6
16
17
7
17
13
23
10
14
8
18
28
10
18
A
o
26
59
27
22
20
31
23
31
16
43
32
6
30
34
11
47
21
10
34
61
11
32
11
12
64
31
14
50
19
12
51
NUTS 2
+
49
32
33
23
33
41
35
40
47
31
44
37
23
37
41
37
41
58
18
31
41
25
48
28
28
13
36
24
32
28
28
21
36
26
34
25
17
18
32
29
35
12
20
23
37
30
39
32
-
30
31
42
36
40
28
43
30
29
43
35
43
20
32
32
43
45
16
18
28
29
24
20
26
25
21
18
22
37
22
21
24
16
32
27
10
17
30
28
31
34
23
19
32
12
35
36
9
-10%
5
31
9
24
19
14
9
8
15
11
13
2
28
20
9
17
13
0
5
14
8
31
1
22
16
50
3
23
24
20
17
44
1
21
29
31
5
41
8
29
19
1
30
31
1
16
13
8
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Theft of motor cars
Fraud
Drug offences
LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
LO7
LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
LO7
LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
57
18
30
25
25
42
48
33
10
-0
39
60
54
69
56
32
1
31
26
28
33
20
43
27
25
34
8
27
16
16
24
36
22
25
5
22
37
26
20
15
24
38
48
38
23
22
21
6
7 •
6
32
6
34
4
16
36
0
1
3
Q
o
54
11
g
0
0
41
43
39
14
41
28
14
35
40
28
21
25
2
46
73
32
27
3
1
28
12
36
20
44
19
32
21
38
17
56
25
12
25
37
22
35
20
20
20
23
24
21
22
23
34
21
39
29
15
28
33
29
29
to
!
53
2
29
17
25
6
28
7
37
2
0
0
15
3
46
36
Note: "+10 %" (and "-10%", respectively) indicate the percentage share of positive (negative) coeffi-
cient estimates that are significant at the 10 percent or higher level."+" (-) represents shares of positive
(negative) estimates below the 10 % significance level. Significant shares above 50 % are depicted in
bold type.
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Table 35: Murder (Ol)
Denmark Germany Spain
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Italy The Netherlands Finland
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3' NUTS 2
Sweden United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
LO7
LO1
-5.832
(-2.299)
1
2.546
(0.428)
2
2.580
(0.851)
0
-32.293
(-2.360)
1
-15.764
(-1.777)
0
0.345
(1.250)
1
-0.207
(-1.742)
1
0.351
(1.630)
2
2.731
(2.339)
0
1.068
(1.187)
2
-4.113
(-1.631)
1
-0.289
(-0.181)
2
-0.013
(-0.395)
0
-0.084
(-3.636)
1
-0.590
(-1.904)
0
-0.616
(-0.550)
1
2.479
(1.873)
0
-6.532
(-2.127)
0
-6.076
(-2.796)
2
-0.100
(-1.699)
2
0.077
(1.211)
1
0.522
(1.601)
2
0.849
(0.937)
2
-2.929
(-1.429)
0
1.507
(0.298)
2
2.681
(2.017)
0
-0.153
(-3.146)
2
0.409
(1.029)
0
-0.962
(-0.981)
0
-3.325
(-1.373)
2
-3.942
(-0.636)
1
3.477
(1.969)
0
"
0.085
(1.174)
2
0.447
(1.779)
1
-1.310
(-1.400)
0
2.123
(1.710)
0
14.459
(3.569)
0
1.482
(1.315)
2
0.085
(1.852)
2
-0.058
(-1.778)
2
0.529
(1.377)
2
-5.632
(-3.148)
0
-2.384
(-0.902)
2
17.440
(2.519)
0
4.333
(1.641)
1
0.197
(2.146)
2
-0.093
(-1.415)
2
-1.651
(-1.441)
2
-9.073
(-3.265)
2
10.279
(3.424)
2
20.024
(2.201)
1
4.688
(1.156)
0
"
-0.143
(-2.140)
2
-1.132
(-0.732)
1
-1.227
(-0.374)
2
9.859
(1.882)
0
36.084
(3.398)
1
-8.713
(-2.170)
2
'
0.376
(3.257)
1
-0.656
(-0.805)
0
1.138
(1.039)
1
-3.278
(-1.653)
0
14.850
(1.980)
0
-22.340
(-2.661)
2
-0.101
(-1.365)
2
-0.258
(-2.754)
1
3.923
(1.810)
2
26.443
(5.133)
2
22.276
(4.423)
1
38.305
(3.307)
0
-48.762
(-1.665)
0
0.117
(1.435)
1
-0.565
(-4.519)
1
1.200
(2.914)
2
-5.978
(-4.438)
0
-7.072
(-3.035)
0
-4.693
(-0.878)
0
-11.836
(-1.174)
0
0.052
(0.712)
0
—
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
84
0.616
1.975
2212
0.359
2.116
250
0.777
2.042
396
0.607
2.123
199
0.696
2.140
1030
0.649
2.131
239
0.766
2.219
244
0.518
1.921
69
0.712
1.928
120
0.488
2.044
30
0.895
2.748
147
0.662
2.060
Note: The lag structure of the respective regressions can be inferred from the numbers under the t-values. The lags can take on the values 0, 1 and 2.
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Table 36: Sex offences (O2)
Denmark Germany Spain
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
' Italy The Netherlands Finland
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Sweden United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
LO7
LO2
-0.060
(-0.717)
2
-0.550
(-1.017)
0
-0.683
(-1.599)
0
2.422
(2.393)
0
-2.477
(-3.911)
2
0.040
(2.958)
0
—
-0.320
(-1.722)
2
-0.178
(-0.242)
0
-2.690
(-3.325)
0
2.370
(1.171)
2
0.288
(0.206)
2
0.090
(2.679)
0
0.243
(3.945)
1
-0.661
(-3.332)
1
0.105
(0.228)
0
1.554
(1.385)
1
-6.373 .
(-2.521)
2
-0.800
(-1.079)
0
0.114
(2.313)
1
0.408
(2.449)
0
1.120
(2.545)
0
0.510
(0.471)
0
2.352
(1.120)
1
1.121
(1.790)
2
"
0.267
(4.132)
1
-0.844
(-1.274)
1
3.792
(2.636)
2
4.678
(3.000)
2
6.886
(1.483)
1
4.984
(2.361)
0
0.210
(3.129)
1
-2.172
(-1.997)
2
2.166
(0.888)
2
-7.078
(-1.729)
0
-28.890
(-3.192)
0
6.277
(1.338)
0
0.414
(3.473)
1
-1.690
(-1.591)
1
-0.855,
(-0.563)
1
2.767
(1.677)
0
-5.552
(-0.787)
1
-15.705
(-3.290)
0
-0.107
(-1.719)
1
-0.105
(-1.211)
2
-1.756
(-2.103)
0
9.607
(4.845)
2
2.817"
(1.087)
0
22.704
(4.862)
0
-25.611
(-3.866)
2
0.123
(3.189)
0
0.316
(2.555)
1
0.201
(0.929)
1
-1.058
(-1.409)
0
2.518
(2.346)
2
-2.465
(-0.978)
0
-4.125
(-0.866)
0
-0.057
(-1.729)
1
0.397
(4.996)
1
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
2561
0.699
1.981
268
0.857
2.186
442
0.773
1.864
233
0.859
2.073
245
0.696
2.365
70
0.840
2.450
120
0.354
2.332
30
0.897
2.055
161
0.827
2.403
Note: The lag structure of the respective regressions can be inferred from the numbers under the t-values. The lags can take on the values 0, 1 and 2.
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Table 37: Rape (O21)
Denmark Germany Spain
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Italy The Netherlands Finland
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3
Sweden United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
LO7
LO21
2.990
(1.750)
2
-4.712
•(-1.609)
1
5.132
(2.900)
2
24.603
(2.651)
0
21.902
(5.087)
1
0.484
(2.769)
2
-0.445
(-3.839)
1
-0.241
(-1.225)
2
-1.668
(-1.665)
1
1.188
(1.536)
2
-2.738
(-1.382)
2
-1.870
(-1.390)
2
0.045
(1.610)
0
-0.081
(-3.582)
1
-0.824
(-2.589)
0
-3.410
(-3.063)
0
-0.133
(-0.127)
0
-2.521
(-0.864)
1
-1.290
(-0.727)
2
0.059
(1.195)
0
0.370
(5.880)
1
-0.847
(-2.668)
1
-2.071
(-2.792)
0
2.539
(1.414)
1
3.272
(0.808)
2
-1.217
(-1.023)
0
—
-0.594
(-2.033)
1
-2.445
(-3.171)
0
2.866
(1.399)
2
7.929
(1.709)
2
-2.395
(-1.686)
0
—
0.758
(2.995)
1
1.717
(1.843)
1
0.997
(0.823)
1
-4.877
(-1.188)
1
-3.190
(-2.844)
2
-0.123
(-2.756)
2
-0.042
(-1.336)
2
0.879
(2.755)
0
2.568
(2.129)
0
-6.112
(-3.240)
2
7.220
(1.231)
2
2.829
(1.236)
0
0.102
(1.337)
0
-0.108
(-1.673)
2
-0.899
(-1.093)
1
1.554
(0.882)
2
6.148
(3.148)
2
5.430
(0.943)
1
-3.607
(-1.362)
0
"
0.068
(1.014)
1
-4.541
(-4.030)
2
-2.109
(-0.677)
0
6.942
(2.637)
1
-7.439
(-0.917)
0
-6.297
(-1.787)
2
—
-1.792
(-2.016)
1
-4.130
(-2.254)
2
2.079
(1.007)
0
-8.451
(-0.995)
1
-20.822
(-2.524)
0
0.081
(0.981)
1
-0.194
(-1.949)
2
-2.727
(-1.704)
0
6.664
(1.985)
2
9.417
(1.920)
2
8.064
(0.785)
1
-25.298
(-1.316)
2
0.213
(2.358)
1
-0.142
(-1.109)
1
-0.016
(-0.038)
2
-1.463
(-1.235)
0
-0.308
(-0.183)
0
-13.787
(-3.661)
0
-38.541
(-4.630)
2
0.102
(1.883)
0
0.130
(1.717)
1
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
84
0.518
2.113
2272
0.472
2.052
263
0.855
2.185
442
0.621
2.074
199
0.757
2.033
1030
0.174
1.933
239
0.293
2.321
245
0.664
2.132
80
0.820
2.192
105
0.373
2.510
30
0.778
2.401
147
0.835
1.975
Note: The lag structure of the respective regressions can be inferred from the numbers under the t-values. The lags can take on the values 0, 1 and 2.
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Table 38: Serious assault (O3)
Denmark
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Germany
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Spain
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Italy
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
The Netherlands
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Finland
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Sweden
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
LO7
LO3
0.489
(1.052)
2
5.184
(6.877)
1
1.926
(3.590)
2
-3.608
(-1.226)
1
-12.181
(-7.266)
2
0.052
(0.892)
2
-0.098
(-1.163)
2
0.499
(7.487)
1
1.039
(2.796)
1
-0.664
(-2.363)
0
-2.007
(-3.003)
0
-1.247
(-2.821)
2
0.031
(3.361)
0
0.202
(9.549)
1
0.576
(5.575)
1
1.388
(3.804)
2
-0.771
(-1.884)
0
-3.335
(-3.448)
1
0.357
(0.495)
2
0.040
(2.087)
2
0.520
(9.969)
1
-0.391
(-1.382)
2
2.239
(3.164)
0
0.810
(0.502)
2
7.538
(1.946)
0
2.367
(2.263)
0
"
0.494
(10.703)
1
0.143
(0.424)
1
2.519
(3.108)
1
-0.850
(-0.404)
0
13.414
(2.578)
1
2.608
(1.709)
0
"
0.492
(8.568)
1
0.456
(3.161)
0
1.526
(3.014)
0
0.649
(0.985)
2
4.432
(2.049)
0
-1.036
(-1.714)
2
-0.055
(-2.275)
2
0.581
(23.590)
1
1.135
(7.004)
2
-0.127
(-0.187)
2
2.195
(2.095)
0
5.975
(2.083)
2
1.607
(1.590)
1
-0,146
(-4.022)
2
0.428
(8.306)
1
0.429
(1.124)
0
0.590
(0.605)
,1
3.907
(4.427)
2
-8.809
(-2.988)
2
1.777
(1.463)
0
"
0.556
(9.910)
1
-1.247
(-1.874)
2
-4.133
(-1.738)
0
4.517
(2.254)
2
-14.101
(-2.319)
0
8.037
(2.835)
0
"
0.591
(5.720)
1
0.149
(0.911)
0
1.527
(4.611)
2
0.663
(1.304)
2
4.630
(2.447)
1
-4.567
(-3.027)
1
-0.029
(-1.582)
1
-0.274
(-2.321)
2
0.298
(0.733)
0
0.571
(0.832)
1
4.921
(3.889)
2
-8.880
(-4.674)
0
24.217
(2.568)
0
0.027
(1.153)
1
—
1.345
(4.555)
2
-2.003
(-1.963)
2
3.903
(2.532)
0
-8.683
(-2.228)
0
33.790
(4.875)
1
-0.084
(-1.636)
1
0.596
(10.066)
1
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
84
0.894
1.876
2413
0.892
2.184
253
0.971
2.336
382
0.840
2.049
168
0.908
2.117
1027
0.753
2.107
239
0.845
1.727
245
0.793
2.179
70
0.858
2.716
105
0.856
1.679
30
0.977
1.242
161
0.938
2.425
Note: The lag structure of the respective regressions can be inferred from the numbers under the t-values. The lags can take on the values 0, 1 and 2.
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Table 39: Theft (all kinds of theft) (O4)
Denmark
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Germany
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Spain
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Italy
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
The Netherlands
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Finland
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Sweden
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
LO7
LO4
-0.630
(-2.570)
2
0.882
(2.087)
0
1.185
(3.486)
0
2.594
(1.769)
0
-1.214
(-1.147)
0
-0.028
(-0.949)
0
-0.204
(-1.411)
2
0.152
(4.372)
2
-2.229
(-10.567)
1
-0.991
(-6.253)
1
-1.040
(-2.719)
1
-0.718
(-2.821)
2
0.004
(0.668)
2
0.419
(21.526)
1
0.249
(3.073)
2
-2.734
(-6.357)
0
0.525
(1.427)
2
-4.619
(-5.156)
1
-0.632
(-0.951)
0
-0.057
(-3.402)
0
0.600
(11.454)
1
-0.100
(-1.264)
2
0.440
(2.120)
2
1.077
(2.273)
0
1.204
(1.025)
1
0.587
(1.870)
2
"
0.563
(13.799)
1
0.183
(1.886)
1
0.989
(4.456)
2
-0.754
(-1.250)
1
2.087
(1.479)
0
0.719
(2.020)
2
"
0.807
(16.604)
1
0.272
(5.106)
0
0.363
(1.941)
1
0.728
(2.958)
0
3.992
(5.232)
0
-0.219
(-1.021)
2
0.061
(6.150)
0
0.613
(26.758)
1
0.221
(2.262)
0
-1.856
(-5.121)
0
2.006
(3.691)
0
-2.638
(-1.738)
2
-0.303
(-0.533)
0
0.072
(3.461)
0
0.494
(9.631)
1
-0.305
(-1.586)
1
-0.801
(-1.690)
1
1.054
(2.044)
0
5.127
(3.372)
1
1.256
(2.103)
1
" •
0.334
(5.659)
1
-0.387
(-0.961)
2
-0.700
(-0.663)
1
1.891
(1.504)
0
7.426
(2.401)
1
1.666
(1.060)
0
0.251
(2.184)
1
0.429
(1.606)
1
1.047
(2.943)
0
-0.409
(-1.027)
2
-2.584
(-1.503)
2
2.874
(2.345)
1
-0.037
(-2.361)
1
0.294
(3.106)
1
-1.412
(-3.844)
2
-3.793
(-6.447)
1
3.062
(2.638)
2
-8.517
(-5.018)
0
19.190
(3.036)
1
-0.057
(-2.915)
2
0.157
(1.127)
1
0.091
(0.961)
2
-2.458
(-6.612)
2
0.577
(1.024)
1
4.832
(3.503)
0
-7.246
(-2.849)
1
-0.037
(-1.958)
2
0.679
(16.071)
1
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
72
0.988
2.165
2364
0.971
1.939
301
0.984
1.658
396
0.970
2.057
199
0.975
2.202
1112
0.940
1.906
260
0.962
1.640
280
0.927
2.178
80
0.928
2.182
105
0.914
2.152
30
0.987
2.156
161
0.954
1.807
Note: The lag structure of the respective regressions can be inferred from the numbers under the t-values. The lags can take on the values 0, 1 and 2.
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Table 40: Aggravated theft (O41)
Denmark
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Germany
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Spajn
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Italy
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
The Netherlands
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Finland
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Sweden
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
L07
L041
-0.286
(-0.647)
2
2.835
(4.101)
0
1.901
(3.302)
0
-4.638 . -
(-1.870)
1
3.837
(2.459)
0
-0.108
(-2.334)
1
—
0.208
(3.920)
2
-2.237
(-7.509)
1
0.019
(0.089)
2
-1.367
(-2.378)
0
-0.764
(-1.995)
2
-0.001
(-0.122)
2
0.362
(17.189)
1
0.300
(2.973)
2
-3.141
(-5.823)
0
0.602
(1.289)
2
-4.721
(-4.157)
1
-1.446
(-1.704)
0
-0.126
(-5.939)
0
0.649
(12.812)
1
-0.154
(-1.527)
2
0.612
(2.349)
2
1.396
(2.310)
0
2.593
(1.754)
1
-0.685
(-1.686)
1
'
0.450
(10.164)
1
-0.254
(-1.922)
0
1.124
(4.260)
2
1.937
(2.500)
0
2.764
(1.620)
0
-0.827
(-1.773)
1
"
0.662
(11.803)
1
0.514
(7.566)
0
-0.528
(-2.360)
0
0.078
(0.256)
1
-2.013
(-1.930)
2
0.365
(1.127)
0
0.055
(4.421)
0
0.499
(19.502)
1
0.552
(4.753)
0
-0.796
(-1.993)
0
1.575
(2.467)
0
-4.608
(-2.578)
2
0.740
(1.113)
0
0.027
(1.117)
0
0.443
(8.269)
1
-0.178
(-0.680)
1
-1.704
(-2.635)
1
1.934
(2.684)
0
4.959
(2.393)
1
1.317
(1.585)
1
0.548
(10.661)
1
0.608
(1.268)
0
-3.189
(-2.901)
2
3.267
(1.970)
0
13.399
(3.647)
1
3.063
(1.640)
0
0.261
(2.101)
1
0.591
(1.360)
1
1.472
(2.550)
0
-1.104
(-1.694)
2
-5.420
(-1.986)
2
4.563
(2.602)
0
-0.022
(-0.870)
1
0.443
(4.989)
1
1.761
(4.716)
0
-3.396
(-5.360)
1
8.732
(7.096)
2
-8.637
(-4.923)
0
25.747
(3.545)
1
0.065
(3.047)
1
-0.445
(-2.512)
2
0.406
(2.168)
0
-5.239
(-10.721)
2
2.271
(2.939)
0
2.928
(1.357)
0
1.469
(0.368)
0
-0.024
(-0.853)
0
0.782
(19.758)
1
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
72
0.952
2.311
2235
0.966
2.072
301
0.986
1.614
396
0.952
2.144
199
0.965
2.090
1114
0.886
1.916
260
0.934
1.864
280
0.927
2.124
70
0.958
2.168
105
0.848
2.122
30
0.981
2.690
161
0.966
1.667
Note: The lag structure of the respective regressions can be inferred from the numbers under the t-values. The lags can take on the values 0, 1 and 2.
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Table 41: Robbery and violent theft (O411)
Denmark
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Germany
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Spain
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Italy
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
The Netherlands
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Finland
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Sweden
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
LO7
LO411
-0.655
(-0.735)
2
-1.936
(-1.084)
1
1.695
(1.229)
0
5.017
(1.036)
1
4.66
(1.56)
2
-0.05
(-0.50)
1
0.25
(2.38)
1
1.264
(10.619)
2
-0.143
(-0.204)
2
0.780
(1.731)
1
2.422
(2.231)
2
-4.16
(-6.32)
2
0.06
(4.08)
0
0.06
(2.67)
1
1.314
(6.316)
1
-1.189
(-1.550)
1
0.167
(0.241)
2
-6.194
(-3.359)
1
-1.53
(-1.34)
2
0.08
(2.36)
0
0.46
(10.01)
1
-0.119
(-0.686)
0
-1.080
(-2.837)
0
1.026
(1.202)
2
3.237
(1.475)
0
1.19
(2.33)
2
0.46
(10.49)
1
-0.402
(-2.581)
0
-1.302
(-3.351)
0
-0.788
(-0.819)
2
-3.733
(-1.644)
2
1.7
(2.84)
2
0.67
(12.24)
1
1.184
(9.530)
0
-1.025
(-2.475)
0
0.433
(0.781)
2
5.659
(3.030)
1
-2.23
(-4.98)
2
0.08
(4.4)
2
0.38
(13.2)
1
0.730
(3.153)
0
-1.427
(-1.698)
2
3.563
(2.582)
0
5.364
(1.536)
1
-1.79
(-1.79)
2
0.11
(2.59)
2
0.37
(6.18)
1
0.982
(1.828)
2
-6.714
(-4.418)
0
3.836
(2.665)
1
-6.812
(-1.603)
0
-2.62
(-1.54)
2
0.42
(7.77)
1
-0.798
(-0.889)
1
-6.984
(-3.159)
2
5.874
(2.345)
2
10.744
(1.574)
1
-8.05
(-2.41)
1
0.26
(2.11)
1
-1.151
(-2.274)
1
-3.552
(-3.635)
2
2.352
(2.058)
0
-15.986
(-3.502)
1
-16.98
(-3.59)
0
-0.03
(-0.67)
1
-0.13
(-1.38)
1
3.482
(3.520)
2
12.138
(4.756)
2
15.814
(5.664)
1
28.243
(3.895)
2
32.78
(1.8)
0
-0.13
(-2.89)
0
0.26
(1.87)
2
0.959
(4.898)
2
-3.275
(-4.674)
2
-0.928
(-0.863)
2
-5.312
(-1.903)
0
-14.28
(-2.62)
2
0.14
(3.33)
1
0.59
(9.51)
1
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
84
0.948
2.182
2620
0.891
2.159
260
0.980
2.287
396
0.960
2.113
199
0.968
2.175
1026
0.877
2.171
239
0.929
2.017
280
0.902
2.085
70
0.934
2.212
105
0.774
2.351
30
0.993
2.87
146
0.979
2.190
Note: The lag structure of the respective regressions can be inferred from the numbers under the t-values. The lags can take on the values 0, 1 and 2.
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Table 42: Breaking and entering (O412)
Denmark Germany Spain Italy The Netherlands Finland
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3
Sweden United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
LO7
LO412
-0.282
(-0.639)
2
2.831
(4.086)
0
1.936
(3.353)
0
-4.765
(-1.916)
1
3.808
(2.434)
0
-0.107
(-2.307)
1
—
-0.767
(-6.677)
1
1.622
(2.785)
0
1.901
(4.479)
2
-1.007
(-0.903)
0
-0.357
(-0.428)
0
0.054
(3.600)
2
0.122
(5.727)
1
-1.388
(-4.791)
1
-3.083
(-2.598)
1
2.144
(1.904)
2
-4.873
(-1.893)
0
-0.368
(-0.185)
1
0.165
(2.957)
2
0.331
(6.086)
1
-0.275
(-2.361)
2
0.651
(2.340)
2
1.855
(2.596)
1
2.425
(1.545)
1
-0.858
(-1.916)
1
'
0.404
(8.838)
1
-0.316
(-2.285)
0
1.101
(3.933)
2
2.213
(2.679)
0
3.361
(2.030)
2
-1.192
(-2.375)
1
"
0.608
(10.815)
1
0.509
(7.269)
0
-0.429
(-1.841)
0
-0.114
(-0.359)
1
-2.249
(-2.071)
2
0.421
(1.250)
0
0.061
(4.730)
0
0.493
(19.349)
1
0.531
(4.528)
0
-0.580
(-1.440)
0
0.897
(1.402)
0
-4.445
(-2.447)
2
0.911
(1.348)
0
0.035
(1.450)
0
0.469
(8.959)
1
-0.325
(-0.974)
1
-1.939
(-2.354)
1
1.958
(2.191)
0
4.776
(1.805)
1
1.191
(1.129)
1
"
0.551
(10.750)
1
1.008
(1.865)
0
-4.928
(-4.140)
2
-3.325
(-1.889)
1
6.605
(1.719)
1
2.680
(1.371)
0
"
0.475
(3.863)
1
0.609
(1.379)
1
1.502
(2.558)
0
-1.117
(-1.685)
2
-5.607
(-2.018)
2
4.620
(2.588)
0
-0.022
(-0.840)
1
0.448
(5.065)
1
1.773
(4.683)
0
-3.409
(-5.266)
1
8.817
(7.036)
2
-8.622
(-4.813)
0
26.427
(3.550)
1
0.066
(3.018)
1
-0.451
(-2.556)
2
0.406
(2.157)
0
-5.258
(-10.702)
2
2.388
(3.073)
0
3.059
(1.413)
0
1.600
(0.399)
0
-0.026
(-0.897)
0
0.782
(19.818)
1
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
72
0.950
2.334
2428
0.863
2.157
295
0.942
2.243
396
0.925
2.108
199
0.945
2.049
1114
0.880
1.927
260
0.935
1.828
280
0.891
2.270
70
0.954
2.284
105
0.845
2.114
30
0.978
2.759
161
0.965
1.677
Note: The lag structure of the respective regressions can be inferred from the numbers under the t-values. The lags can take on the values 0, 1 and 2.
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Table 43: Theft of motor cars (O42)
Denmark
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Germany
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Spain
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Italy
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
The Netherlands
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Finland
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Sweden
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
LO7
LO42
0.021
(0.030)
0
-3.646
(-2.012)
2
-2.054
(-2.247)
2
6.959
(2.082)
2
-6.600
(-2.467)
1
0.063
(0.868)
2
0.237
(2.352)
1
0.642
(6.887)
2
-2.767
(-5.391)
1
-0.087
(-0.234)
2
-2.010
(-2.149)
0
-1.322
(-2.127)
2
0.018
(1.382)
2
0.274
(13.319)
1
0.921
(5.050)
2
-4.452
(-5.326)
0
1.074
(1.374)
2
-5.602
(-2.787)
0
0.552
(0.387)
2
-0.160
(-4.554)
0
0.563
(9.776)
1
-0.083
(-0.552)
2
1.884
(4.942)
2
-0.976
(-1.184)
0
1.246
(0.606)
2
1.947
(3.708)
2
"
0.597
(14.100)
1
-0.261
(-1.475)
0
1.374
(3.346)
2
-0.349
(-0.342)
1
-1.983
(-0.747)
1
1.188
(1.914)
2
0.751
(17.068)
1
0.491
(5.591)
0
1.184
(4.083)
2
1.029
(2.573)
0
3.699
(2.975)
0
0.355
(0.981)
2
0.083
(5.162)
0
0.584
(24.498)
1
0.301
(2.145)
0
1.554
(3.164)
2
1.132
(1.242)
0
5.848
(2.724)
0
0.896
(1.155)
2
0.099
(3.325)
0
0.664
(15.868)
1
0.815
(1.369)
1
-5.617
(-4.217)
2
3.280
(2.201)
2
7.881
(1.830)
1
-1.874
(-1.091)
2
"
0.339
(6.265)
1
1.720
(1.545)
2
-6.771
(-2.281)
2
-2.613
(-0.637)
1
17.299
(1.899)
2
-5.745
(-1.607)
2
"
0.326
(2.960)
1
1.285
(2.954)
0
1.312
(1.585)
2
-1.677
(-1.644)
0
11.638
(2.802)
0
7.482
(1.746)
0
0.082
(1.944)
2
0.347
(3.682)
1
-0.339
[-0.736)
0
8.161
(5.708)
2
10.321
(5.584)
1
13.202
(3.416)
2
12.243
(2.944)
2
-0.093
;-3.663)
2
0.476
(3.337)
1
-0.145
(-0.870)
2
-2.790
(-4.461)
1
-1.105
(-1.237)
0
7.033
(3.291)
0
-10.887
(-2.636)
1
-0.052
(-1.490)
0
0.770
(15.984)
1
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
107
0.925
2.175
2415
0.884
2.049
278
0.972
1.927
396
0.927
1.973
199
0.939
1.961
1027
0.944
2.066
239
0.975
1.981
245
0.892
2.080
70
0.898
2.220
105
0.873
2.124
30
0.989
2.675
162
0.961
2.110
Note: The lag structure of the respective regressions can be inferred from the numbers under the t-values. The lags can take on the values 0, 1 and 2.
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Table 44: Fraud (O5)
Denmark Germany Spain Italy The Netherlands Finland
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Sweden United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
LO7
LO5
0.215
(0.233)
0
0.696
(0.295)
1
-0.988
(-0.947)
1
-16.346
(-3.592)
2
4.519
(1.544)
0
0.331
(3.154)
1
0.19
(1.68)
2
0.625
(7.349)
1
3.441
(7.248)
0
0.041
(0.117)
> 1
-4.335
(-5.002)
0
0.590
(1.014)
1
0.046
(3.945)
1
0.28
(14.96)
1
0.564
-(2.914)
1
3.875
(4.068)
0
-0.106
(-0.114)
0
-6.448
(-2.928)
0
1.130
(0.724)
2
0.115
(2.771)
1
0.30
(5.11)
1
1.131
(4.566)
1
3.743
(6.644)
2
-3.383
(-2.493)
1
0.349
(0.112)
2
5.135
(5.961)
1
0.27
(5.12)
1
1.165
(4.958)
2
3.182
(5.160)
2
-3.894
(-2.565)
2
13.912
(3.671)
0
2.074
(2.146)
0
'
0.24
(3.23)
1
0.854
(1.598)
1
0.321
(0.290)
2
3.741
(2.842)
0
-12.894
(-3.276)
2
4.510
(2.613)
0
0.16
(2.48)
1
-1.457
(-1.650)
0
0.346
(0.163)
2
-7.885
(-2.204)
1
-31.628
(-3.927)
0
7.091
(1.803)
0
4.917
(2.425)
1
-21.740
(-4.006)
2
-9.744
(-1.488)
2
-63.128
(-3.132)
2
70.207
(1.132)
0
-0.164
(-1.427)
1
0.57
(1.27)
2
0.037
(0.171)
2
-2.940
(-3.768)
2
2.795
(2.520)
1
5.331
(1.867)
1
5.598
(1.099)
0
0.013
(0.379)
0
0.54
(9.23)
1
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
96
0.801
2.477
3127
0.797
2.060
277
0.899
2.239
396
0.807
1.931
233
0.809
1.674
245
0.599
2.1
70
0.754
2.239
30
0.804
2.301
145
0.887
1.926
Note: The lag structure of the respective regressions can be inferred from the numbers under the t-values. The lags can take on the values 0, 1 and 2.
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Table 45: Drug offences (O7)
Denmark Germany Spain
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Italy The Netherlands Finland
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Sweden United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
LRGDPPC
URT
WPOPRT
GBIRTHRT
AGRARERT
LO7
-2.354
(-2.906)
0
-2.236
(-1.117)
1
3.501
(3.750)
1
18.287
(4.907)
2
1.563
(0.575)
0
—
1.233
(7.797)
1
4.948
(6.280)
1
0.972
(1.735)
2
-6.212
(-4.280)
1
-3.768
(-3.820)
1
0.297
(14.977)
1
0.884
(3.601)
0
4.665
(5.495)
2
1.609
(1.769)
2
-5.608
(-3.152)
0
-8.742
(-5.568)
0
0.686
(16.569)
1
1.103
(8.532)
1
1.063
(2.040)
1
1.009
(1.514)
0
-13.134
(-5.613)
2
-1.105
(-1.817)
2
0.440
(16.643)
1
0.533
(2.391)
1
0.289
(0.281)
1
5.163
(3.571)
0
-19.183
(-4.840)
1
-3.424
(-2.380)
2
0.490
(9.485)
1
2.214
(1.722)
0
8.036
(4.199)
0
2.947
(1.195)
0
22.528
(2.703)
0
-18.034
(-3.487)
0
0.435
(5.680)
1
-3.849
(-0.998)
2
10.550
(1.867)
0
-24.683
(-2.411)
2
48.874
(2.963)
1
-29.938
(-0.788)
2
-0.622
(-3.341)
2
1.919
(5.273)
0
-6.541
(-5.449)
2
2.338
(1.262)
0
-0.616
(-0.130)
1
8.707
(1.057)
2
0.633
(10.934)
1
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
96
0.954
2.492
2466
0.774
2.060
322
0.940
1.857
1112
0.817
2.163
259
0.879
2.037
135
0.729
2.312
30
0.653
2.889
180
0.886
2.398
Note: The lag structure of the respective regressions can be inferred from the numbers under the t-values. The lags can take on the values 0, 1 and 2.
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Table 46: Leading factors of criminality (effect, lead)
Denmark
Germany
Spain
Italy
The Nether-
lands
Finland
Sweden
UK
Murder
...
—
...
...
—
Agrarian sector,
H.2
Unemployment,
(+),2
...
/ Rape
Agrarian sector,
(+)(?). 1
...
...
GDP per capita,
(+),1
Working age
population,
(+). 1-2
...
—
Agrarian sector,
(").2
Serious Assault
Agrarian sector,
(-),2
GDP per capita,
Unemployment,
(+). 0-1
GDP per capita,
(+), 0-2
—
Agrarian sector,
(-),1
Working age
population,
(+),2
Agrarian sector,
(+)(?). 1
Theft (total)
—
Unemployment,
W.0-1
—
Unemployment,
(+),1
—
...
Unemployment,
(-), 1
Unemployment,
(-),2
Robbery and violent theft
—
GDP per capita,
(+), 1-2
—
Drugs,
(+)-2
Unemployment,
(-), 0-2
Unemployment,
(-).2
Working age
population,
(+).1
Unemployment,
(-).2
Theft of motor cars
—
GDP per capita,
(+),2
Unemployment,
(+).2
Unemployment,
(+),2
—
Unemployment,
(+),2
Unemployment,
Drug offences
Gross birth rate,
(+),2
GDP per capita,
(+),1
n.a.
Gross birth rate,
(").1-2
n.a.
—
Unemployment,
(-)(?), 2
Notes: Leading indicators based on regional crime data. The table contains factors of crime associated with non-zero lags, maximal t-values which have to exceed 2.6 and
unambiguous results for the NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 level.
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4.3.2 Consequences of crime
One of the main innovative contributions of this report is the assessment of the negative im-
pact of crime on economic performance based on highly disaggregate data from several inter-
national sources. In contrast with aggregate data, data of a high spatial detail can reveal both
cause and effect closer to the scene of the crime. Thus, unlike already existing work in the
literature and in addition to attempts with alternative and recent aggregate data performed in
Section 4.2.2 and Section 4.2.3, the data at the NUTS 2 level and, in particular, at the NUTS 3
level help us to identify economic decisions that might have been negatively affected by the
local incidence of crime.
Our testing strategy is based on the economic theory of growth and on causality tests. It re-
sembles the investigation of reversal crime effects in the analysis of crime in the "Europe of
Nations" and in the international cross-section of nations (see Section 4.2.2 and Section
4.2.3). Using available data from all countries that have responded to our data request, we
have tested the statistical significance of causal crime effects on the basis of the following
equation:
growth(t) = a growth(t-l) + bcrime(t-l) + c control(t-5) .
Economic "growth" is measured by growth of real GDP per head (in national currencies), as
well as by employment growth. Employing the Granger causality test philosophy, all estimates
require the presence of lagged growth rates. If statistical t-tests reject the null hypothesis that b
equals zero, they confirm the causal effect of crime. Further control variables take the effect of
initial variables known from the empirical growth literature. Since we are dealing with panel
data, it is not possible to use GDP from a base year as we did in Section 4.2.3 (i.e. GDP77).
Instead, we include the lagged ratio (lagged by five years) of employment in the agrarian sec-
tor to total employment into our regression. In accordance with the general convergence hy-
pothesis, we would expect convergence towards more industrialised and service oriented so-
cieties. Countries with relatively high shares of agriculture are expected to catch up in a way
that they witness higher growth rates. Hence, we expect a positive sign of the coefficient on
agriculture. Finally, since we analyse real GDP per head as endogenous variable, lagged birth
rates are added as an additional explanatory variable. It corrects for recent changes in the non-
adult part of the population that might change the number of "heads", but not (yet) "real
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GDP". Of course, all estimates rely on specifications using fixed (region) effects in order to
correct for unobserved heterogeneity.
Detailed results of all estimates (all countries, all crime categories) can be found in the Ap-
pendix (Table 63 to Table 73). Based on these tables, Table 47 and Table 48 filter out esti-
mates of the coefficient b as well as of corresponding t-values, i.e. they provide information
about causality or non-causality of crime effects. In the following section, results are summa-
rised by type of crime, by country, by magnitude and by general robustness.
4.3.2.1 Consequences by type of crime
The most significant results and striking evidence for negative crime effects can be observed
for "theft", in particular for "aggravated theft", "robbery and violent theft" and "theft of
motor cars". It should be reminded that "theft of motor cars" is also the only category for
which a negative impact on growth is detected at the aggregate (NUTS 0) level (see Table 29).
GDP growth is affected in Denmark, Germany and Italy, whereas employment growth has
mainly been hurt in Denmark, Germany and Sweden. Spain and Italy, too, reveal distortions of
employment growth, but "only" from theft of motor cars in case of Italy and from "aggravated
theft" and "robbery and violent theft" in case of Spain. Moreover, in the latter case results
from, the NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 level are not fully consistent: Statistical significance can be
observed at the NUTS 2 level, but not at the NUTS 3 level.
Besides the effects arising from theft, violent theft and robbery, other types of crime hinder
growth, though at a lower level of statistical certainty. The danger of rape seems to have a
negative impact on employment in Germany and Denmark. Evidently, (female) labour inten-
sive production will not be located in dangerous areas where a high number of sexual offences
has become public. "Murder", too, does affect employment (Germany and UK), whereas it
has no significant causal effect on GDP growth. The list of obstacles to growth is completed
by serious assault (Germany, Italy) and drug offences (Italy).
4.3.2.2 Consequences by country
Germany and Italy seem to be countries where crime has the strongest negative impact on
economic performance. However, we should avoid jumping to conclusions. A closer look at
the data reveals that just for these countries we dispose of the highest number of cross-
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sectional units. At the NUTS 3 level the German data underlying Table 47 and Table 48 con-
sist of 330 regions ("Kreise"), and Italian evidence is based on about 90 regions ("Provincie").
At least 40 regions are also available for Spain (50 Provincias) and the Netherlands (40
COROP-Regio's). Estimates for Scandinavian countries and for the UK are based on 15 to 20
regions, Swedish evidence is based on only 8 regions ("Lan"). The absolute number of re-
gions, however, is also misleading, since, for instance, the number of inhabitants per region
(Amt) in Denmark is 350,800, whereas it is 755,200 in Spain (see Table 14). Thus, as a gen-
eral rule of thumb, it seems advisable to rely more on the evidence from those countries with a
sufficient number of cross-sectional units, relatively long time-series and a high population
density within the regions of our database. These countries are Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands and Denmark. Thus, if crime effects do not show up in the estimations for the re-
maining countries, it should not be taken for granted that there is no feedback at all. Most
probably, it simply has escaped detection.
Given this general observation, one exception should be noted. In spite of its relatively large
number of cross-sectional units (40), the absence of any causal effect in the Netherlands is
remarkable.
4.3.2.3 Consequences by magnitude
All estimated coefficients b collected in Table 47 and Table 48 can be interpreted as follows:
Increasing crime by 1 per cent leads to a change of economic growth by b percentage points.
Illustrative example: The parameter estimate on theft of motor cars in Germany is highly sig-
nificant for the explanation of both GDP growth and growth of employment. Inspecting the
NUTS 3 level, b amounts to -0.02 in both cases. Thus, lowering car theft by one per cent
would increase the growth rate of GDP (and of employment) by 0.02 percentage points. To be
as concrete as possible we start from the following exemplary situation: Let us assume that the
number of motor car thefts per 100.000 inhabitants is 300 (the overall German average of the
year 1995 was 322). Moreover, we assume a real GDP p.c. growth rate of 2 per cent per year
(which coincides with the sample average at the NUTS 3 level). Thus, a reduction by 1 per
cent implies a reduction of the number of car thefts from 300 to 297. The reduction would
cause GDP growth rates to shift from 2.00 % to 2.02 %. This effect seems to be very small at
first glance, but it has to be noted that we are dealing with growth rates:
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a) After 10 years a permanent growth by 2.00 % p.a. would lead to a rise of real GDP p.c. by
21.9 %, whereas 2.02 % growth per year cumulates to 22.13 %, so that the difference is al-
ready 0.23 % of, GDP after 10 years. Thus, if we set this into relation to the German GDP
of 1999, a permanent reduction of car theft by 1 per cent each year, being started ten years
ago, would amount to a rise of present German GDP by 4.6 milliard Euro.
b) The effect in a) is the result of a very small change starting from a high level of crime. If
we instead assume a sustainable reduction of offences by 5 per cent each year, then after
10 years the incidence of theft of motor vehicles would have fallen from 300 to 179.6
(300*0.95A10), which is equivalent to a reduction by 40.1 per cent. By inspecting our es-
' timate in Table 47, we are able to quantity the cumulative effect of such a crime reduction:
It would shift the growth rate from 2.0 % to 2.8 % (0.02*40=0.8). In terms of the German
GDP of 1999, 0.8 % of GDP is equivalent to something like 16 milliard Euro.
c) Table 47 and Table 48 present direct (short-run) effects. The effect of crime on steady-
state solutions (which are calculated under the assumption that growth rates are in a
"steady-state", i.e. constant over time) could be achieved by the division b/(l-a). In case of
German GDP growth, this long-run effect of a single crime reduction (which is equivalent
to the total effect after an infinite number of periods) is 0.023 (= 0.02/(1-0.12)). Thus, as-
suming that crime is not only changed once but reduced every year, the (very) long-run ef-
fect should be based on 0.023 instead of 0.02 and results in a) and b) would change ac-
cordingly.
Point c) has to be taken into consideration by interpreting Danish crime effects. These are
higher than in other countries. For instance, "theft" has a very high short-run effect of-0.17.
However, whereas for the majority of all relevant estimates a is not too far away from zero
(see, for instance, the case of car theft in Germany presented above), a is negative and about -
0.5 for Danish GDP growth rates. In the case of theft, the estimated coefficient is -0.59, such
that the long-run effect is -0.11 and thus smaller (in absolute value) than the short-run effect.
Still, this is a very large effect, which is much higher than the equally calculated (and likewise
highly significant) effects in Italy (-0.016) or Germany (-0.057), for instance.
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4.3.2.4 Consequences by robustness of results
Some results seem to suggest that crime has positive effects on economic growth. In total,
however, the evidence is clear: Out of 56 significant estimates in Table 47 and Table 48 there
are only 13 which are positive. Moreover, when we reduce the probability of spurious results
by concentrating on data from those countries that have been found most suitable for the pres-
ent purpose (Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark), the ratio changes to 46:5. Since we
are dealing with statistics and uncertainty, we suggest to dismiss the small minority of 5
"growth fostering" crime effects as implausible statistical errors.
4.3.2.5 Conclusions
Contrary to the results based on international data, disaggregate data from the "Europe of Re-
gions" reveal clear evidence of negative crime effects on economic performance. In particular,
the incidence of theft and related crime categories (theft of motor cars, aggravated theft, rob-
bery and violent theft) vary negatively with the growth of real GDP per capita and the growth
of employment. Crime against the person, too, deters growth, but to a lesser extent. Here, the
potential danger of "serious assault" and "rape" in the neighbourhood of workplaces seem to
play a prominent role for the location decisions of firms.
Denmark, Germany, and Italy can be identified as most affected countries, whereas in the
Netherlands no significant influence has been detected. However, it has become very clear
from the comparison of highly aggregated and disaggregated data that investing in the search
for crime data of a high spatial detail is a worthwhile project - also for future work - since the
link from crime to economic performance is very difficult to unveil by use of aggregate data.
Hence, countries not mentioned in the list above may nevertheless suffer from crime distor-
tions, but so far they may have escaped detection.
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Table 47: The effect of crime on GDP growth in the Europe of Regions
GROWTH Denmark Germany
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Spain Italy The Netherlands Finland
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Sweden
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
-0.032
(-1.632)
0.064
(1.424)
0.046
(1.800)
0.279
(2.588)
-0.187
(-1,637)
-0.138
(-1.720)
-0.024
(-0.488)
-0.134
(-1.685)
-0.080
(-0.816)
-0.071
(-1.346)
-0.010
(-0.582)
United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
-0.006
(-0.517)
-0.012
(-0.431)
-0.005
(-0.217)
0.032
(2.006)
0.011
(0.335)
0.025
(1.136)
0.023
(1.654)
0.024
(1.122)
0.003
(0.162)
0.005
(0.204)
0.006
(0.608)
Murder(-1)
Sexoffences(-I)
Rape(-1)
Serious assault(-1)
Theft(-1)
Aggravated theft(-1)
Robbery and violent theft(-1)
Breaking and entering(-1)
Theft of motor cars(-1)
Fraud(-1)
Drugoffences(-I)
0.000
(-0.028)
—
-0.013
(-1.341)
0.032
(1.352)
-0.171
(-2.834)
-0.078
(-2.345)
-0.041
(-2.767)
-0.077
(-2.303)
-0.010
(-0.581)
-0.031
(-2.014)
0.034
0.000
(-0.128)
-0.003
(-1.044)
-0.002
(-1.351)
•0.013
(-2.630)
-0.050
(-6.213)
-0.022
(-3.564)
-0.014
(-4.485)
0.000
(-0.122)
•0.020
(-5.772)
0.010
(2.747)
-0.002
(-0.688)
-0.011
(-1.214)
-0.028
'(•2.020)
-0.012
(-1.313)
-0.018
(-0.944)
-0.091
. (-3.979)
-0.057
(-3.194)
-0.035
(-2.495)
0.011
(1.409)
-0.046
(-3.846)
0.047
(4.597)
0.006
(0.847)
-0.006
(-1.550)
0.000
(0.016)
-0.002
(-0.400)
-0.004
(-1.073)
-0.011
(-0.932)
-0.017
(-1.647)
-0.011
(-1.586)
-0.012
(-1.229)
0.022
(3.313)
-0.010
(-1.653)
0.000
(0.012)
-0.031
(-1.956)
-0.009
(-0.942)
-0.011
(-1.620)
-0.058
(-2.490)
-0.046
(-2.043)
-0.024
(-1.614)
-0.035
(-1.666)
•0.029
(-2.577)
0.012
(0.811)
0.001
(0.513)
-0.002
(-1.674)
-0.004
(-2.012)
-0.018
(-4.645)
-0.017
(-4.863)
-0.011
(-4.570)
-0.015
(-4.558)
-0.014
(-4.799)
-0.006
(-3.571)
-0.002
(-0.744)
-0.003
(-0.740)
-0.013
(-2.488)
-0.028
(-2.942)
-0.021
(-2.294)
-0.010
(-1.833)
-0.021
(-2.329)
-0.023
(-3.101)
-0.008
(-1.765)
0.001
(0.171)
-0.012
(-1.488)
0.002
(0.265)
0.021
(1.657)
-0.013
(-0.543)
-0.010
(-0.612)
0.005
(0.593)
-0.009
(-0.720)
-0.001
(-0.168)
-0.018
(-1.691)
0.007
(0.461)
-0.004
(-0.213)
0.014
(0.887)
0.026
(1.144)
-0.006
(-0.134)
-0.011
(-0.282)
0.014
(0.762)
0.007
(0.217)
-0.005
(-0.291)
-0.023
(-0.971)
-0.004
(-0.287)
0.012
(0.804)
-0.002
(-0.156)
0.117
(1.672)
0.188
(2.087)
0.086
(1.682)
-0.012
(-0.514)
0.085
(1.691)
-0.015
(-0.492)
0.038
(2.949)
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Table 48: The effect of crime on employment in the Europe of Regions
GROWTH
Murder(-I)
Sexoffences(-I)
Rape(-1)
Serious assault(-1)
Theft(-1)
Aggravated theft(-1)
Robbery and violent theft(-1)
Breaking and entering(-1)
Theft of motor cars(-1)
Fraud(-1)
Drugoffences(-I)
Denmark
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
0.001
(0.264) /
-0.014
(-3.712)
0.004
(0.396)
-0.112
(-4.815)
-0.057
(-3.922)
-0.002
(-0.422)
-0.057
(-3.930)
-0.018
(-2.005)
0.000
(-0.012)
-0.005
(-0.832)
Germany
NUTS 3
-0.001
(-0.728)
0.002
(0.837)
-0.001
(-0.933)
-0.006
(-1.928)
-0.043
(-9.727)
-0.030
(-8.807)
-0.014
(-8.043)
0.000
(-0.154)
-0.020
(-10.438)
-0.001
(-0.394)
-0.001
(-0.607)
NUTS 2
-0.015
(-2.861)
0.017
(2.058)
-0.015
(-2.540)
-0.029
(-2.119)
-0.093
(-8.527)
-0.070
(-7.954)
-0.042
(-5.625)
-0.004
(-0.969)
-0.046
(-7.566)
0.005
(0.807)
-0.007
(-1.424)
Spain
NUTS 3
-0.002
(-0.674)
0.005
(1.159)
0.001
(0.235)
-0.001
(-0.340)
0.004
(0.480)
-0.002
(-0.268)
-0.008
(-1.602)
0.001
(0.211)
0.001
(0.240)
-0.006
(-1.290)
...
NUTS 2
0.009
(1.549)
-0.012
(-0.914)
-0.006
(-0.727)
-0.007
(-1.158)
-0.035
(-1.929)
-0.039
(-2.233)
-0.030
(-2.695)
-0.024
(-1.411)
-0.037
(-4.354)
0.003
(0.276)
...
Italy
NUTS 3
•0.001
(1.168)
-0.001
(-1.035)
0.000
(-0.019)
-0.004
(-0.956)
-0.002
(-0.549)
-0.004
(-1.845)
-0.001
(-0.417)
-0.007
(-2.414)
—
-0.005
(-2.734)
NUTS 2
-0.003
(-0.644)
-0.009
(-1.613)
0.006
(0.865)
0.023
(1.686)
0.026
(2.025)
-0.006
(-0.726)
0.024
(1.904)
-0.018
(-1.789)
—
-0.005
(-0.789)
The Netherlands
NUTS 3
0.000
(-0.003)
0.008
(0.833)
-0.005
(-0.586)
0.012
(0.839)
-0.050
(-1.833)
-0.029
(-1.525)
-0.011
(-1.111)
-0.012
(-0.778)
0.001
(0.075)
-0.003
(-0.239)
—
NUTS 2
-0.003
(-0.224)
-0.004
(-0.322)
0.000
(-0.032)
0.000
(0.012)
-0.040
(-1.049)
-0.009
(-0.281)
-0.008
(-0.473)
-0.011
(-0.389)
0.009
(0.617)
0.017
(0.812)
—
Finland
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
0.003
(0.342)
0.011
(1.045)
0.003
(0.259)
0.043
(0.850)
0.077
(1.231)
0.053
(1.504)
-0.003
(-0.171)
0.052
(1.493)
-0.012
(-0.565)
—
0.023
(2.800)
Sweden
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
-0.015
(-1.235)
0.059
(2.309)
0.026
(1.724)
0.211
(3.525)
-0.176
(-2.666)
-0.119
(-2.484)
-0.014
(-0.477)
-0.116
(-2.432)
-0.065
(-1.249)
-0.037
(-1.183)
0.006
(0.548)
United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
•0.020
(-2.119)
-0.022
(-1.070)
0.010
(0.672)
0.019
(1.520)
-0.048
(-1.704)
0.001
(0.037)
0.013
(1.272)
-0.001
(-0.036)
-0.026
(-1.580)
-0.028
(-1.421)
0.009
(1.153)
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5 Conclusions
This report on behalf of the European Commission consists of three major parts:
a) summary of recent research on socio-economic causes, interactions and consequences of
crime, presentation of a list of known indicators of criminality
b) presentation of suitable methods and development of an adequate parameterised model
capable of
• evaluating and developing socio-economic indicators of crime,
• evaluating the negative impact of crime on economic performance,
• covering European evidence on the basis of official data.
c) validation of criminality indicators and assessment of the consequences of crime based on
• a panel data set from the national statistics of all 15 EU member states ("Crime in the
Europe of Nations"),
• 12 national panel data sets from 8 member states using disaggregate information from
the NUTS 3 and NUTS 2 level ("Crime in the Europe of Regions"),
• an international cross-section of 202 countries.
Results known from the scientific literature
Viewing the criminological literature, the literature on the economics of crime, and consulting
international experts in the field have resulted in a long list of potential indicators and con-
sequences of crime, which we summarised elsewhere in the report (Table 11). Without re-
peating too many details from the first part of the report, besides demographic factors like age
and gender (a high share of all crimes is committed by young males aged 14 to 25), the fol-
lowing six indicators of crime are considered to be particularly important: urbanisation, family
disruption, the influence of peer groups, poverty and unemployment, deterrence and wealth.
We will discuss these factors in more detail below, when we assess them in the context of
own results, exclusively prepared for this report.
The literature is relatively silent about the consequences of criminality on economic growth
and development, as well as on costs of crime. Given its obvious importance for economists,
there is surprisingly little evidence on how location decisions of firms and households might
be affected by criminal factors. Recent work on 629 neighbourhoods (municipalities) in Los
Angeles (Willis 1999b), however, provides a remarkable exception. Willis has shown, for
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instance, that a one per cent increase of violent crime is responsible for the loss of 14 jobs per
square mile (see Section 2.2.3 for more details).
Estimates of costs of crime have been provided mainly for non-European countries (only few
exceptions can be found for Europe, see, for instance, Palle and Godefroy (1998)). Many
authors present figures for total costs of crime that amount to something like 4 per cent of
GDP. The highest estimate is given for the U.S. by Anderson (1999), who has tried to make a
comparison with the ideal state in which there is no occurrence of criminal behaviour at all.
His cost estimate then would even amount to 11 per cent of GDP in 1999.
Previous causality tests based on aggregate data, however, have not revealed any causal link,
from crime to economics. Thanks to a unique data set based on socio-economic and crimino-
logical time series from approximately 550 European regions this report brings the reversal
link between economics and crime into focus. Contrary to the known results from the litera-
ture a negative impact from crime on economic growth can be detected (see below).
Data and methods
The evaluation of indicators of crime and the test of causal relationships is based on statistical
methods suitable for the analysis of dynamic panel data ("panel criminometrics"). Given the
complex problem of criminality, the technical estimation and testing procedure is chosen such
that multidimensional phenomena can be treated, and dynamic developments and feedback
situations can be taken into consideration. Moreover, very important in the context of analys-
ing crime rates is to control for potential unobserved heterogeneity. It arises in the presence
of different shares of unreported crimes or because of slightly deviating definitions of crime
between regions. For this reason all estimates of the report are based on fixed-effect panel
models.
Results presented in the report have undergone an extensive validation process based on sta-
tistical specification tests. After testing numerous alternative models and indicators, the report
finally presents results based on sound methods and robust model specifications.
Collecting data was a major problem while carrying out the project. On the one hand, it is
aspired to perform the empirical analysis for as much EU member states as possible. On the
other hand, data should be as disaggregate as possible. However, at least regional data on
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crime are not available from international data sources. National data are available from inter-
national sources, but they sometimes lack reliability (see Interpol and UN statistics, for in-
stance). As a consequence, the regional crime data had to be collected directly from the mem-
ber states. In Germany the situation was even worse, because the Federal Criminal Police Of-
fices of all German states ("Landeskriminalamter") had to be contacted directly.74 National
crime data have been taken from the European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC).
Solely CDPC (1999:9) has proved to be aware of the absolute necessity of a thorough check
on the data delivered by national sources. Since the aim of the project is to identify and quan-
tify causes and consequences of criminality, we have also included a large set of socio-
economic variables. The New Cronos database from Eurostat (1999) turned out to be very
useful. It does not only contain very detailed national statistics for all EU member states, but
also a number of important variables on different regional levels. As far as statistics on the
national level are concerned we also used data from the World Bank.
The impact of socio-economic indicators on crime known from the literature, but not
covered by the empirical analysis of this report
Arguments behind the relevance of "urbanisation", "family disruption" and "peer groups"
mainly originate from sociologically oriented contributions to the scientific literature (for in-
stance, from theories of social disorganisation, differential association/ social learning and
social control), whereas "poverty and unemployment", "deterrence" and "wealth" play a
more prominent role in the economic theory of crime. Sharp distinctions, however, are diffi-
cult to make. Poverty and unemployment, for instance, are also crucial to the understanding of
social disorganisation theory as well as of strain theory, whereas the contributions of peer
groups and of neighbourhood effects belong to the most discussed fields in modern econom-
ics.
The influence of peer groups is widely acknowledged but hardly measurable in any macro
setting that has to be based on official data, as demanded for this report. Deterrence, at least
in the form of changing clear-up rates, seems to be effective according to many (but not all)
74
 Thanks to the kind support of the German Federal Criminal Police Office ("Bundeskriminalamt"),
these contacts turned out to be very fruitful so that we have been able to create a quite rich German
database.
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authors, though the deterrence effect of more severe sentences is still under debate. The
authors of this report have contributed to this field in a recent article (Entorf and Spengler
1998), but unfortunately there were no European data of sufficient quality and comparability
available that could have been used in this report. Major problems have arisen because of de-
viating and changing definitions, or simply because of missing data at disaggregate levels.
The impact of socio-economic indicators on crime known from the literature and cov-
ered by the empirical analysis in this report
Based on a variety of both aggregate and disaggregate data sets, results on the impact of so-
cio-economic indicators on crime have been documented in several tables (Table 18 to Table
24 and Table 34 to Table 45), as well as in the Appendix (Table 52 to Table 62). The most
robust findings are summarised in Table 49. Indicators of family disruption, drug influence,
labour force participation and the share of the labour force employed in agriculture play a cru-
cial role for the understanding of all types of crime.
First, the total labour force participation rate is associated with higher crime rates simply
because it represents the "active" part of the population. The potential of being "active"
implies to work in a regular job or to search for such a job, but it likewise increases the prob-
ability of being "active" in the illegal sector. Moreover, since active people have to be mobile
and do not stay at home, they more often are victims of criminal activities, too. Such reason-
ing holds a fortiori for the most "active" part of the population, i.e. the share of the young.
The share of the population working in the agrarian sector represents the degree of urbanity
in a society. The crime enhancing influence of urban factors is particularly strong for assault
and drug offences.
Many estimations based on the "Europe of Nations" confirm the crucial role of causal crime
factors embedded in family disruption for almost all types of crime. Significant results have
been found for "divorces per marriage", "average age of women at childbirth" and other indi-
cators of family disruption. These results are in line with theories stressing the lowering pa-
rental supervision of youth, the declining value of conventional norms and the decreasing so-
cial capital within industrialised countries, since more and more people act in own short-term
self interest.
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Table 49: Main socio-economic causes of criminality and their directions of influence
General
Family
disruption
Drugs
Active popula-
tion
Urbanity
Murder
Family
disruption
Serious Assault
Wealth
Unemployment
Family
disruption
Urbanity
Total Theft
Wealth
Family
disruption
Drugs
Robbery and
violent theft
Wealth
Drugs
Theft of motor
cars
Wealth
Share of the
young
Drug offences
Wealth
Family
disruption
Unemployment
Active popula-
tion
Urbanity
Note: Summary of the most robust findings based on estimations in this report.
Many offences are related to drugs: This conclusion becomes clear from the analysis of theft,
in particular from the analysis of "robbery and violent theft". The explanatory factors of drug
offences themselves are "wealth (+)", "family disruption (+)", "unemployment (+) ", "labour
force participation (+) " and "agrarian region (-)". Hence, drug problems most probably arise
in the climate of big cities, which is accompanied by social problems due to (structural) un-
employment and family disruption.
The incidence of theft and related categories of crime (robbery and violent theft, theft of mo-
tor cars) can be best understood by consulting the economic theory of crime. Better illegal
income opportunities lead to higher property crime rates, as can be seen from the presence of
"wealth (+)" for the respective types of crime. It should be noted, however, that in cases of
crimes against property the level of "wealth" means more than the mere level of real GDP per
head. Table 40 (see the regressions for Germany, Italy, Sweden and the UK) indicates that in
areas where both low unemployment and high GDP coexist, higher crime rates for theft, in
particular for theft of motor cars, can be observed. Thus, in case of theft, high "wealth" refers
to regions with both high levels of GDP and low unemployment rates. This pattern of GDP
and unemployment does not coincide with the explanatory pattern of drug offences and seri-
ous assault, where the simultaneous existence of high GDP and relatively high unemployment
rates seems to provide the unfavourable and unbalanced social situation that leads to high lev-
els of respective crime rates. Our results reflect the widely discussed and unsolved problem in
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the scientific literature on how to interpret the effect of unemployment on crime. We suggest
to have a closer look at the type of crime.
The negative impact of crime on economic performance
One of the most innovative contributions of this report is the assessment of the negative im-
pact of crime on economic performance based on an international cross-section of nations, a
panel consisting of national time series from the 15 EU member states and a set of regional
panel data originating from 8 different countries. Our high investments in searching adequate
regional data has brought substantial returns. It turned out that data of a higher spatial detail in
fact entail a higher statistical power for the discovery of reversal crime effects. In contrast
with previous attempts known from the scientific literature and in contrast with testing proce-
dures carried out on aggregate data (see Section 4.2.2 and Section 4.2.3), causality tests based
on the NUTS 2 level and, in particular, on the NUTS 3 level have shown that growth rates are
indeed negatively affected by the regional incidence of crime.
Table 50 summarises the main findings. First of all, the incidence of theft and related crime
categories (theft of motor cars, aggravated theft, robbery and violent theft) vary negatively
with the growth of real GDP per capita and with the growth of employment. Crime against the
person, too, deters growth, but to a lesser extent. Nevertheless, the potential dangers of "seri-
ous assault" and "rape" in the neighbourhood of workplaces seem to play a significant role
for the location decisions of firms.
Table 50: Criminality indicators of economic performance
Criminality indicator
Serious assault
Rape
Theft (total)
Aggravated theft
Robbery and violent theft
Theft of motor cars
Fraud
Drug offences
Affected countries, measures of economic performance: Y = GDP growth, L = employ-
ment growth
Germany (Y)
Denmark (L)
Denmark (L, Y), Germany (L, Y), Italy (Y), Sweden (L)
Germany (L, Y), Italy (Y)
Denmark (Y), Germany (L, Y), Italy (Y)
Germany (L,Y), Italy (Y), Europe (investment/ GDP ratio)
Germany (Y, positive sign (?))
Italy (L, Y), Finland (L, Y, positive sign (?))
Note: Summary of most significant and robust results from Table 27 to Table 32, Table 47 and Table
48. Entries are based on data from the NUTS 3 level (if not available: NUTS 2). To be included, signs
have to be unambiguous and t-values need to show signif icance at least at the one percent level.
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Denmark, Germany and Italy can be identified as most affected countries, mostly by prop-
erty crimes, whereas no significant influence has been detected for the Netherlands. How-
ever, as has become very clear from the comparison of highly aggregated and disaggregate
data, the link from crime to economic performance is very difficult to unveil by use of aggre-
gate data. Hence, countries not mentioned in the list above may nevertheless suffer from crime
distortions, but so far they may have escaped detection because of insufficient data quality.
Interpretation of results, policy conclusions
Though drawing policy conclusions does not belong to the primary goals of the project, some
remarks are straightforward. In European (and other industrialised) societies it seems that
further growth of wealth, more and more built on self-interest rather than on social values,
comes with the cost of family disruption, as can be seen, for instance, from the (still) growing
number of divorces throughout Europe. Changing family structures, however, are an impor-
tant and often overlooked cause of crime. Their strong impact has been confirmed by the em-
pirical panel analysis in this report. According to a number of recent contributions to the sci-
entific literature, the female labour force participation is an important factor of family disrup-
tion, and it is found to vary positively with crime rates (in this report, too, we have found a
positive association with burglary and robbery, see Section 4.2.1). The main reasons for these
empirical results might be seen in the lacking supervision and the degrading social attachment
of children and in the rising negative influence of peer groups, which substitute for traditional
family bonds.
As we do not want our empirical research to be understood in a way that the female participa-
tion rate should be reduced, other measures of family (re-)integration have to be considered,
e.g. substitutes of parental supervision. Many pupils of working mothers and fathers have to
take care of themselves after school, since teachers do not have the time to take care of their
homework, for instance. The need for after school care centres is even much stronger for chil-
dren in female headed households.
Regarding the importance of social cohesion on criminality and the strong evidence of rever-
sal effects from crime to economics, one may finally conclude that fighting crime should not
just be a matter of the police and of domestic policy, but it should also be a matter of social
policy and of selfish economic interests, i.e. of economic policy.
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6 Appendix
Letter 1: Accompanying letter of the German Federal Criminal Police Office
EU Research Project: "Development and Validation of Scientific Indicators of the Relationship
between Criminality, Social Cohesion and Economic Performance"
As can be seen from the enclosed document, the Centre for European Economic Research (Zentrum
fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung, (ZEW) in Mannheim) is conducting the above-mentioned re-
search project, which was commissioned by the EU. The project, which is endowed with 150.000 DM,
has a duration of one year and will be completed at the end of January 2000.
In the year 1997, the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) expressed its general consent to
collaborate with the ZEW. The kind of support that is required for the ongoing project is to help the
ZEW to obtain certain national and international data on crime.
The topic of this research project is the working out of a set of indicators considering demographic,
socio-economic and legal indicators, allowing forecasts of the development of crime in general or of its
individual areas.
By doing this research it is intended to get a deeper insight into the relationship between crime rates
and the socio-economic environment. If appropriate, an "early-warning system" for future crime rate
developments as a consequence of changing social conditions is to be developed. Moreover, the "eco-
nomic point of view" can also provide approaches for an evaluation of the costs created by crime and
thus for measuring the macro-economic damage.
As the practical value of the indicator system depends decisively on the quality of the data it is based
upon, we would be very grateful for your support of the project.
Yours Sincerely
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Letter 2: Data request sent to the EU member states
Dear Sir/Madam,
on behalf of the European Commission (Directorate-General V - Employment, Industrial Relations and
Social Affairs) and in co-operation with the German Federal Criminal Police Office (Group Kl 1 ,,Crimi-
nal Strategy") and the University of Wurzburg (Prof. Dr. Horst Entorf), the Centre for European Eco-
nomic Research (ZEW) is working on a research project entitled ..Development and validation of scien-
tific indicators of the relationship between criminality, social cohesion and economic performance"
(Contract No. 00844). The empirical part of this project is about examining the practical usefulness of a
theoretical model of indicators with the help of data from as many EU member states as possible. To
that end, apart from economic and socio-demographic data, obviously data on crime is also needed
and that is why we are today requesting the data described below from your organisation.
Our client wants the empirical validation to be based on a body of data with the highest possible de-
gree of spatial and factual disaggregation. As for spatial disaggregation, the obvious thing to do is to be
orientated towards Eurostat's Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS ), thus ensuring
compatibility of the economic and socio-demographic data provided by Eurostat databases with the
data on crime that cannot be provided by that source and that we are kindly asking you to supply. (For
[Name of the country] the following NUTS levels do exist: NUTS 0 = [...], NUTS 1 = [...], NUTS 2 = [...],
NUTS 3 = [...]). Since the highest possible disaggregation is required, NUTS level 3 ([...]) represents
the degree of aggregation most suitable for our project.
Apart from spatial disaggregation, our client also attaches great importance to factual disaggregation.
Therefore, the study is not meant to restrict itself to the overall criminal offences, but to include an ex-
amination differentiated by categories of offences, too. In accordance with Interpol's International
Crime Statistics, the following categorisation should be The aim:
1. Murder
2. Sex offences (including rape)
2.1 Rape
3. Serious assault
4. Theft (all kinds of)
4.1 Aggravated theft
4.1.1 Robbery and violent theft
4.1.2 Breaking and entering
4.2 Theft of motor cars
4.3 Other thefts
5. Fraud
6. Not required
7. Drug offences
8. Total number of offences
For all these categories of offences, we need both the number of cases known to the police (in abso-
lute terms and/ or expressed as volume of crime per 100 000 inhabitants) and the respective clear-up
rates.
Finally, for statistical reasons, it is crucial that the individual statistical units can be studied over a
longer period. Annual data completely covering the period 1980-1998 would be ideal.
Let me briefly sum up the data we request: we are asking you to make available annual information for
the period 1980-1998 about the number of cases known to the police and the respective clear-up rates
for the above mentioned categories of offences (Interpol classification) for [name of the country at the
level of [name of NUTS 3 level].
The successful completion of the project parts that are still to be tackled essentially hinges on the
availability of international data on crime, hence we would greatly appreciate your assistance.
Yours faithfully,
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Table 51: Addresses of the contact persons in the EU member states
Country Contact persons
Belgium Mr Gerad de Coninck (Chef de Division), Service General D' Appui Policier, Division
Appui en matiere de politique policiere, 47 Rue Royale, 1000 Bruxelles. Phone:
+32/(0)2 500 2621. Fax: +32/(0)2 500 2640.
Denmark Mr A. P. J0rgensen (Detective Superintendent), Interpol Copenhagen, Polititorvet
14, 1780 Copenhagen. Phone: +45/33 14 88 88 (operator). Fax: +45/33 32 27 71.
Germany For national statistics:
Mr Uwe Dormann (Wissenschaftlicher Direktor) and Mr Franz Rohrer (Kriminal-
hauptkommissar), Kl 12, Bundeskriminalamt, 65173 Wiesbaden. Phone: +49/(0)611
551 6834 and +49/(0)611 551 6840. Fax: +49/(0)611 551 6804.
For regional statistics:
Ms Schneider, Landeskriminalamt Baden-Wurttemberq. Taubenheimstr. 85, 70372
Stuttgart. Phone: +49/(0)711 5401-3443 (-1 operator).
Ms Eichinger, Baverisches Landeskriminalamt. Maillingerstrafte 15, 80636
Miinchen. Phone: +49/(0)89 1212-4125 (-0 operator).
Mr Klaus-Peter Obst (Kriminalhauptkommissar), Per Polizeipra'sident in Berlin. Platz
der Luftbrucke 6, 12101 Berlin. Phone: +49/(0)30 699-37930.
Mr Linke, Landeskriminalamt Brandenburg. Prenzlauer Strafie 66-70, 16352 Bas-
dorf. Phone: +49/(0)33397 4-2310 (-02 operator).
Ms Marianne Galow, Der Senator fur Inneres. Kultur und Sport des Landes Bremen.
Contrescarpe 22-44, 28203 Bremen. Phone: +49/(0)421 36-212320 (-10 operator).
Mr Egon Weber, Landeskriminalamt Hamburg. Beim Strohhause 31, 20097 Ham-
burg. Phone: +49/(0)40 42865-8094.
Mr Dreyer (Kriminalhauptkommissar), Hessisches Landeskriminalamt. Holderlin-
strafie 5, 65187 Wiesbaden. Phone: +49/(0)611 83-2112 (-0 operator).
Mr Lesske (Direktor), Landeskriminalamt Mecklenburg Vorpommern. Retgendorfer
Str. 02, 19067 Rampe. Phone: +49/(0)3866-660 (-0 operator).
Mr Brattke, Landeskriminalamt Niedersachsen. Schiitzenstralle 25, 30161 Han-
nover. Phone: +49/(0)511 330-3101 (-0 operator).
Mr Baumler (Kriminaloberrat), Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein-Westfalen. Volklinger
Str. 49, 40221 Diisseldorf. Phone: +49/(0)211 939-6038 (-0 operator).
Mr W. Bodo Munk, Landeskriminalamt Rheinland-Pfalz. Valenciaplatz 1-7, 551188
Mainz. Phone: +49/(0)6131 65-0 (operator).
Mr Christian (Kriminaloberrat), Landeskriminalamt Saarland. Hellwigstrafle 14,
66121 Saarbriicken. Phone: +49/(0)681 962-0 (operator).
Mr Dr. Michaelis, Landeskriminalamt Sachsen. Neulander Strafte 60, 01129 Dres-
den. Phone +49/(0)351 855-0 (operator).
Mr Reichelt, Landeskriminalamt Sachsen-Anhalt. Liibecker StrafJe 53-63, 39124
Magdeburg. Phone: +49/(0)391 250-2112 (-0 operator).
Mr E. Schubert, Landeskriminalamt Schleswig-Holstein, Muhlenweg 166, 24116
Kiel. Phone: +49/(0)431 160-4560 (-33 operator).
Mr Kurzawsky (Kriminaloberrat), Landeskriminalamt Thuringen, Am Schwemmbach,
99099 Erfurt. Phone: +49/(0)361 341-1227 (operator).
Greece Mr Nikolaos Tassiopoulos (Police Colonel and Director), Interpol Athens, 173 Alex-
andras Ave., Athens (T. 11522). Phone: +30/1 69 25178. Fax: +301/69 24006.
Spain Mr Francisco Javier Cirujano Gonzalez, Comisaria General de Policia Judical, Sec-
cion de Estadfstica, C/ Julian Gonzalez Segador s/n, 28043 Madrid. Phone: +34/91
582 2404. Fax: +34/91 582 2401.
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France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
The Netherlands
Austria
Portugal
Finland
Sweden
United Kingdom
Mr Philippe Sassenhoff (Commissaire Divisionaire and Chef de la Division des
Etudes et de la Prospective), Direction Central de la Police, 11 Rue des Saussaies,
75008 Paris. Phone: +33/(0)1 49 274 038. Fax: +33/(0)1.49 240 402.
Mr Noel Carolan (Sergeant Crime Branch)), Garda Sfochana, Phoenix Park, Dublin
8. Phone: +353/1 6662619. Fax: +353/1 6704558.
Mr Patrick Cregg (Chief Superintendent), Garda Siochana, Phoenix Park, Dublin 8.
Phone: +353/1 6662620. Fax: +353/1 6704558.
Mr Antonio D'Acunto (Direttore della Divisione), Ministero Dell'lntemo, Dipartimento
della P.S., Ufficio Cordinamento E Planificazione Forze Di Polizia, Roma. Phone:
+39/06 46537401.pax: +39/06 4818671. Email: dacunto@katamail.com.
No contacts have been established.
Mr Frits Huls (Project Manager Police Statistics), Statistics Netherlands, P.O. Box
4000, 2270 Voorburg. Mr Phone: +31/70 337 5667. Fax: +31/70 337 5979. Email:
FHLS@cbs.nl.
Mr Ahss, Bundesministerium Fur Inneres, Referat 11/1, Herrengasse 7, 1014 Wien.
Phone: +43/1 53126-5287 (-0 operator). Fax: +43/1 53126-5165.
Silvia Pedrosa (Assessora do Director-Geral da Pollcia Judiciaria), Ministerio Da
Justiqa, Policia Judiciaria, Rua Gomes Freire 174, 1169-007 Lisboa. Phone:
+351/(0)1 3533131 (operator). Fax: +351/(0)1 3575844. .
Jorma Kallio, Statistics Finland, P.O. Box HB, FIN-00022 Helsinki. Fax: +358/9 1734
2191. Email: Jorma.Kallio@stat.fi.
Risto Lattila (Senior Adviser), Statistics Finland, P.O. Box HB, FIN-00022 Helsinki.
Phone: +358/9 1734 3252. Fax: +358/9 1734 2191.
Gabriella Bremberg (Head of Statistical Unit) , National Council for Crime Preven-
tion, Statistical Unit, P.O. Box 1386, SE-11193 Stockholm. Phone: +468/401-8723.
Fax:+468/411-9075.
Tove Sporre, National Council for Crime Prevention, Statistical Unit, P.O. Box 1386,
SE-11193 Stockholm. Fax:+468/411-9075.
Email: tove.sporre@brottsforebygganderadet.se.
Mr Gordon Barclay, Home Office RDS (Research Development Statistics), 50
Queen Anne's Gate, London S W 1 H 9AT. Phone: +44/171 273-3960. Fax: +44/171
273-3362. Email: Gordon.Barclay@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk.
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Table 52: Assessing the factors of Murder: Frequency distribution of coefficient esti-
mates by sign and significance level
Country
Denmark
Germany
Spain
Italy
The Netherlands
Finland
Sweden
UK
Factors
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
+10%
0
15
0
0
0
1
9
36
4
0
0
0
0
4
0
28
—
47
6.
34
67
2
20
0
0
66
31
2
• . . .
0
2
0
8
! o
! o
—
—
—
—
I
I
i
I
I
I
i
| . . .
NUTS
+
3
43
72
13
0
35
62
53
87
29
2
11
58
81
48
13
54
...
53
27
42
31
85
62
15
0
34
3
23
...
25
68
52
45
33
18
_.
—
—
...
—
...
—
...
—
—
—
...
3
-
57
42
28
55
29
42
29
11
10
28
91
89
41
19
52
87
18
...
0
40
23
2
13
18
75
34
0
60
68
...
74
29
25
47
45
67
...
—
—
...
—
...
—
...
—
—
...
...
-10%
40
1
0
32
71
21
0
0
0
43
8
0
1
0
0
0
0
...
0
27
0
0
0
0
10
66
0
6
6
...
2
0
24
0
23
15
...
—
—
—
...
—
...
—
—
...
...
+10%
...
...
—
—
...
...
0
6
6
1
0
0
4
0
0
0
83
...
2
0
16
61
4
51
0
0
64
32
0
...
...
—
—
...
—
...
17
22
31
4
1
0
54
0
0
0
0
19
NUTS 2
+
...
...
...
—
...
...
28
50
45
16
0
0
89
68
29
43
17
...
84
33
42
32
73
49
1
22
35
38
35
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
47
38
43
25
49
64
39
0
3
7
16
50
-
—
—
—
—
...
—
55
44
49
33
43
48
8
32
71
55
0
...
14
22
42
7
23
0
98
76
1
29
45
...
...
...
...
...
._
_.
29
29
26
35
38
35
7
13
54
65
69
30
-10%
—
—
—
j
I
...
17
0
0
50
57
52
Q ""
0
0
2
0
...
0
45
0
0
0^
.-cT
1
2
0
0
20
...
...
—
—
...
...
...
7
11
0
35
12
0
0
87
43
28
15
1
Note: "+10 %" (and "-10%", respectively) indicate the percentage share of positive (negative) coeffi-
cient estimates that are significant at the 10 percent or higher level."+" (-) represents shares of positive
(negative) estimates below the 10 % significance level. Significant shares above 50 % are depicted in
bold type.
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Table 53: Assessing the factors of Sex Offences: Frequency distribution of coefficient
estimates by sign and significance level
Country
Denmark
Germany
Spain
Italy
The Netherlands
Finland
Sweden
UK
Factors
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
+10%
...
...
—
...
—
... .
0
32
0
62
0
32
0
13
4
0
0
...
...
—
—
—
—
...
0
53
26
3
38
...
0
12
7
0
0
0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
NUTS
+
... .
...
...
...
—
...
63
24
11
23
0
2
30
64
40
67
45
...
...
—
—
—
—
—
0
38
28
46
29
...
11
51
59
33
10
30
—
...
...
—
—
...
...
...
...
...
...
—
3
-
... :
—
...
...
—
...
37
38
87
15
0
66
52
22
49
0
39
...
...
—
— .
—
—
...
55
9
29
47
30
...
69
36
23
52
31
48
—
—
—
—
—
...
—
...
—
—
...
...
-10%
...
...
...
...
...
...
0
6
2
0
100
1
18
1
7
33
16
...
...
...
—
—
—
•
44
0
17
4
3
...
20
2
11
15
59
22
—
—
—
—
—
...
...
...
—
—
—
...
•+io%
...
...
...
...
—.
...
7
6
0
0
19
50
58
24
2
29
4.
—
—
...
—
—
. —
...
0
10
4
0
6
...
—
—
...
—
. —
...
10
65
19
41
6
4
11
1
15
2
0
0
NUTS 2
+
...
...
...
...
...
...
47
51
2
17
79
50
42
64
62
68
81
...
...
—
—
—
—
—
1
35
35
13
55
...
—
—
—
—
—
...
32
30
67
43
30
50
35
31
70
27
7
10
-
...
...
...
...
...
...
44
33
45
55
2
0
0
11
36
3
15
...
...
—
—
—
—
—
38
55
57
63
33
...
—
—
—
—
...
50
5
14
16
52
46
52
49
15
67
58
83
-10%
...
...
...
...
...
...
2
9
53
29
0
0
0
0
0
o
0
...
...
—
—
—
—
—
61
0
4
25
6
—
—
—
...
—
—
8
0
0
1
12
0
2
19
0
4
35
6
Note: "+10. %" (and "-10%", respectively) indicate the percentage share of
cient estimates that are significant at the 10 percent or higher level."+" (-)
(negative) estimates below the 10 % significance level. Significant shares
bold type.
positive (negative) coeffi-
represents shares of positive
above 50 % are depicted in
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Table 54: Assessing the factors of Rape: Frequency distribution of coefficient estimates
by sign and significance level
Country
Denmark
Germany
Spain
Italy
The Netherlands
Finland
Sweden
UK
Factors
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR -
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
+10%
31
4
24
12
69
27
0
0
5
3
0
58
0
0
8
33
0
—
97
27
0
6
2
0
0
0
78
0
0
...
0
0
0
0
0
0
— -
—
—
—
—
...
—
—
...
...
...
...
NUTS
+ '
60
54
65
55
27
48
4
51
62
38
10
42
0
0
69
67
27
—
3
43
54
27
16
15
3
43
22
50
4
...
8
41
79
50
11
66
...
—
—
—
—
...
—
—
...
—
—
...
3
-
9
39
11
33
3
25
61
44
29
50
82
0
55
54
23
0
72
...
0
30
44
56
32
28
88
57
0
50
77
...
65
50
21
48
60
34
...
—
...
—
—
...
—
...
...
...
—
...
-10%
0
3
0
1
0
0
35
6
4
8
8
0
45
46
0
0
2
...
0
0
3
11
50
57
9
0
0
0
19
...
27
10
0
2
29
0
_.
...
—
—
—
...
...
...
...
...
...
+10%
._
—
—
—
...
0
0
0
1
0
14
0
0
37
10
1
...
54
29
0
1
2
2
0
1
66
0
0
—
—
—
...
—
...
I o
19
24
! 1 1
7
! 2 7
r 78
0
29
0
0
63
NUTS 2
+
—
—
—
—
—
...
0
23
40
25
37
81
2
5
62
66
39
...
43
40
1
55
53
78
0
53
34
25
11
...
—
—
...
—
...
...
51
66
66
52
60
37
14
26
50
10
23
35
-
—
—
—
—
...
22
18
60
50
63
5
62
39
1
23
60
...
3
31
58
44
32
20
20
46
0
68
66
...
—
—
...
—
...
...
33
15
10
37
31
35
................
56
21
37
42
2
-10%
—
—
—
—
—
...
78
59
0
24
0
0
37
56
0
0
0
...
0
0
42
0
13
0
80
0
0
7
23
—
—
—
—
—
...
—
_ _ _
0
0
1
3
1
0™ -
18
0
52
35
0
Note: "+10 %" (and "-10%", respectively) indicate the percentage share of positive (negative) coeffi-
cient estimates that are significant at the 10 percent or higher level."+" (-) represents shares of positive
(negative) estimates below the 10 % significance level. Significant shares above 50 % are depicted in
bold type.
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Table 55: Assessing the factors of Serious Assault: Frequency distribution of coefficient
estimates by sign and significance level
Country
Denmark
Germany
Spain
Italy
The Netherlands
Finland'
Sweden
UK
Factors
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
+10%
5
60
63
9
0
24
100
80
30
0 >
0
34
0 •
68
4
86
84
. „
98
79
57
61
0
2
0
6
87
0
6
...
9
42
1
9
0
26
...
...
...
...
— .
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
NUTS 3
+
, 34
18
34
48
0
47
0
15
6
0
0
33
28
26
62
14 ,
16
...
2 L
21
43
34
43
46
30
71
13
0
50
...
51
20
70
21
0
44
... .
—
...
...
—
...
—
...
...
—
...
...
-
30
20
3
41
3 -
21
0
5
30
42 -
0
32
5 4 ••
2
34
0
o •
. . .
0
0 V
0.
6
50
24
65
23
0
9
27
...
20
28
28
45
31 =
29
....
—
—
— .
. —
...
—
...
—
—
...
....
• - • •
- 1 0 %
31
2
0
3
97
8
0
0
34
58
100
0
19
3
0
0
0
...
0
0
0
0
7
28
5
0
0
91
17
...
20
10
1
26
69
2
...
—
—
—
—
...
—
...
—
—
—
...
+10%
—, -.:
... •
—
. ...
...
98
38
0
0
1
82
0
36
20
32
ro
100
0.
36
70
44
0
0.
1
65
. 0
13
'
...
> ...
• . - • - -
. ' —
. . .ico
68
28,
•'• 1 2 .
19
I . - 1 .
i 65
! 5
11
1
67
! 11
NUTS 2
+
._
....
...
...
...
...
2
35
9
0
68
18
22
41
33
67
67
...
0
19
55
27
51
0
1
62
31
1
43
...
—
...
—
—
—
...
40
28
38
45
35
54
33
30
70
21
33
41
-
...
...
...
...
...
...
0
21
57
4
30
0
63
11
48
2
12
...
0
54
9
4
5
18
64
36
4
52
39
...
—
...
—
—
—
...
40
4
32
32
41
44
_ _
39
19
55
0
44
-10%
...
...
...
...
...
...
0
6
34
96
0
0
15
11
0
0
0
...
0 :
27
0
0
0
82
. . 36
0
0
47
6
i
—
—
—
—
. . .
• • 7 . •
0
2
11
4
2
0
26
0
23
0
4
Note: "+10 %" (and "-10%", respectively) indicate the percentage share of
cient estimates that are significant at the 10 percent or higher level . "+" (-)
(negative) estimates below the 10 % significance level. Significant shares
bold type.
positive (negative) coeffi-
represents shares of positive
above 50 % are depicted in .
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Table 56: Assessing the factors of Total Theft: Frequency distribution of coefficient es-
timates by sign and significance level
Note: "+10 %" (and "-10%", respectively) indicate the percentage share of positive (negative) coeffi-
cient estimates that are significant at the 10 percent or higher level."+" (-) represents shares of positive
(negative) estimates below the 10 % significance level. Significant shares above 50 % are depicted in
bold type.
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Country
Denmark
Germany
Spain
Italy
The Netherlands
Finland
Sweden
UK
Factors
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
+10%
3
20
34
14
0
15
65
22
21
24
0
67
0
22
51
56
30
...
100
36
62
61
0
89
0
0
56
63
33
...
11
37
0
7
42
3
...
—
—
—
—
...
—
—
—
—
—
...
NUTS 3
+
22
42
44
50
28
54
6
0
12
30
0
31
3
15
38
42
61
—
0
12
28
23
15
8
0
12
43
36
45
...
31
30
11
44
46
37
—
—
—
—
—
...
—
—
—
—
—
...
-
39
25
22
33
51
30
9
4
9
26
5
3
33
27
11
2
8
—
0
12
10
14
65
3
66
23
0
1
22
...
32
26
86
45
12
45
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
...
-10%
37
13
0
3
21
1
21
74
57
20
95
0
64
36
0
0
0
...
0
41
0
2
20
0
34
64
0
0
0
...
26
7
3
5
0
15
—
—
—
—
—
...
—
—
—
—
—
...
+10%
—
_.
._
...
...
...
33
0
24
6
0
0
0
33
2
14
2
...
74
28
49
38
1
65
0
0
12
38
11
..
...
—
...
12
13
79
2
22
4
I 27
20
45
84
2
51
NUTS 2
+
—
—
...
...
_.
...
31
2
36
17
9
14
12
14
68
49
29
...
22
17
32
28
29
23
11
10
61
56
81
...
—
_.
...
—
—
—
34
27
20
16
65
58
35
7
37
15
11
18
-
—
—
—
—
—
...
11
21
33
28
51
49
31
26
31
36
53
---
3
10
18
22
56
12
89
47
25
6
8
...
—
...
...
—
—
_.
37
34
0
36
12
8
24
8
15
1
34
20
-10%
—
—
j
. „
„ .
. _
24
78
7
50
40
36
56
27
0
0
17
—
0
44
1
12
14
0
0
43
2
0
0
...
—
...
—
—
—
...
17
25
0
47
1
31
14
65
3
0
52
11
Table 57: Assessing the factors of Aggravated Theft: Frequency distribution of coeffi-
cient estimates by sign and significance level
Country
Denmark
Germany
Spain
Italy
The Netherlands
Finland
Sweden
UK;
Factors
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP • '
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
.DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS.
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
+10%
8
33
52
0
48
11
47
22
16
8
0
15
0
33
53
74
0
—
100
12
56
6
7
91
6
0
66
53
6
...
19
44
0
3
45
3
...
..i.-
. . .
—
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
—
NUTS 3
+
37
11
37
7
44
43
9
0
17
20
0
38 ':..
14
15'
39
25
—
0
26
40
20
63
9
55
14
29
45
25
...-
37
40
4
58
53
61
— •
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
—
. . .
. . ^
. . .
. . .
- '
:
33
36
11
46
7
30
10
6
14
28
6
39-
53
38
8
1
75
... •
0
27
4
40
29
o-:
39
20 :
5
3
50
27
15
81
28
2
36
...
...
...
—
—
...
—
—
...
...
...
...
-10%
22
19
0
47
0
16
34
72
53
43
94
8
33
14
0
0
16
—
0
36
0
34
1
0
0
67
0
0
19
...
17
1
15
12
0
0
—
—
—
—
—
...
—
—
_.
...
—
—
+10%
...
...
...
...
...
17
•o
30
' 8
0
' 0
0
35
• 31
•
;
 17
0
•.' —
100
4
53
• 8
20
35
12
0 ;
' 36
41
9
. - • —
• —
—
- —
• • . . . .
• „.
. —
13
10
82
0
22
39
24
27
34
63
2
61
NUTS
+
...
...
...
...
...
...
29
1
41
21
3
0
4
14
60
44
5
...
0
43
31
21
51
56
67
7
40
53
82
...
...
—
—
—
—
...
38
35
17
20
63
28
39
11
45
28
14
16
2
-
...
...
...
...
...
...
22
20
28
33
22
7
23
33
9
32
40
...
0
24
16
42
28
9
21
23
20
6
10
...
—
—
—
—
—
...
35
40
1
52
14
4
27
8
20
8
44
21
-10%
... .
...
—
...
—
i|
31
78
1
38
75
93
73
18
0
7
55 |
0
28 *
1
29
1
0
or
70
4
o
0
• • - . . •
_
—
—
—
—
14 :
15
0
28
1
29
11
54
1
1
39
2
Note: "+10 %" (and "-10%", respectively) indicate the percentage share of
cient estimates that are significant at the 10 percent or higher level."+" (-)
(negative) estimates below the 10 % significance level. Significant shares
bold type.
positive (negative) coeffi-
represents shares of positive
above 50 % are depicted in
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Table 58: Assessing the factors of Robberv and Violent Theft: Frequency distribution of
coefficient estimates by sign and significance level
Country
Denmark
Germany
Spain
Italy
The Netherlands
Finland
Sweden
UK
Factors
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
+10%
0
13
25
0
5
4
100
29
32
39
0
89
3
6
22
60
1
—
100
0
80
88
0
40
29
0
98
0
1
—
1
2
5
33
10
1
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
...
NUTS 3
+ '
26
50
64
33
35
32
0
14
58
21
0
11
26
27
€5
25
7
...
0 .
10
20
12
40
60
64
0
2
1
25
—
18
33
75
30
35
38
—
—
— .
—
—
...
—
—
—
—
—
...
-
46
36
11
67
56
61
0
25
10
14
0
0
53
32
13
14
26
...
0
59
0
0
53
0
8
0
0
44
38
...
55
36
20
3
36
55
—
—
—
—
—
...
—
—
—
—
—
...
-10%
28
1
0
1
5
3
0
32
0
25
100
0
19
35
0
1
67
—
0
31
0
0
7
0
0
100
0
55
36
...
26
29
0
33
18
6
—
—
—
—
—
...
—
—
—
—
...
+10%
—
—
—
...
...
100
14
4
0
39
89
1
23
0
10
1
...
98
0
67
21
11
67
0
0
75
8
0
—
...
—
—
j
...
—
I 14
I 20
I 55
I 2i 4
! o
| 73
10
1
21
0
| 99
NUTS 2
+
_
._
...
_.
._
0
26
51
6
43
11
11
14
19
30
5
...
2
0
27
64
61
33
16
0
25
45
9
...
._
...
...
—
...
. ...
47
42
44
16
37
3
21
14
13
25
17
1
-
—
...
—
...
...
...
0
40
44
25
16
0
29
17
81
42
30
...
0
39
7
15
28
0
80
19
0
35
37
...
...
...
...
—
...
...
36
30
1
55
50
94
5
18
50
24
44
0
-10%
—
—
—
—
—
...
0
20
1
69
3
0
59
45
0
18
64
...
0
61
0
0
0
0
4
81
0
12
54
—
—
_. j
—
—
...
...
3
9
0
27
9
4
0
58
37
29
39
0
Note: "+10 %" (and "-10%", respectively) indicate the percentage share of positive (negative) coeffi-
cient estimates that are significant at the 10 percent or higher level."+" (-) represents shares of positive
(negative) estimates below the 10 % significance level. Significant shares above 50 % are depicted in
bold type.
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Table 59: Assessing the factors of Breaking and Entering: Frequency distribution of
coefficient estimates by sign and significance level
Country
Denmark'
Germany
Spain
Italy
The Netherlands
Finland
Sweden'
UK
Factors
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH.
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
+10%
8
33
53
0
48
11
0
36
42
0
' 4
33
0
36
57
69
0
...
100
18
34
0
14
99
12
0
50
23
3
...
19
44
0
2
45
3
...
...
...
...
...
—
...
...
...
—
...
NUTS 3
+
38
11
37
7
44
43
0
19
36
5
35
5
6
27
36
29
15
...
0
27
54
17
62
1
35
13
44
' 65
51
...
37
40
-
pi.
59
53
61
...
...
...
—
—
...
—
...
—
—
—
...
-
32
37
10
45
7
31
1
14
22
55
42
60
50
31
7
3
79
...
• 0
25
13
34
^24
0
• 50
20
5
12
27
...
27
14
81
27
2
36
...
...
—
—
—
...
—
—
—
—
—
—
-10%
22
19
0
48
0
15
99
31
0
40
19
2
-44
6
0
0
6
...
0
30
0
50
0
0
4
67
0
0
19
...
17
1
15
12
0
0
....
. ...
...
—
. —
...
—
...
—
—
—
...
+10%
...
—
... •
...
—
— •
0
0
45
2
0
54
0
35
67
24
0
100
17
37
6
26
49
34
0
30
28
21
...
—
—
...
—
—• :
... .
ro
i
9
81
0
22
40
22
28
39
64
2
61
NUTS 2
+
...
...
' • • . —
, —
. . .
1
' : 7
•• 4 7
. 38
34
42
2
26
29
' 50
1
-
0
39
37
• 20
45
44
47
17
46
57
75
...
38
; 36
18
20
63
27
39
- 10
45
27
14
16
-
...
...
...
...
...
...
14
61
8
47
65
3
18
31
5
22
40
...
0
22
24
42
28
7
19
18
20
14
4
...
—
—
—
—
—
35
40
1
53
14
-
pi.
27
8
16
8
45
21
-10%
...
...
...
...
I|
85 |
32 i
0 I
12
1
0
80
7
0
3
59
...
0
21
2
32
0
0
0
64
4
0
0
...
—
—
—
—
14
15
0
27
1
29
12
54
1
1
39
3
Note: "+10 %" (and "-10%", respectively) indicate the percentage share of positive (negative) coeffi-
cient estimates that are significant at the 10 percent or higher level."+" (-) represents shares of positive
(negative) estimates below the 10 % significance level. Significant shares above 50 % are depicted in
bold type.
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Table 60: Assessing the factors of Theft of Motor Cars: Frequency distribution of coeffi-
cient estimates by sign and significance level
Country
Denmark
Germany
Spain
Italy
The Netherlands
Finland
Sweden
UK
Factors
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
+10%
24
0
0
43
0
0
87
9
16
14
0
43
0
28
2
14
42
...
100
46
95
18
24
100
17
0
91
6
0
—
50
21
0
33
76
25
—
—
—
—
—
...
—
—
—
—
I
NUTS 3
+
74
44
39
53
2
56
13
10
58
22
0
53
1
12
25
37
33
...
0
20
5
20
46
0
78
0
9
58
27
—
32
43
19
27
23
62
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
...
—
...
-
2
56
48
3
31
44
0
13
26
29
5
4
14
22
58
48
24
—
0
1
0
28
29
0
5
0
0
27
60
—
17
26
79
36
1
13
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
...
...
...
—
...
-10%
0
1
14
0
67
0
0
68
0
35
95
0
85
39
15
0
0
...
0
33
0
35
0
0
0
100
0
9
13
...
i
10
2
4
0
0
—
—
—
—
—
...
—
—
...
...
—
...
+10%
—
—
—
—
—
...
81
2
12
14
14
0
0
41
0
5
24
...
70
40
79
18
31
93
32
0
57
43
0
—
—
—
—
—
...
...
16
9
66
2
14
1
8
2
18
80
0
48
NUTS 2
+
—
...
...
...
...
—
13
4
62
21
53
6
0
15
18
20
50
—
30
18
19
21
57
7
57
6
38
52
36
—
—
—
—
—
...
...
41
19
30
9
63
38
29
9
38
20
5
23
-
—
...
—
...
—
...
6
11
26
29
25
25
27
19
79
49
17
...
0
14
2
33
12
0
11
47
5
4
59
—
—
—
—
—
—
...
28
37
4
27
21
36
_ _ -
11
35
1
29
23
-10%
—
...
...
I
—
...
0
83
0
36
9
69
73
25
3
25
9
...
0
28
0
28
0
0
0
47
0
0
5
...
—
—
—
—
...
...
16
35 |
0
62
2
26
........ ^ .....
78
8
0
65
7
Note: "+10 %" (and "-10%", respectively) indicate the percentage share of positive (negative) coeffi-
cient estimates that are significant at the 10 percent or higher level."+" (-) represents shares of positive
(negative) estimates below the 10 % significance level. Significant shares above 50 % are depicted in
bold type.
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Table 61: Assessing the factors of Fraud: Frequency distribution of coefficient estimates
by sign and significance level
Country
Denmark
Germany
Spain
Italy
The Netherlands
Finland.
Sweden.
UK
Factors
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR.
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
DRUGS
+10%
3
0
0
0 '
52
20
99
70
.17
0
0
100
50
55
0
0
94
. . . •
. . .
. . .
—
—
—
—
! 29
0
30
0
| 64
...
— '
!
—
—
—
. . . • •
. . .
—
—
. . .
. . .
—
. . .
—
. . .
. . .
. . .
! —
NUTS
+
42
36
27
5
45
32
1
13
43
5
17
0
46
20
14
20
6
...
...
...
—
—
—
— .'
47
37
45
16
20
...
— •
—
—
—
— •
. . .
. . .
—
—
—
—
. . .
. . .
. . .
—
. . .
—
—
co
i
-
54
60
68
49
3
44
0
13
31
16
53
0
4
23
60
62
0
... .
...
—
—
—
—
— \
25
59
25
48
16
...
— .
—
—
—
—
...
... .
— .
—
—
—
...
— .
—
—
...
—
...
-10%
1
4
5
46
0
4
0
4
9
79
30
0
0
2
25
18
0
... ..
...
...
...
— •
...
0
3
0
36
0
...
—
—
—
—
— •
. . . • "
. . .
—
—
— .
—
. . .
—
—
— .
. . .
—
. . .
+10%
...
...
...
...
...
...
82
64
0
0
0
100
48
40
0
37
8
...
...
...
—
—
—
...
0
2
•11
0
11
...
—
—
—
—
—
...
37
0
17
0
0
0
11
23
57
78
3
37
NUTS
+
...
...
...
... -
• —
16
11
37
0
61
0
42
53
22
40
83
...
...
...
. • . . . •
- • . . .
1
53
49
15
. 70
. —
... .
—
—
—
—
— .
55
10
58
21
48
22
co
i
19
22
22
47
53
2
-
...
...
...
...
...
...
2
15
49
12
36
0
10
8
58
23
9
...
...
...
...
—
—
...
69
43
35
34
19
...
—
—
—
—
—
...
7
44
25
47
51
78
46
10
20
0
45
10
I
-10%
— . |
j
|
I
j
|
0 I
10 !
15 |
88
3 |
o !
0 !
o
20 I
0
0
...
...
...
—
—
—
—
31
2
5
51
0
...
—
—
—
—
0
46
0
32
2
0
"12
47
1
0
5
0
Note: "+10 %" (and "-10%", respectively) indicate the percentage share of positive (negative) coeffi-
cient estimates that are significant at the 10 percent or higher level."+" (-) represents shares of positive
(negative) estimates below the 10 % significance level. Significant shares above 50 % are depicted in
bold type.
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Table 62: Assessing the factors of Drug Offences: Frequency distribution of coefficient
estimates by sign and significance level
Country
Denmark
Germany
Spain
Italy
The Netherlands
Finland
Sweden
UK
Factors
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
GDP
UR
WPOP
BIRTH
AGRAR
+10%
7
26
77
71
3
100
84
90
19
0
...
—
...
—
...
100
73
43
0
0
—
—
—
—
...
10
94
15
37
0
—
—
—
—
—
...
—
—
—
...
•
NUTS 3
+
39
52
23
24
63
0
11
10
14
0
...
...
—
—
—
0
27
56
0
4
—
—
—
—
...
24
6
56
49
33
—
—
—
—
...
...
—
—
—
...
-
38
21
0
5
33
0
5
0
0
0
_.
...
...
—
...
0
0
1
3
50
—
...
—
—
—
45
0
28
14
43
—
—
—
—
...
...
—
—
—
...
-10%
16
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
67
100
._
...
...
—
._
0
0
0
97
46
—
--
—
—
—
21
0
1
0
23
—
—
—
—
...
—
—
—
—
...
+10%
—
...
—
...
...
96
84
54
0
0
...
—
—
—
—
100
37
50
0
1
—
...
—
—
...
—
—
—
—
...
0
0
0
3
2
96
6
5
8
1
NUTS 2
+
...
...
—
...
...
4
15
39
10
0
...
...
...
—
...
0
45
45
0
15
—
...
—
—
...
—
—
—
...
...
41
28
4
58
70
4
14
60
19
54
-
—
—
—
...
...
0
2
8
33
4
._
._
_.
—
—
0
18
5
11
43
—
...
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
...
59
69
90
39
28
0
24
29
34
40
-10%
—
—
—
...
i
" 6 "
o !
0
57
96
_ •
i
;
„
0
0
0
89
42
—
...
—
—
...
• —
—
— i
—
. . .
1
2
6
0
o
 i
o
56
5
40
4
Note: "+10 %" (and "-10%", respectively) indicate the percentage share of positive (negative) coeffi-
cient estimates that are significant at the 10 percent or higher level."+" (-) represents shares of positive
(negative) estimates below the 10 % significance level. Significant shares above 50 % are depicted in
bold type.
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Table 63: The consequences of murder for the growth rates of real GDP per capita and employment
Denmark Germany
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita
Spain Italy The Netherlands
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Finland Sweden United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS'2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LOl(-l)
GROWTH(-l)
1.318
(1.871)
-0.728
(-1.412)
0.000
(-0.028)
-0.495
(-4.741)
-1.617
(-
12.522)
0.506
(4.218)
0.000
(-0.128)
0.150
(5.874)
-2.652
(-8.581)
-0.198
(-0.995)
-0.011
(-1.214)
-0.019
(-0.282)
0.286
(1.827)
0.233
(3.818)
-0.006
(-1.550)
-0.134
(-3.090)
0.618
(2.150)
0.175
(1.278)
0.000
(0.012)
-0.105
(-1.423)
1.896
(13.191)
0.070
(2.238)
0.001
(0.513)
-0.075
(-2.331)
1.607
(6.182)
0.103
(1.287)
-0.002
(-0.744)
-0.168
(-2.817)
-0.588
(-0.927)
-0.052
(-0.210)
0.001
(0.171)
-0.317
(-3.547)
-0.379
(-0.315)
-0.582
(-1.064)
0.007
(0.461)
-0.565
(-3.100)
-0.978
(-0.770)
-1.930
(-1.238)
-0.004
(-0.287)
0.122
(0.929)
1.096
(1.091)
2.042
(1.107) .
-0.032
(-1.632)
0.142
(0.846)
2.124
(1.683)
-1.223
(-1.040)
-0.006
(-0.517)
0.010
(0.097)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
81
0.250
2.713
1603 214 552 204 869
0.197 0.323 0.032 0.072 0.182
2.147 2.109 1.839 1.577 2.258
240 175 50 75
0.217 -0.052 0.060 -0.205
1.898 2.121 2.127 2.425
42
-0.119
2.211
128
-0.061
2.090
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LOl(-l)
DEMPLT(-l)
0.908
(2.788)
0.367
(1.903)
0.001
(0.264)
0.292
(2.661)
-1.238
(-
16.325)
0.393
(5.702)
-0.001
(-0.728)
0.1.88
(7.407)
-1.927
(-9.472)
0.029
(0.156)
-0.015
(-2.861)
0.116
(1.876)
0.474
(4.179)
0.037
(0.838)
-0.002
(-0.674)
0.112
(2.778)
0.378
(1.649)
0.125
(1.144)
0.009
(1.549)
0.082
(1.187)
0.395
(2.939)
0.059
(1.989)
0.001
(1.168)
0.169
•' (4.795)
-0.114
(-0.329)
-0.033
(-0.317)
-0.003
(-0.644)
-0.008
(-0.122)
2.132
(2.876)
-0.390
(-1.440)
0.000
(-0.003)
-0.538
(-8.563)
2.894
(2.895)
0.006
(0.017)
-0.003
(-0.224)
-0.539
(-3.693)
1.228
(1.565)
0.654
(0.610)
0.003
(0.342)
0.499
(4.269)
1.887
(3.140)
2.028
(1.801)
-0.015
(-1.235)
0.517
(3.945)
4.071
(4.278)
-0.341
(-0.395)
-0.020
(-2.119)
0.268
(3.137)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
113
0.157
2.030
1609
— 0.376
— , 2.048
192
0.594
1.836
552
0.122
1.930
204
0.150
1.569
869
0.052
1.926
240
-0.078
1.542
209
0.241
2.377
59
0.269
2.523
75
0.146
2.821
42
0.289
1.977
110
0.185
2.186
176
Table 64: The consequences of sex offences for the growth rates of real GDP per capita and employment
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita
Denmark Germany
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Spain Italy The Netherlands
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Finland Sweden United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LO2(-1)
GROWTH(-l)
-1.445
(-
12.023)
0.480
(4.381)
-0.003
(-1.044)
0.167
(6.751)
-2.686
(-8.863)
-0.153
(-0.770)
-0.028
(-2.020)
0.010
(0.158)
0.293
(1.870)
0.227
(3.721)
0.000
(0.016)
-0.129
(-2.975)
0.494
(1.703)
0.202
(1.492)
-0.031
(-1.956)
-0.107
(-1.470)
-0.706 -0.353
(-1.115) (-0.293)
-0.044
(-0.180)
-0.012
-0.608
(-1.117)
-0.004
(-1.488) (-0.213)
-0.301 -0.549
(-3.367) (-2.918)
-0.962
(-0.764)
-2.128
(-1.354)
0.012
(0.804)
0.104
(0.784)
0.076
(0.067)
2.881
(1.468)
0.064
(1.424)
0.126
(0.747)
1.913
(1.512)
-1.295
(-1.075)
-0.012
(-0.431)
0.010
(0.094)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
1693 223
0.202 0.340
2.131 2.141
552 204
0.027 0.091
1.844 1.622
175 50
-0.036 0.055
2.124 2.093
75
-0.193
2.453
42
-0.140
2.170
128
-0.062
2.104
Dependent variable: Growth rate of employment
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LO2(-1)
DEMPLT(-l)
-1.140
(-
15.948)
0.388
(6.003)
0.002
(0.837)
0.203
(8.165)
-1.906
(-9.442)
0.092
(0.520)
0.017
(2.058)
0.128
(2.074)
0.481
(4.240)
0.037
(0.830)
0.005
(1.159)
0.111
(2.768)
0.295
(1.253)
0.158
(1.433)
-0.012
(-0.914)
0.081
(1.164)
2.231
(2.998)
-0.400
(-1.487)
0.008
(0.833)
-0.538
(-8.621)
2.849
(2.918)
0.030
(0.084)
-0.004
(-0.322)
-0.538
(-3.750)
1.162
(1.497)
0.356
(0.327)
0.011
(1.045)
0.477
(4.040)
1.081
(1.703)
2.781
(2.491)
0.059
(2.309)
0.548
(4.373)
3.530
(3.679)
-0.593
(-0.649)
-0.022
(-1.070)
0.292
(3.365)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
1699
0.371
1.960
201
0.584
1.917
552
0.124
1.932
204
0.143
1.586
210
0.245
2.364
60
0.273
2.531
75
0.161
2.762
42
0.361
2.058
110
0.155
2.339
177
Table 65: The consequences of rape for the growth rates of real GDP per capita and employment
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita
Denmark Germany
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Spain Italy The Netherlands Finland
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3
Sweden United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LO21(-1)
GROWTH(-l)
1.360
(2.024)
-0.655
(-1.350)
-0.013
(-1.341)
-0.507
(-5.032)
-1.438
(-
11.997)
0.485
(4.447)
-0.002
(-1.351)
0.166
(6.710)
-2.716
(-8.858)
-0.167
(-0.833)
-0.012
(-1.313)
-0.009
(-0.133)
0.292
(1.864)
0.229
(3.742)
-0.002
(-0.400)
-0.129
(-2.985)
0.596
(2.081)
0.202
(1.457)
-0.009
(-0.942)
-0.104
(-1.416)
1.
(13
0.
(2-
899
.381)
067
131)
-0.002
(-1
-0
(-2
.674)
.077
.372)
1.653
(6.406)
0.095
(1.180)
-0.003
(-0.740)
-0.165
(-2.759)
-0.575
(-0.909)
-0.049
(-0.198)
0.002
(0.265)
-0.319
(-3.556)
-0.380
(-0.319)
-0.635
(-1.184)
0.014
(0.887)
-0.590
(-3.209)
-0.930
(-0,731)
-1.836
(-1.163)
-0.002
(-0.156)
0.124
(0.936)
0.562
(0.567)
2.231
(1.217)
0.046
(1.800)
0.217
(1.225)
2.111
(1.594)
-1.358
(-0.942)
-0.005
(-0.217)
0.015
(0.142)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
81
0.270
2.745
1693
0.202
2.132
223
0.332
2.134
552 204
0.028 0.076
1.846 1.592
869
0.185
2.253
240
0.217
1.897
175 50
-0.052 0.075
2.125 2.184
75
-0.206
2.445
42
-0.101
2.179
128
-0.064
2.094
Dependent variable: Growth rate of employment
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LO21(-1)
DEMPLT(-l)
0.822
(2.691)
0.317
(1.753)
-0.014
(-3.712)
0.309
(3.017)
-1.144
(-
16.032)
0.380
(5.908)
-0.001
(-0.933)
0.203
(8.169)
-2.011
(-9.974)
0.037
(0.207)
-0.015
(-2.540)
0.129
(2.109)
0.477
(4.201)
0.035
(0.794)
0.001
(0.235)
0.110
(2.710)
0.333
(1.449)
0.161
(1.444)
-0.006
(-0.727)
0.088
(1.273)
0.378
(2.841)
0.057
(1.932)
-0.001
(-1.035)
0.172
(4.891)
-0.026
(-0.076)
-0.055
(-0.533)
-0.009
(-1.613)
0.002
(0.032)
2.120
(2.882)
-0.403
(-1.494)
-0.005
(-0.586)
-0.536
(-8.575)
2.882
(2.948)
0.021
(0.058)
0.000
(-0.032)
-0.535
(-3.723)
1.176
(1.487)
0.561
(0.514)
0.003
(0.259)
0.498
(4.246)
1.598
(2.717)
2.054
(1.863)
0.026
(1.724)
0.583
(4.276)
3.474
(3.478)
0.080
(0.075)
0.010
(0.672)
0.280
(3.218)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
113
0.261
2.061
1699
0.371
1.965
201
0.589
1.900
552
0.121
1.927
204
0.141
1.579
869
0.052
1.925
240
-0.068
1.569
210
0.244
2.390
60
0.271
2.524
75
0.145
2.795
42
0.318
1.983
118
0.148
2.257
178
Table 66: The consequences of serious assault for the growth rates of real GDP per capita and employment
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita
Denmark Germany
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Spain Italy The Netherlands
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Finland Sweden United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LO3(-1)
GROWTH(-l)
1.260
(1.873)
-0.442
(-0.842)
0.032
(1.352)
-0.499
(-4.971)
-1.415
(-
11.801)
0.434
(3.917)
-0.013
(-2.630)
0.166
(6.690)
-2.610
(-8.352)
-0.244
(-1.227)
-0.018
(-0.944)
-0.003
(-0.047)
0.906 1.382 1.876 1.609 -0.768 -0.389
(4.238) (4.121) (13.251) (6.338) (-1.208) (-0.329)
0.222 0.204 0.067 0.086
(3.570) (1.778) (2.146) (1.087)
-0.004 -0.011 -0.004 -0.013
(-1.073) (-1.620) (-2.012) (-2.488)
-0.127 -0.200 -0.078 -0.181
0.014 -0.525
(0.056) (-0.974)
0.021 0.026
(1.657) (1.144)
-0.323 -0.590
(-2.750) (-2.676) (-2.407) (-3.066) (-3.648) (-3.257)
-0.894
(-0.723)
-2.162
(-1.420)
0.117
(1.672)
0.024
(0.172)
-2.322
(-1.519)
2.302
(1.316)
0.279
(2.588)
0.065
(0.412)
1.093
(0.837)
-1.192
(-1.034)
0.032
(2.006)
-0.032
(-0.316)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
81
0.271
2.739
1693
0.205
2.131
223
0.329
2.089
460 170
0.105 0.231
2.120 2.214
869
0.186
2.255
240
0.236
1.919
175 50
-0.032 0.087
2.156 2.205
75
-0.149
2.336
42
-0.002
2.392
128
-0.025
2.173
Dependent variable: Growth rate of employment
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LO3(-1)
DEMPLT(-l)
0.894
(2.736)
0.417
(1.814)
0.004
(0.396)
0.290
(2.657)
-1.137
(-
15.933)
0.362
(5.545)
-0.006
(-1.928)
0.199
(7.986)
-1.902
(-9.427)
-0.101
(-0.521)
-0.029
(-2.119)
0.136
(2.206)
1.215
(7.448)
-0.019
(-0.401)
-0.001
(-0.340)
0.093
(1.956)
1.079
(3.807)
-0.034
(-0.336)
-0.007
(-1.158)
0.291
(3.603)
0.369
(2.778)
0.060
(2.014)
0.000
(-0.019)
0.173
(4.889)
-0.063
(-0.185)
-0.019
(-0.184)
0.006
(0.865)
-0.010
(-0.143)
2.058
(2.782)
-0.333
(-1.204)
0.012
(0.839)
-0.539
(-8.633)
2.879
(2.959)
0.023
(0.060)
0.000
(0.012)
-0.534
(-3.732)
1.158
(1.486)
0.401
(0.368)
0.043
(0.850)
0.441
(3.266)
-0.594
(-0.703)
2.339
(2.382)
0.211
(3.525)
0.443
(3.871)
3.078
(3.011)
-0.310
(-0.354)
0.019
(1.520)
0.283
(3.296)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
113
0.158
2.037
1699
0.372
1.964
201
0.585
1.793
460
0.218
1.794
170
0.286
1.726
869
0.051
1.927
240
-0.077
1.536
210
0.245
2.363
60
0.271
2.520
75
0.155
2.689
42
0.463
2.217
110
0.166
2.315
179
Table 67: The consequences of theft (all kinds of theft) for the growth rates of real GDP per capita and employment
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita
Spain Italy The Netherlands Finland Sweden United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Denmark Germany
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LO4(-1)
GROWTH(-l)
1.192
(1.852)
-1.083
(-2,263)
-0.171
(-2.834)
-0.589
(-5.803)
-1.312
(-
10.934)
0.365
(3.330)
-0.050
(-6.213)
0.123
(4.828)
-2:437
(-8.121)
-0.178
(-0.935)
-0.091
(-3.979)
-0.121
(-1.706)
0.
(I-
0.
(3.
-0
(-0
-0
(-3
296
889)
242
839)
.011
.932)
.130
.011)
0.647
(2.296)
0.284
(2.016)
-0.058
(-2.490)
-0.135
(-1.841)
1.536
(9.667)
0.048
(1.542)
-0.018
(-4.645)
-0.100
(-3.078)
1.153
(3.830)
0.034
(0.414)
-0.028
(-2.942)
-0.186
(-3.165)
-0.567.
(-0.898)
-0,059
(-0.241)
-0.013
(-0.543)
-0.311
(-3.453)
-0.338
(-0.281)
-0.612
(-1.121)
-0.006
(-0:134)
-0.555
(-3.005)
-1.348
(-1.091)
-0.486
(-0.297)
0.188
(2.087)
0.135
(1.070)
-0.892
(-0.622)
-0.769
(-0.308)
-0.187
(-1.637)
0.077
(0.463)
1.839
(1.364)
-0.953
(-0.706)
0.011
(0.335)
0.025
(0.219)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
81
0.333
2.605
1693
0.223
2.106
223
0.378
2.077
552 204
0.029 0.102
1.841 1.578
869
0-2.04
2.278
240
0.245
1.931
175 50
-0.050 0.055
2.110 2.098
75
-0.120
2.520
42
-0.118
2.041
128
-0.063
2.126
Dependent variable: Growth rate of employment
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LO4(-1)
DEMPLT(-l)
0.884
(3.022)
0.186
(1.049)
-0.112
(-4.815)
0.133
(1.288)
-1.027
( - •
14.656)
0.261
(4.108)
-0.043
(.9.727)
0.166
(6.824)
-1.587
(-9.068)
0.078
(0.520)
-0.093
(-8.527)
0.060
(1.137)
0.475
(4.183)
0.031
(0.685)
0.004
(0.480)
0.109
(2.680)
0.372
(1.632)
0.198
(1.774)
-0.035
(-1.929)
0.098
(1.417)
0.297
(1.946)
0.054
(1.773)
-0.004
(-0.956)
0.176
(4.981)
0.318
(0.770)
0.036
(0.328)
0.023
(1.686)
-0.042
(-0.612)
2.158
(2.960)
-0.360
(-1.348)
-0.050
(-1.833)
-0.544
(-8.777)
2.873
(2.988)
0.127
(0.344)
-0.040
(-1.049)
-0.557
(-3.892)
1,078
(1.384)
1.184
(1.029)
0.077
(1.231)
0.494
(4.278)
0.167
(0.206)
-0.439
(-0.315)
-0.176
(-2.666)
0.405
(3.218)
4.304
(4.256)
-1.169
(-1.167)
-0.048
(-1.704)
0.140
(1.159)
Number of Obs;
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
113
0.319
1.970
1699
0.411
2.009
201
0.703
2.090
552
0.122
1.924
204
0.156
1.608
869
0.052
1.937
240
-0.066
1.514
210
0.257
2.440
60
0.288
2.603
75
0.167
2.813
42
0.390
1.910
110
0.171
2.058
180
Table 68: The consequences of aggravated theft for the growth rates of real GDP per capita and employment
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita
Denmark
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Germany
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Spain Italy The Netherlands Finland Sweden United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LO41(-1)
GROWTH(-l)
1.087
(1.644)
-0.532
(-1.115)
-0.078
(-2.345)
-0.610
(-5.586)
-1.370
(-
11.338)
0.413
(3.732)
-0.022
(-3.564)
0.141
(5.464)
-2.579
(-8.607)
-0.275
(-1.422)
-0.057
(-3.194)
-0.084
(-1.204)
0.264
(1.679)
0.239
(3.892)
-0.017
(-1.647)
-0.130
(-3.007)
0.467
(1.596)
0.262
(1.858)
-0.046
(-2.043)
-0.124
(-1.699)
1.573
(10.234)
0.039
(1.254)
-0.017
(-4.863)
-0.098
(-3.044)
1.248
(4.087)
0.041
(0.486)
-0.021
(-2.294)
-0.186
(-3.117)
-0.516
(-0.807)
-0.041
(-0.165)
-0.010
(-0.612)
-0.316
(-3.543)
-0.273
(-0.223)
-0.616
(-1.139)
-0.011
(-0.282)
-0.557
(-3.057)
-1.215
(-0.975)
-1.378
(-0.893)
0.086
(1.682)
0.094
(0.729)
-0.096
(-0.086)
-0.032
(-0.015)
-0.138
(-1.720)
0.050
(0.297)
1.259
(0.897)
-0.346
(-0.251)
0.025
(1.136)
0.033
(0.314)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
81
0.309
2.732
1693 223
0.209 0.361
2.101 2.071
552 204
0.033 0.092
1.839 1.586
869
0.206
2.289
240
0.233
1.927
175 50
-0.050 0.056
2.110 2.092
75
-0.149
2.436
42
-0.109
2.084
128
-0.051
2.188
Dependent variable: Growth rate of employment
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LO41(-1)
DEMPLT(-l)
0.772
(2.537)
0.322
(1.792)
-0.057
(-3.922)
0.147
(1.360)
-1.055
(-
15.030)
0.272
(4.264)
-0.030
(-8:807)
0.156
(6.279)
-1.820
(-
10.455)
-0.078
(-0.504)
-0.070
(-7.954)
0.040
(0.741)
0.474
(4.153)
0.037
(0.829)
-0.002
(-0.268)
0.113
(2.776)
0.228
(0.982)
0.205
(1.846)
-0.039
(-2.233)
0.101
(1.466)
0.334
(2.266)
0.056
(1.840)
-0.002
(-0.549)
0.172
(4.897)
0.393
(0.955)
0.056
(0.505)
0.026
(2.025)
-0.029
(-0.433)
2.305
(3.115)
-0.361
(-1.347)
-0.029
(-1.525)
-0.539
(-8.684)
2.918
(2.972)
0.034
(0.095)
-0.009
(-0.281)
-0.536
(-3.745)
. 1.020
(1.313)
0.867
(0.817)
0.053
(1.504)
0.467
(3.998)
1.000
(1.575)
0.445
(0.361)
-0.119
(-2.484)
0.385
(2.943)
3.656
(3.438)
-0.306
(-0.294)
0.001
(0.037)
0.287
(2.882)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
113
0.272
2.063
1699
0.404
1.988
201
0.691
2.111
552
0.121
1.930
204
0.162
1.621
869
0.051
1.930
240
-0.060
1.514
210
0.252
2.417
60
0.273
2.533
75
0.177
2.768
42
0.375
1.983
110
0.144
2.269
181
Table 69: The consequences of robberv and violent theft for the growth rates of real GDP per capita and employment
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita
Denmark
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Germany
NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Spain Italy The Netherlands
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS'3 NUTS 2
Finland Sweden United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
L0411(-l)
GROWTH(-l)
0.881
(1.329)
-1.152
(-2.361)
-0.041
(-2.767)
-0.578
(-5.736)
-1.341
11 0881X I . V/OO 1
0.393
(3.559)
-0.014
(-4.485)
0.145
(5.776)
-2.128
(-5.719)
-0.278
(-1.417)
-0.035
(-2.495)
-0.048
(-0.700)
0.257
(1.626)
0.233
(3.816)
-0.011
(-1.586)
-0.136
(-3.143)
0.485
(1.642)
0.228
(1.640)
-0.024
(-1.614)
-0.122
(-1.662)
1.686
(11.502)
0.040
(1.271)
-0.011
(-4.570)
-0.092
(-2.855)
1.428
(5.116)
0.078:
(0.963).
-0.010
(-1.833)
-0.173
(-2.924)
-0.626
(-0.984)
-0.048
(-0.194)
0.005 ..
(0.593)
-0.312
(-3.473)
-0.480
(-0.397)
-0.528
(-0.958)
0.014
(0.762),
-0.553 .
(-3.055)
-0.963
(-0.762)
-1.980
(-1.27.0)
-0.012
(-0.514)
0.121
(0.927)
0.758
(0.736)
1.703
(0.851)
-0.024.
(-0.488)
0.084
(0.474)
0.805
(0.563)
-0.297
(-0.233)
0.023
(1.654)
-0.028
(-0.266)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
81
0.329
2.790
1693
0.213
2.163
223
0.348
2.118
552 204
0.032 0.085
1.838 1.566
869
0.203
2.273
240
0,227
1.917
175 50
-0.050 0.069
2.134 2.132
75
-0.201
2.413
42
-0.203
2.091
128
-0.037
2.142
Dependent variable: Growth rate of employment
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LO411(-1)
DEMPLT(-l)
0.891
(2.724)
0.357
(1.834)
-0.002
(-0.422)
0.272
(2.324)
-1.040
( - - • .
14.653)
0.271
(4.208)
-0.014
(-8.043)
0.187
(7.696)
-1.188
(-5.173)
0.003
(0.018)
-0.042
(-5.625)
0.134
(2.349)
0.449
(3.922)
0.039
(0.877)
-0.008
0.171
(0.727)
0.208
(1.892)
-0.030
(-1.602) (-2.695)
0.111
(2.748)
0.078
(1.140)
0.289
(2.070)
0.048
(1.570)
-0.004
(-1.845)
0.168
(4.776)
-0.192
(-0.512)
-0.046
(-0.435)
-0.006
(-0.726)
-0.011
(-0.165)
2.220
(3.009)
-0.433
(-1.597),
-0.011
(-1.111)
-0.536
2.960
(3.003)
-0.038
(-0.099)
-0.008
(-0.473)
-0.538
(-8.602) (-3.762)
1.206
(1.541)
0.592
: (0.549)
-0.003
(-0.171)
0.498
(4.237)
1.740
(2.868)
1.879
(1.581)
-0.014
(-0.477)
0.483
(3.499)
3.110
(2.974)
0.224
(0.229)
0.013
(1.272)
0.311
(3.510)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
113
0.158
2.034
1699
0.399
2.028
201
0.641
1.849
552
0.126
1.934
204
0.172
1.622
869-
0.055
1.938
240
-0.078
1.551
210
0.247
2.366
60
0.275
2.532
75 -
0.145
2.812
42
0.260
1.970
110
0.159
2.352
182
Table 70: The consequences of breaking and entering for the growth rates of real GDP per capita and employment
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita
Denmark Germany
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Spain Italy The Netherlands Finland
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3
Sweden United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LO412(-1)
GROWTH(-l)
1.093
(1.652)
-0.526
(-1.099)
-0.077
(-2.303)
-0.67
(-6.62)
-1.442
(-
12.465)
0.513
(4.904)
0.000
(-0.122)
0.34
(16.44)
-2.805
(-9.496)
-0.259
(-1.330)
0.011
(1.409)
0.33
(4.75)
0.279
(1.776)
0.236
(3.840)
-0.012
(-1.229)
-0.03
(-0.59)
0.542
(1.886)
0.231
(1.662)
-0.035
(-1.666)
-0.07
(-0.93)
1.593
(10.354)
0.044
(1.389)
-0.015
(-4.558)
-0.02
(-0.72)
1.241
(4.064)
0.039
(0.466)
-0.021
(-2.329)
-0.17
(-2.85)
-0.522
(-0.822)
-0.045
(-0.183)
-0.009
(-0.720)
-0.90
(-7.91)
-0.417
(-0.333)
-0.629
(-1.159)
0.007
(0.217)
-1.14
(-5.49)
-1.219
(-0.978)
-1.379
(-0.894)
0.085
(1.691)
-0.23
(-1.76)
-0.084
(-0.075)
0.014
(0.007)
-0.134
(-1.685)
-0.56
(-3.39)
1.291
(0.925)
-0.348
(-0.252)
0.024
(1.122)
0.27
(3.09)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
81
0.490
2.653
2059
0.194
2.609
235
0.089
2.391
552 204
-0.043 0.010
1.899 1.608
869
0.047
2.063
240
0.059
1.908
175 50
0.167 0.287
2.044 1.987
75
-0.067
2.054
42
0.402
2.700
128
0.283
2.205
Dependent variable: Growth rate of employment
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LO412(-1)
DEMPLT(-l)
0.774
(2.542)
0.324
(1.805)
-0.057
(-3.930)
0.149
(1.385)
-1.167
(-
16.824)
0.421
(6.797)
0.000
(-0.154)
0.206
(8.663)
-1.964
(-9.882)
0.118
(0.666)
-0.004
(-0.969)
0.140
(2.361)
0.478
(4.206)
0.035
(0.787)
0.001
(0.211)
0.110
(2.711)
0.308
(1.337)
0.172
(1.559)
-0.024
(-1.411)
0.103
(1.473)
0.342
(2.325)
0.057
(1.883)
-0.001
(-0.417)
0.172
(4.897)
0.366
(0.889)
0.052
(0.470)
0.024
(1.904)
-0.028
(-0.413)
2.200
(2.973)
-0.381
(-1.417)
-0,012
(-0.778)
-0.540
(-8.642)
2.967
(2.975)
0.036
(0.101)
-0.011
(-0.389)
-0.536
(-3.746)
1.021
(1.313)
0.862
(0.813)
0.052
(1.493)
0.466
(3.990)
1.010
(1.583)
0.480
(0.389)
-0.116
(-2.432)
0.389
(2.968)
3.689
(3.485)
-0.346
(-0.331)
-0.001
(-0.036)
0.284
(2.836)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
113
0.272
2.063
1770
0.389
2.006
210
0.595
1.849
552
0.121
1.926
204
0.148
1.602
869
0.051
1.929
240
-0.063
1.519
210
0.245
2.397
60
0.274
2.533
75
0.177
2.767
42
0.371
1.982
110
0.144
2.261
183
Table 71: The consequences of theft of motor cars for the growth rates of real GDP per capita and employment
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita
Spain Italy The Netherlands Finland Sweden United Kingdom
NUTS. 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS. 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Denmark Germany
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LO42(-1)
GROWTH(-l)
1.451
(2.033)
-0.698
(-1.426)
-0.010
(-0.581)
-0.500
(-4.915)
-1.271 -2.342 0.325 0.534 1.453 0.924 -0.561 -0.220 -0.808
(- (-7.667) (2.091) (1.886) (8.741.) (2.715) (-0.875) (-0.173) (-0.623)
10.762)
0.449 -0.354 0.157 0.346 0.047 0.100 -0.053 -0.647 -1,753
(4.318) (-1.857) (2.456) (2.319) (1.504) (1.283) (-0.217) (-1.180) (-1.117)
-0.020 -0.046 0.022 -0.029 -0.014 -0.023 -0.001 -0.005 -0.015
(-5.772) (-3.846) (3.313) (-2.577) (-4.799) (-3.101) (-0.168) (-0.291) (-0.492)
0.120 -0.119 -0.133 -0.118 -0.106 -0.197 -0.317 -0.570 0.124
(4.909) (-1.795) (-3.114) (-1.631) (-3.268) (-3.322) (-3.550) (-3.063) (0.943)
-0.374
(-0.211)
1.173
(0.546)
-0.080
(-0.816)
0.194
(0.943)
1.967
(1.539)
-1.082
(-0.826)
0.003
(0.162)
0.013
(0.120)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
81
0.254
2.747
1764
0.218
2.085
232
0.381
2.010
552 204
0.048 0.104
1.865 1.579
869
0.205
2.272
240
0.248
1.929
175. . 50
-0.052 0.057
2.120 2.101
75
-0.202
2.452
42
-0.187
2.133
128
-0.064
2.103
Dependent variable: Growth rate of employment
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LO42(-1)
DEMPLT(-l)
1.007
(3.118)
0.321
(1.684)
-0.018
(-2.005)
0.251
(2.304)
-0.992
(-
14.385)
0.345
(5.742)
-0.020
(-
10.438)
0.173
(7.449)
-1.364
(-7.162)
0.083
(0.540)
-0.046
(-7.566)
0.080
(1.521)
0.478
(4.206)
0.033
(0.700)
0.001
(0.240)
0.109
(2.630)
0.269
(1.227)
0.338
(2.986)
-0.037
(-4.354)
0.128
(1.925)
0.155
(0.971)
0.045
(1.504)
-0.007
(-2.414)
0.173
(4.943)
-0.642
" (-1.387)
-0.042
(-0.411)
-o:oi8
(-1.789)
-0.009
(-0.131)
2.124
(2.856)
-0.389
(-1.442)
0.001
(0.075)
-0.538
(-8.602)
2.719
(2.710)
0.065
(0.180)
0.009
(0.617)
-0.548
(-3.798)
1.323
(1.637)
0.720
(0.666)
-0.012
(-0.565)
0.500
(4.292)
0.771
(0.778)
1.272
(0.997)
-0.065
(-1.249)
3.925
(4.103)
-1.008
(-1.035)
-0.026
(-1.580)
0.572
(4.020)
0.194
(1.879)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
113
0.190
2.082
1770
0.432
2.010
210
0.692
1.806
552
0.121
1.923
204
0.220
1.682
869
0.058
1.943
240
-0.065
1.571
210.
0.242
2.375
60
0.277
2!502
75
0.149
2.805
42
0.289
1.946
no
0.167
2.132
184
Table 72: The consequences of fraud for the growth rates of real GDP per capita and employment
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita
Denmark Germany
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Spain Italy The Netherlands
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Finland Sweden United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LO5(-1)
GROWTH(-l)
1.106
(1.654)
-0.507
(-1.041)
-0.031
(-2.014)
-0.472
(-4.753)
-1.500
(-
12.714)
0.565
(5.270)
0.010
(2.747)
0.173
(7.004)
-3.162
(-
10.609)
-0.116
(-0.615)
0.047
(4.597)
0.007
(0.114)
0.286
(1.828)
0.256
(4.039)
-0.010
(-1.653)
-0.137
(-3.163)
0.610
(2.135)
0.159
(1.156)
0.012
(0.811)
-0.100
(-1.357)
-0.543 -0.506 -0.684
(-0.867) (-0.422) (-0.544)
-0.051 -0.557 -2.297
(-0.211) (-1.035) (-1.484)
-0.018 -0.023 -0.052
(-1.691) (-0.971) (-1.470)
-0.333 -0.540 0.008
(-3.747) (-2.983) (0.050)
-0.889
(-0.552)
2.786
(1.423)
-0.071
(-1.346)
0.127
(0.748)
1.938
(1.492)
-1.111
(-0.914)
0.005
(0.204)
0.014
(0.133)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
81
0.294
2.783
1723
0.214
2.122
226
0.404
2.252
552 204
0.033 0.075
1.856 1.566
175 50
-0.031 0.078
2.085 2.054
75
-0.162
2.406
42
-0.147
2.220
128
-0.064
2.102
Dependent variable: Growth rate of employment
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LO5(-1)
DEMPLT(-l)
0.905
(2.720)
0.368
(1.882)
0.000
(-0.012)
0.289
(2.647)
-1.184
(-
16.741)
0.421
(6.632)
-0.001
(-0.394)
0.192
(7.695)
-2.031
(-9.973)
0.109
(0.605)
0.005
(0.807)
0.133
(2.052)
0.473
(4.170)
0.050
(1.094)
-0.006
(-1.290)
0.114
(2.834)
0.341
(1.484)
0.142
(1.297)
0.003
(0.276)
0.084
(1.207)
2.138
(2.903)
-0.393
(-1.459)
-0.003
(-0.239)
-0.536
3.098
(3.089)
0.020
(0.057)
0.017
(0.812)
-0.558
(-8.534) (-3.845)
1.225
(1.606)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.043
(-1.741)
0.361
(2.592)
0.874
(0.911)
2.455
(2.071)
-0.037
(-1.183)
0.492
(3.756)
4.171
(4.136)
-0.683
(-0.750)
-0.028
(-1.421)
0.234
(2.514)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
113
0.156
2.035
1729
0.381
1.928
204
0.592
1.880
552
0.124
1.937
204
0.139
1.571
210
0.242
2.376
60
0.282
2.471
75
0.188
2.884
42
0.286
2.044
no
0.163
2.240
185
Table 73: The consequences of drug offences for the growth rates of real GDP per capita and employment
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita
Denmark Germany
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Spain . Italy . The Netherlands
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2
Finland Sweden United Kingdom
NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 NUTS 2 NUTS3 NUTS 2
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LO7(-1)
GROWTH(-l)
1.015
(1.516)
-0.586
(-1.232)
0.034
(2.244) •
-0.446
(-4.433)
-1.433
(-
12.306)
0.510
(4.861)
-0.002
(-0.688)
0.151
(6.274)
-2.833
(-9.266)
-0.139
(-0.610)
0.006
(0.847)
-0.021
(-0.339)
1.606
(9.987)
0.051
(1.629)
-0.006
(-3.571)
-0.099
1.294(4.035)
0.046
(0.536)
-0.008
(-1.765)
-0.190
(-3.032) (-3.125)
-0.384
(-0.322)
-1.220
(-0.835)
0.038
(2.949)
-0.169
(-1.079)
0.825 • —
(0.805)
2.108
(1.098)
-0.010
(-0.582)
0.098
(0.566)
1.632
(1.172)
-0.833
(-0.641)
0.006
(0.608)
-0.003
(-0.024)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
81
0.304
2.458
1764
0.200
2.104
232
0.338
2.109
869
0.195
2.258
240
0.226
1.883
75
-0.045
2.261
42
-0.199
2.160
128
-0.060
2.092
Dependent variable: Growth rate of employment
GBIRTHRT(-5)
AGRARERT(-5)
LO7(-1)
DEMPLT(-l)
0.886
(2.722)
0.279
(1.273)
-0.005
(-0.832)
0.257
(2.216)
-1.163
(-
16.693)
0.420
(6.774)
-0.001
(-0.607)
0.205
(8.607)
-1.882
(-9.125)
0.034
(0.183)
-0.007
(-1.424)
0.148
(2.496)
0
0
0
0
.158
.036)
.042
.387)
-0.005
(-2
0.
(4,
.734)
.175
.988)
.. -0.288
(-0.667)
-0.070
(-0.614)
-0.005
(-0.789)
-0.003
(-0.044)
1.099
(1.498)
0.585
(0.584)
0.023
(2.800)
0.278
(2.057)
1.754
(2.904)
1.959
(1.698) .
0.006
(0.548)
0.502
(3.774)
3.252
(3.198)
0.228
(0.227)
0.009
(1.153)
0.303
(3.451)
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-squared
DW Statistic
113
0.162
2.047
1770
0.390
2.007
210
0.597
1.806
869
0.060
1.926
240
-0.077
1.542
75
0.249
2.679
42
0.262
1.993
no
0.156
2.304
186
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